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1 Introduction 
 
Globalization is an ongoing process in which countries are becoming more and more 
integrated with each other. According to Friedman (2005), this process has even resulted in 
a ‘flat world’, referring to the world as a level-playing field where all competitors from all 
countries have equal opportunities. The general term for globalization can be used to 
describe several types of integration, like economic, political or cultural integration. In this 
dissertation the term globalization refers to economic integration. The most important 
driver of this process is probably technological progress. Although the term globalization 
became popular in the 1990s, the process of economic integration started many centuries 
ago. Historic sources neatly describe that international trade routes were established as 
early as 3000 B.C. (Frank, 1998). A more recent wave of globalization started in the 
sixteenth century. Global trade increased substantially after Columbus discovered America 
in 1492 and Vasco da Gama travelled around Africa in 1498 (O’Rourke and Williamson, 
2002). Advances in maritime technology allowed European countries like Spain, Portugal, 
and the Netherlands to explore, expand and trade over long distances (Maddison, 2001). De 
Vries and Van der Woude (1997) argue that the Netherlands was the first modern economy. 
The high level of international integration of the Netherlands contributed to this.  
The first phase of modern globalization started in the nineteenth century, when 
technological advances like steamships and railroads considerably reduced transportation 
costs (O’Rourke and Williamson, 2002). Additionally, in the twentieth century, it became 
possible to travel and transport goods much faster due to advances in aviation technology. 
Baldwin (2006) argues that the reduction of transportation costs caused the ‘first 
unbundling’, which ended the necessity to produce goods in the same location as they are 
consumed. In addition to a reduction in transportation costs, this period was characterized 
by international integration of capital markets (see, e.g., Taylor, 1996; Obstfeld and Taylor, 
1998). Another important development in the twentieth century was the large reduction in 
communication costs. As a result of lower communication and coordination costs it became 
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possible to fragmentize the production process (Baldwin, 2006). He refers to this as the 
‘second unbundling’, a period in which firms did not only trade in goods, but also in tasks, 
that were previously untradeable. This has important implications for how globalization 
affects firms and workers (Baldwin, 2006; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008).  
The International Monetary Fund distinguishes four types of economic globalization, 
which are (i) trade, (ii) capital movements, (iii) migration, and (iv) dissemination of 
knowledge (IMF, 2000). This dissertation focuses on two of these four types, which are 
trade and migration. These two types of globalization also impact the dissemination of 
knowledge, since trade and migration can potentially increase the rate of diffusion of 
knowledge. Special attention is given to outsourcing, which consists of trade in 
intermediates. Trends in globalization may provide challenges for firms on how they should 
organize their production process. As a result of global competition, firms may be forced to 
change their production process in order to remain competitive. For example, firms are 
constantly facing the question whether they should perform a task internally or externally. 
They are facing a trade-off between higher production costs and higher transaction costs. 
Migration is discussed in the context of its effects on the diversity of the labour force. A 
diverse labour force can potentially increase productivity if it leads to an increase in 
innovative ideas, but it might also decrease productivity as a result of higher transaction 
costs within the firm. 
Notwithstanding the various ways in which globalization manifests itself, trade is 
clearly the first manifestation that comes to mind. The large increase in global trade in the 
last century was indicative for the process of globalization that occurred in this period. 
Figure 1.1 compares the development of global trade in goods with the development of 
global GDP, between 1870 and 2008. The average annual increase in global trade volume 
in goods was 3.4 percent between 1870 and 1913, 0.9 percent between 1913 and 1950, 7.9 
percent between 1950 and 1973, and 5.1 percent between 1973 and 1998 (Maddison, 2001). 
In most of these periods, the interwar period being an exception, the global trade volume 
growth exceeded the growth of global GDP. This means that the world experienced an 
increase in openness and that the economies of countries became more integrated with each 
other. The relatively strong growth of global trade between 1870 and 1913 was partly 
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caused by decreasing transportation costs in that period (see, e.g., OECD, 1968; Harley, 
1989). Hummels (1999) argues that the high growth of global trade after 1950 cannot be 
explained by declining transportation costs exclusively. Other explanations for the increase 
in global trade in this period are less restrictive trade policies as well as the revolution in 
communication technology.  
 
Figure 1.1. Index of global trade of goods and GDP, 1870–2008 (1870 = 1) 
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Source: development of GDP (1870–2008) and development of trade in goods (1870–1998) is based on 
interpolations based on Maddison (2001). Development of trade in goods (1999–2008) is based on the CPB 
world trade monitor.  
 
Although global trade has increased faster than global GDP, according to Trefler (1995) 
and Davis et al. (1997), the current global trade volume is still below the volume that would 
be predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin model. They argue that a home bias in preferences 
may explain this ‘mystery of missing trade’. Another possible explanation for this is that 
transaction costs for international trade might be higher than for domestic trade, as a result 
of cultural and institutional distances (Den Butter and Mosch, 2003; De Groot et al., 2004; 
Guiso et al., 2009). Chapter 2 investigates this hypothesis, by using a gravity model for 
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international trade. This is done on the level of countries, but specific attention is given to 
differences between product groups. 
Most economists would agree that the world is best off in a situation of unrestricted 
global trade, because this leads to the most efficient allocation of production. One reason 
why trade can improve the allocation of production is the existence of comparative 
advantages. In the seminal work of Ricardo (1817), he explained that even when a country 
can produce all products cheaper than another country, both countries can still gain from 
trade when their relative costs of producing products differ. Examples of causes for 
comparative advantages are differences in climate, technology, human capital, or 
preferences. Another reason for the existence of comparative advantages are differences in 
endowments of capital and labour, which is the core of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. This 
model predicts that countries will export products that require relatively much of the 
resource they have in abundance and import products that require relatively much of the 
other resource.  
It is difficult to determine in which products a country has a comparative advantage, 
since it requires an analysis of the production costs. Balassa (1967) suggested to use export 
flows as an indication of revealed comparative advantages (RCA). The Balassa index is 
calculated by dividing the export share of a certain product of a certain country by the 
export share of the product in a reference group of countries (for example the world):1  
,,
, ,
,
, ,
, ,
, , ,
jj
i ti t
j
i t w tj
i t j
w t i t
w t w t
XX
X X
BI i I j J
X X
X X
     (1.1)
where jtiX ,  equals country i’s exports of product/sector j at time t, 
j
twX ,  equals the exports 
of the reference group of countries product/sector j at time t, I is the group of countries 
considered, J is the set of products considered,  j jtiti XX ,, and  j j twtw XX ,, .  
                                                 
1 Alternatively, it can be described as country i’s share in the exports of product j of the reference group 
relative to country i’s share in the total exports of the reference group. 
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A Balassa index above one indicates that a country exports relatively much of the product 
in comparison to other countries. Table 1.1 shows the fifteen product groups (based on the 
SITC revision 2 classification) with the highest Balassa index for the Netherlands in 2009. 
These values are based only on trade in goods, including re-exports. This means that a high 
Balassa index could also reflect a comparative advantage in trading the good, rather than a 
comparative advantage in the production of the good. This distinction is particularly 
relevant for the Netherlands, because about 50 percent of the Dutch exports are re-exports, 
which is related to its role as a gateway to Europe (Den Butter, 2012). An analysis of 
revealed comparative advantages excluding re-exports and including services can be found 
in Groot and Möhlmann (2008). 
 
Table 1.1. Product groups with the highest Balassa index in the Netherlands, 2009 
Notes: own calculations based on the OECD ITCS database. Only based on trade in goods, including re-
exports. 
 
Balassa 
index 
Share in 
Dutch 
exports 
Share in 
global 
exports 
29: Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s. 8.8 2.5% 0.3% 
94: Animals, live, zoo animals, dogs, cats etc. 4.4 0.0% 0.0% 
00: Live animals chiefly for food 3.9 0.5% 0.1% 
12: Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 3.6 1.0% 0.3% 
02: Dairy products and birds’ eggs 3.5 1.6% 0.5% 
43: Animal-vegetable oils-fats, processed, and waxes 3.5 0.2% 0.1% 
05: Vegetables and fruit 2.6 3.4% 1.3% 
34: Gas, natural and manufactured 2.5 4.3% 1.7% 
09: Miscellaneous edible products and preparations 2.5 1.0% 0.4% 
08: Feeding stuff for animals, not including unmilled cereals 2.5 1.1% 0.4% 
01: Meat and meat preparations 2.4 2.0% 0.8% 
75: Office machines and automatic data processing equipment 2.2 8.6% 4.0% 
07: Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, manufactures thereof 2.1 1.1% 0.5% 
51: Organic chemicals 1.9 4.3% 2.3% 
54: Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 1.9 6.9% 3.7% 
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Comparative advantages imply that a country can increase the level of its productivity by 
allowing free trade. Some economists also believe that international trade can increase the 
growth rate of the productivity (see, e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Krueger, 1997). 
An argument in favour of a positive relationship between trade and productivity growth is 
that trade makes a country more open to foreign influences, allowing a faster diffusion of 
knowledge between countries. The extent to which this may be the case is an empirical 
question. Note that the positive relationship between openness and the level of productivity 
can also cause a relationship between openness and the growth of productivity, when there 
is an ongoing decrease of trade restrictions that goes along with an increase in openness. 
Several empirical studies reported a positive relationship between openness and economic 
growth (see, e.g., Dollar, 1992; Sachs et al., 1995; Edwards, 1998). Others are more 
sceptical about the relationship between openness and growth (see Rodríguez and Rodrik, 
2001, for a critique on the previously mentioned empirical studies).  
Although globalization is a global phenomenon that affects almost all countries in the 
world, it is particularly relevant for a small country such as the Netherlands. The 
Netherlands has a history of trading, which started in the sixteenth century with maritime 
exploration and which led to the ‘golden age’ in the seventeenth century, a period of high 
economic growth. The role of trade in the economic success of the Netherlands in that 
period was already acknowledged by Adam Smith in 1776. Currently, the Netherlands is 
still one of the most globalized countries in the world. Table 1.2 contains a list of the ten 
countries that had the highest level of economic globalization in 2009, according to the 
KOF globalization index. This index is based on actual trade flows and investment flows as 
well as on trade and capital restrictions (Dreher et al., 2008). According to this index, the 
Netherlands is ranked sixth in 2009. Table 1.2 also includes the KOF index for overall 
globalization, which is also based on the extent of political and social globalization. For 
this index the Netherlands is ranked third, after Belgium and Ireland. 
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Table 1.2. KOF index for economic and overall globalization, 2009 
Source: KOF Swiss Economic Institute. 
 
The openness of the Netherlands, defined as the value of exports and imports divided by 
GDP, increased significantly in the second half of the last century. Den Butter et al. (2008) 
show that the increase in openness contributed to the increase in the productivity of the 
Netherlands in the period 1955–1992. Figure 1.2 shows that the openness increased from 
less than 30 percent in 1946 to over 125 percent in 2011. Openness is based here only on 
trade in goods and includes re-exports, because data on trade in services and re-exports are 
not available for such a long time period.2 Note that the level of openness of the 
Netherlands was historically rather low in 1946 as a result of the economic depression and 
protectionist policies in the 1930s and the second world war. For example, the openness 
was about 74 percent in 1925.  
                                                 
2 Not including trade in services leads to an underestimation of openness, and including re-exports leads to an 
overestimation of openness. According to data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS), re-exports had a share of 49 
percent in imports and of 44 in exports in 2011. The share of services in total trade was 19 percent for imports 
and 20 percent for exports.  
Ranking of economic 
globalization 
Country KOF economic 
globalization index 
KOF overall 
globalization index 
1 Singapore 97.4 89.2 
2 Luxembourg 94.6 86.0 
3 Ireland 93.3 92.0 
4 Malta 92.2 79.4 
5 Belgium 92.2 92.8 
6 The Netherlands 91.9 90.9 
7 Hungary 90.5 87.4 
8 Sweden 89.0 88.2 
9 Bahrain 89.0 68.8 
10 United Arab Emirates 88.7 75.7 
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Figure 1.2. Openness of the Netherlands (in percent), 1946–2011  
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Notes: own calculations based on data from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Only based on trade in goods, 
including re-exports. 
 
In 2011, the value of total imports was 60 percent of GDP and the value of total exports 
was 67 percent of GDP.3 Although Figure 1.2 suggests a large increase of the importance of 
exports for the Dutch economy, in terms of value added, the importance of exports 
remained fairly constant between 1995 and 2005 at around 30 percent (Groot and 
Möhlmann, 2008).4 One of the explanations for the difference between the growth of the 
trade volume and the growth of the importance of exports in terms of value added, is the 
increasing share of re-exports in total exports. In 2011 almost half of total exports consisted 
of re-exports, which create less value added than domestic exports. Another explanation is  
                                                 
3 This is sometimes used to claim that the Dutch economy depends for 67 percent on foreign markets, but this 
is an overestimation. The reason for this is that exports and GDP are different measurements. Exports is a 
production value while GDP is measured in terms of value added. Exports can therefore very well exceed 
GDP. The dependence on foreign markets is smaller than 67 percent, because a large part of the value of the 
exports is not created in the Netherlands, but imported. Re-exports are an extreme example of this. Only about 
ten percent of the value of re-exports is added in the Netherlands (CPB, 2001). For normal exports, the share 
of the value that is created in the Netherlands is higher, but these exports also use imports as input.  
4 Also see Kuypers et al. (2012) for an update to 2009.  
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the increase of the use of imported intermediates in domestic exports (Groot and 
Möhlmann, 2008). This suggests an increase of international outsourcing. The effects of 
domestic and international outsourcing on firm productivity and unemployment risk are 
studied in Chapters 3 and 4. 
An interesting observation that can be made from Figure 1.2 is that the Netherlands 
had a trade deficit in trade of goods in most years between 1946 and 1980, while it had a 
surplus in all years between 1981 and 2011. These trade surpluses should lead to a large 
stock of foreign assets, since a surplus of the current account is usually used for 
investments in foreign countries. However, Boonstra (2008) shows that the net external 
investment position of the Netherlands is much smaller than the sum of these trade 
surpluses. This is mainly caused by changes in valuations of the stock of external 
investments (Boonstra, 2008).  
Besides the value of Dutch trade flows, there have also been changes in the origin of 
imports and destinations of exports. Traditionally, important trade partners of the 
Netherlands are European countries and the United States. Recently, emerging countries 
like Brazil, Russia, India and China also gained relevance, particularly for imports (Groot et 
al., 2011). Figure 1.3 shows the eleven most important export destinations in 2009, with the 
export shares for 1990 and for 2009. In Figure 1.4 the same is done for the eleven most 
important countries for Dutch imports in 2009. The neighbouring countries are still by far 
the most important trading partners of the Netherlands, which shows the importance of 
physical distance for international trade. The role of distance is also discussed in Chapter 2, 
where a gravity model is applied to international trade. This chapter specifically looks at 
how distance has a different impact on certain types of goods.  
The countries in the EU-27 are particularly important for Dutch exports (73 percent in 
2009) and somewhat less for Dutch imports (52 percent in 2009). However, the share of 
exports that goes to countries outside the European Union is higher if indirect exports are 
taken into account (Groot et al., 2011). In this context, indirect exports are exports that are 
used as intermediates and are then exported again to another country as an intermediate of a 
final product. For example, Groot et al. (2011) estimate that the share of exports that go to 
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China in 2009, is 2.2 percent instead of 1.6 percent, when indirect exports are taken into 
account. 
Figure 1.3 and Figure 1.4 show that the trade shares of the traditional trading 
partners, like Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, France and the United Kingdom, 
decreased between 1990 and 2009. These figures also confirm the large increase of trade 
with China, which had a share in total Dutch trade of less than one percent in 1990, but was 
ranked eleventh for Dutch exports and fourth for Dutch imports in 2009. Other examples of 
countries of which the trade share increased strongly between 1990 and 2009 are Russia 
(ranked seventh for imports in 2009) and Malaysia (ranked eleventh for imports in 2009). 
 
Figure 1.3. Export shares of most important export countries, 1990 and 2009 
 
Notes: own calculations based on the OECD ITCS database. Belgium and Luxembourg are combined because 
trade statistics prior to 1997 were only made for the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union. 
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Figure 1.4. Import shares of most important import countries, 1990 and 2009 
 
Notes: own calculations based on the OECD ITCS database. Belgium and Luxembourg are combined because 
trade statistics prior to 1997 were only made for the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union. 
 
The previously discussed figures and tables on openness, revealed comparative advantages, 
and trade partners, all relate to the Netherlands as a whole. However, within the 
Netherlands, there are substantial regional differences. The regional dimension of 
globalization has received relatively little attention in the literature, since most studies 
focus on countries. This is partly caused by the fact that many relevant statistics are made 
for countries, while little is known about more detailed regional classifications. However, 
more knowledge on the regional aspects of globalization can be very useful for regional 
policy makers, and also for policy makers at the national level that are concerned with 
regional distributional effects of policy measures. Additionally, more data on regional 
globalization indicators can be useful for research purposes, because regional data suffer 
less from unobserved heterogeneity than country data. The reason for this is that regions 
within one country often share the same language, culture and institutions. Microdata make 
it possible to provide data at a regional level on globalization indicators like openness to 
trade or ethnic diversity of the population. Figure 1.5 shows the regional distribution of the 
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share of total output that is exported in 2005. This figure is based on the firms for which the 
export share was available in the production statistics.5 
 
Figure 1.5. Average export share of total production (in percent), 2005 
Legend
1.11 - 10.02
10.02 - 15.14
15.14 - 20.17
20.17 - 25.26
25.26 - 31.39
31.39 - 42.68
42.68 - 60.82
 
Notes: own calculations based on microdata from Statistics Netherlands. The weights are based on the 
working location of the employees. Some regions do not contain enough observations to produce reliable 
export share averages. For municipalities that employ less than 20,000 full-time equivalents, the map shows 
the average export share of the COROP region instead. 
                                                 
5 See chapter 3 for more information on the production statistics. The average export share is determined by 
taking the weighted average of the export share of the firms, where employment is used as weight. The reason 
for using employment as weight instead of output, is that firms can have plants or offices in different regions. 
We do not know how the output of a firm is distributed over the regions, but we do know the regional 
distribution of the employment of the firms. 
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Figure 1.5 shows that the regional heterogeneity of export shares is very large. Export 
shares are generally high in regions close to the border. This might be related to border 
trade. A more important explanation is probably that the manufacturing industry in the 
Netherlands is generally located outside the Randstad, while the Randstad has a relatively 
high share of firms that produce services.6 Services are much less often exported than 
goods. However, the manufacturing industry does use inputs from the services industry, 
which is why exports are also important for firms that produce services (Groot and 
Möhlmann, 2008). This interaction between firms is not captured by Figure 1.5, since it is 
only based on the share of output that is exported by the firm itself, and not on intermediate 
deliveries between firms. The regional heterogeneity of export shares could have 
implications for the dependence of regions on the global economy. Regions that rely 
relatively strongly on exports may experience a stronger decline of economic growth when 
the global economy is performing poorly, and vice versa. Möhlmann et al. (2011) show that 
the regional dependence on the European business cycle can be partly explained by the 
sectoral composition of the regions. The export share of regions may offer an additional 
explanation for differences in the regional dependence on the European business cycle.  
The second type of globalization that is discussed in this dissertation, migration, leads 
to strong spatial heterogeneity of ethnic diversity in the Netherlands. Figure 1.6 shows the 
regional share of foreign employees in 2008, weighted for the number of days worked. This 
figure shows a completely different picture than Figure 1.5. The highest shares of foreign 
employees are found in the agglomerated regions within the Randstad, while the regions 
that are close to the border do not have particularly high shares of foreign employees. The 
highest share of foreign-born employees is found in Amsterdam (32.3 percent), followed by 
The Hague (31.0 percent) and Rotterdam (30.4 percent). These three regions are also the 
largest cities in the Netherlands, which indicates that immigrants are relatively strongly 
attracted to large cities.   
 
                                                 
6 The Randstad is a conurbation located in the western part of the Netherlands. It contains the four largest 
cities in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) and their surrounding areas. 
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Figure 1.6. Share of foreign-born employees (in percent), 2008 
 
Legend
1.24 - 3.63
3.63 - 5.47
5.47 - 7.66
7.66 - 10.50
10.50 - 14.33
14.33 - 20.52
20.52 - 32.30
 
Notes: own calculations based on microdata from Statistics Netherlands. The shares are based on the housing 
location of the employees.  
 
A similar analysis has been done on the national level for twelve sectors. The sectoral 
export shares are not shown, because not all sectors had a sufficient number of observations 
to provide reliable results. Table 1.3 shows the share of foreign-born employees by sector, 
for 2000 and 2008. There is a strong sectoral heterogeneity in the share of foreign-born 
employees, which ranges from 5.7 percent (construction) to 19.8 percent (other business 
services) in 2008. The table also shows that the share of foreign-born employees has 
increased between 2000 and 2008, from 9.1 percent to 11.5 percent. Besides the sector 
agriculture, all sectors experienced an increase in the share of foreign-born employees.  
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Table 1.3. Sectoral shares of foreign employees and foreign owned firms, 2000 and 2008 
Notes: own calculations based on microdata from Statistics Netherlands. * In this sectoral classification, SBI 
2008 code G was divided over two sectors.  
 
The strong heterogeneity between regions and between sectors suggests that countries may 
not be the optimal level to analyse the effects of globalization. That is why this dissertation 
studies the effects of globalization on a smaller scale. One of the chapters still uses 
countries as the level of observation, but it allows for heterogeneous effects between 
different groups of products. The other three chapters all use microdata, where the units of 
observation are individual firms or individual employees. This was possible due to unique 
access to microdata from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). With microdata it is possible to 
correct for characteristics of firms or employees that remain unobserved in research on a 
macro level. These data make it possible to let go of the traditional assumption that all 
firms are homogeneous, following the seminal work of Melitz (2003). He developed a 
model with heterogeneous firms that explained how exposure to trade will make the most 
productive firms enter the export market, while the least productive firms will exit the 
 SBI 2008 code Share of 
foreign-born 
employees (in 
percent) in 
2000 
Share of 
foreign-born 
employees (in 
percent) in 
2008 
Agriculture A 11.0 9.3 
Manufacturing industry B, C, D, E 11.4 12.3 
Construction F 5.0 5.7 
Wholesale trade and transport G*, H 9.1 10.7 
Consumer services G*, I, R, S, T 9.8 11.7 
Information and communication J 10.0 11.5 
Financial services K 8.3 8.4 
Other business services M, N 18.3 19.8 
Government O 7.3 8.1 
Education P 7.8 8.8 
Health care Q 8.5 9.3 
Real estate L 5.5 6.2 
Total  9.1 11.5 
16 1 – Introduction  
 
 
market entirely. This model suggests that firms that export are more productive due to a 
selection effect and not due to a learning effect, and at the same time it explains how trade 
can increase productivity at the country level. This has been confirmed for Dutch firms by 
Kox and Rojas-Romagosa (2010). In this way, the model by Melitz (2003) offers a solution 
to the micro-macro paradox, which states that internationalization does not lead to 
productivity increases at the level of the firm, but that it does lead to an increase of 
productivity at the country level (see, e.g., Van Bergeijk et al., 2011). The microdata used 
in this dissertation made it possible to study whether certain effects of globalization that we 
observe on a macro level, also occur on a micro level.  
This dissertation contains four chapters that revolve around the following three main 
research questions: 
(i) How do physical, economic, cultural and institutional distance act as barriers to 
international trade, and does the impact of these types of distance vary for 
different types of products? 
(ii) What are the characteristics of firms that outsource, and how does outsourcing 
affect the productivity of the firm and the probability that employees lose their 
job? 
(iii) How does ethnic diversity within firms affect the productivity of these firms? 
 
The first question is covered in Chapter 2. This chapter uses a gravity model of 
international trade, which is estimated for different groups of products. This chapter builds 
upon the work of Rauch (1999). Chapter 2 is applied to the level of countries, while the 
other three chapters all focus on the level of the firm. The second question contains two 
topics, which are productivity and unemployment risk. The effects of outsourcing on 
productivity are considered in Chapter 3, while the effects of outsourcing on the risk of 
unemployment are discussed in Chapter 4. The third main research question, on the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and firm productivity, is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Chapters 3 and 5 both use firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) as the dependent 
variable. It is recommended to read Chapter 3 before reading Chapter 5, because the 
 1 – Introduction 17 
 
 
estimation method and data are discussed most extensively in Chapter 3. Figure 1.7 
contains a diagram that shows how the chapters in this dissertation are related to each other. 
 
Figure 1.7. Structure of dissertation 
Research 
question:   
(i) trade Chapter 2 
uses country 
level data 
with focus on 
product groups 
 
    
(ii) outsourcing 
 
Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
 
total   
factor 
productivity 
 
 
use 
microdata 
on firms and 
employees 
 
 
 
(iii) ethnic diversity Chapter 5   
    
 
 
This dissertation strongly benefited from microdata from Statistics Netherlands. As shown 
in Figure 1.7, these data are the basis for chapters 3, 4 and 5. The most important data 
sources that are used in these chapters are the general firm registry (Algemeen 
Bedrijfsregister; ABR), production data (Productiestatistieken; PS), the Eurostat 
outsourcing survey, tax data on jobs and unemployment benefits (Sociaal Statistisch 
Bestand; SSB-Banen and SSB-WW), and data from municipalities on their inhabitants 
(Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie; GBA). Most of these data sources are used in multiple 
chapters. Table 1.4 shows which of these data sources are used in each of the chapters. 
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Table 1.4. Microdata sources, by chapter 
 
 
 
  Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 
  
Outsourcing and 
productivity 
Outsourcing and 
unemployment 
Ethnic diversity 
and productivity 
Firm registry ABR √ √ √ 
Production statistics PS √  √ 
Outsourcing data survey √ √  
Tax data on jobs SSB-Banen  √ √ 
Unemployment benefits SSB-WW  √  
Municipality inhabitants GBA  √ √ 
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2 Intangible barriers to 
international trade  
 
2.1  Introduction7 
International trade flows have increased impressively in the last few decades (see Chapter 
1). The growing importance of international trade has led to an increased need for sound 
analyses of its determinants. The gravity model has been the workhorse model to explain 
international trade flows for nearly half a century now. The main idea behind this model is 
that the magnitude of bilateral trade flows can be explained by the economic size of the two 
trading countries and the distance between them (Deardorff, 1998). The model has sound 
theoretical foundations, yields almost invariantly plausible parameter estimates and has a 
strong explanatory power.  
Although the basic framework of the gravity model is unaltered throughout the years, 
new insights have contributed to its increasing popularity by improving its theoretical 
underpinnings (see, e.g., Feenstra, 2004) and addressing econometric issues concerning the 
correct specification of the model (see, e.g., Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). These 
include the correct specification of the multilateral resistance (price) effect, the 
specification of panel gravity equations and the treatment of zero-valued bilateral trade 
flows.  
Despite the rapid growth of trade and the popular discussions on the ‘death of 
distance’ (Cairncross, 1997; Friedman, 2005), many studies estimating gravity equations of 
bilateral trade confirm that the impact of geographical distance is still substantial and has 
                                                 
7 This chapter is based on joint work with Sjef Ederveen (Ministery of Economic Affairs), Henri de Groot 
(VU University Amsterdam) and Gert-Jan Linders (Ecorys). It has been published as a book chapter: 
Möhlmann, J.L., S. Ederveen, H.L.F. de Groot and G.M. Linders (2010), ‘Intangible Barriers to International 
Trade: A Sectoral Approach’, in: P.A.G. Van Bergeijk and S. Brakman (eds.), The Gravity Model in 
International Trade: Advances and applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
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not shown a clear tendency to decline over time (Linders, 2006; Disdier and Head, 2008). 
Thus, distance still matters for the patterns of trade. Given the decline in transport and 
communication costs over time, this finding provides support for the view that intangible 
trade barriers are persistent and are important in explaining the resistance to trade (Obstfeld 
and Rogoff, 2000; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2004). 
Substantiating the effect of intangible trade barriers has been another important recent 
extension of the gravity model. Most of the early gravity model studies consider only 
geographical distance. However, it is likely that there are significant additional costs 
involved in trading besides transport costs. Deardorff (2004) suggests that the current 
amount of global trade is far below the level that would prevail if transport costs were the 
only costs of trading. Furthermore, Trefler (1995) and Davis et al. (1997) find that the 
factor proportions theory of trade would predict trade flows that are missing from actual 
observations. They argue that home bias in preferences may explain this ‘mystery of 
missing trade’. But the missing trade flows might also partly originate from alternative 
dimensions of distance in trade. These other dimensions of distance could include cultural 
and institutional distances (Den Butter and Mosch, 2003; De Groot et al., 2004; Guiso et 
al., 2009). The transaction costs of trading can include many aspects including transport 
costs, tariffs, search costs, information costs regarding the product and the reliability of the 
trading partner, and contract enforcement costs (Den Butter and Mosch, 2003; Anderson 
and Van Wincoop, 2004). These transaction costs are likely to increase with cultural 
dissimilarities between countries because firms will have less knowledge about foreign 
cultures and markets. Moreover, the costs of negotiation will be higher when the trading 
partners do not speak the same language (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002). This is why 
more recent studies include measures for cultural and institutional distance (see, e.g., Den 
Butter and Mosch, 2003; De Groot et al., 2004; Linders et al., 2005, Guiso et al., 2009) in 
their gravity model specifications.  
What has remained unchanged in the application of the gravity model is the strong 
focus on total trade flows. This is surprising, as there are good reasons to believe that the 
effects of distance and GDP on the value of bilateral trade differ between different product 
groups. An important exception is the seminal study by Rauch (1999) in which a 
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network/search view of international trade is developed. He argues that search costs present 
a major barrier to trade in differentiated products, whereas distance only increases transport 
costs for trade in homogeneous products without principally preventing trade. These 
hypotheses are empirically tested by estimating models for both homogeneous and 
heterogeneous products, providing empirical support for the hypotheses.  
In this chapter we build on the work of Rauch (1999) by estimating the gravity model 
for different product groups. We improve and extend his empirical work in a number of 
directions. First, we incorporate recent econometric insights. More specifically, we use the 
Heckman selection model to estimate the gravity equation. This model is able to deal with 
zero trade flows in a more satisfactory way, which becomes particularly relevant when 
studying disaggregate trade because of the increased absence of trade of specific products 
between pairs of countries. Second, we use a broader view on the different dimensions of 
distance. Rauch (1999) hypothesises that networks are an important factor in trade 
transactions and that a common language or a shared colonial history will make networks 
more likely to exist. Besides geographical distance, Rauch uses a dummy variable 
indicating whether two countries share a common language or a shared colonial history to 
test this view. However, this variable does not capture the idea that transaction costs 
increase when firms have less knowledge about foreign cultures and markets due to cultural 
differences. In this chapter we include additional cultural indicators to test this hypothesis 
as well. Third, we explore the importance of using different product categories for the 
parameters of the gravity equation. For that purpose we extend the analysis of Rauch by 
exploring the impact on different sectors of the economy and on specific products. In 
addition, we use data on a more recent time period, which is the year 2000.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
basic concept of the gravity model for bilateral trade. Section 2.3 elaborates on the 
importance of intangible barriers to trade, with a special focus on cultural and institutional 
distance. The data and estimation method are discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents 
the results. This section consists of three parts. The first part strictly follows the distinction 
made by Rauch (1999) between homogeneous and heterogeneous products and considers 
the impact of more recent data and different estimation techniques on the key results 
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obtained by Rauch. The second part focuses on the importance of intangible barriers to 
trade. The last part applies the gravity model to more detailed product groups. Finally, 
Section 2.6 presents the conclusions and provides some further discussion. 
 
2.2  The gravity model in international trade 
The gravity model of bilateral trade has become the workhorse model of applied 
international economics (Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998). It was originally inspired by 
Newton’s gravity equation in physics, in which the gravitational forces exerted between 
two bodies depend on their mass and distance. The basic idea of gravity can be used to 
model spatial interaction in social sciences as well. The gravity model has been used 
extensively in regional science to describe and analyse spatial flows of information, goods 
and persons (see, e.g., Greenwood, 1975; Nijkamp and Reggiani, 1992; Isard, 1999), and 
was pioneered in the analysis of international trade by Tinbergen (1962), Pöyhönen (1963) 
and Linnemann (1966). 
The traditional gravity model relates bilateral trade flows to the GDP levels of the 
countries and their geographic distance. The levels of GDP reflect the market size in both 
countries, as a measure of economic mass. The market size of the importing country 
reflects the potential demand for bilateral imports, while GDP in the exporting country 
represents the potential supply of goods from that country. geographic distance reflects 
resistance to bilateral trade. The familiar functional form from physics is then used to relate 
bilateral trade to these variables of economic mass and distance. 
Usually, the gravity equation is expressed in logarithmic form, for the purpose of 
empirical estimation. The basic gravity equation, used in estimation, then looks as follows: 
1 2ln ln ln ln ln ,ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ijT K Y y D M CD ID               (2.1)
where Tij stands for exports from country i to country j; K is a scalar; Yij and yij represent the 
product of GDP and GDP per capita of country i and j; and Dij, CDij and IDij reflect 
physical, cultural and institutional distance between the countries.  
The matrix Mij contains additional variables that may affect the ease of trading 
bilaterally, such as a common border, linguistic or colonial links, and common trade bloc 
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membership (such as the EU and NAFTA). In specifying this basic structure of the model, 
we largely follow the model set out in Rauch (1999). In estimating the model, we conform 
as much as possible to the country sample of Rauch (1999). This serves to facilitate the 
comparison of results. Our key parameters of interest are θ1 and θ2, which capture the effect 
of, respectively, cultural and institutional distance on trade. Finally, εij is a disturbance term 
that reflects the impact of other factors (assumed orthogonal) that have not been included in 
the model.  
The recent literature has provided extensions to the theoretical foundations of the 
gravity model (see, e.g., Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Feenstra, 2004; Anderson, 
2010). This has resulted in a modification of the gravity equation (2.1), to account for 
omitted variable bias related to the omission of multilateral resistance terms Pi and Pj, 
which are themselves a function of all regressor variables (for example, Yk, Yl, Mkl and Dkl) 
for all countries k and l. The resulting equation, also indicated as the theoretical gravity 
equation, is: 
1 1
1 2
ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln ,
ij ij ij ij ij
ij ij i j ij
T K Y y D M
CD ID P P 
   
   
    
      (2.2)
where σ stands for a preference parameter (in the theoretical derivations equal to the 
elasticity of substitution between goods from different countries).  
Because the natural logarithms of the multilateral resistance terms are non-linear 
functions of the variables and parameters in the model, this gravity equation cannot be 
estimated by OLS. A number of solutions has been proposed for estimation. In our analysis, 
we will proceed in line with Feenstra (2004) to estimate a gravity equation in which the 
multilateral resistance terms are estimated as country-specific fixed effects. We assume that 
trade costs are symmetric, implying that we assume the existence of a single country-
specific multilateral resistance term for each country.8  
                                                 
8 Allowing for asymmetric trade costs (and hence for different multilateral resistance terms for exports and 
imports) does not lead to major changes in the OLS estimation results. With the Heckman selection model we 
had to rely on a single indicator of multilateral resistance per country for technical reasons. 
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2.3  Multidimensional distance: institutions, culture and trade 
The point of departure for our analysis is the observation that trade costs are important to 
understand the patterns of bilateral trade. Bilateral resistance to trade can arise from formal 
barriers (such as tariffs and non-tariff bariers) and transport costs, but also from informal 
barriers such as differences in institutional quality and in cultural norms and values. 
Moreover, these barriers to trade may be more important for some products than for others. 
This chapter focuses on these intangible barriers to trade and on the heterogeneous impact 
of these barriers for different types of products.  
 
2.3.1  The network view on trade 
To understand how trade patterns evolve, recent research points at the importance of 
networks, rather than atomistic markets (Rauch, 1999; 2001). The search/network view 
starts from the observation that a majority of products is not traded on organized 
exchanges. Therefore, search processes are important in order to match buyers and sellers. 
Networks serve to facilitate the search for suitable trade partners. As a result, understanding 
the characteristics and development of networks is important to explain the observed 
patterns of trade. 
Rauch (1999) classifies products according to product type. Homogeneous products 
differ from differentiated goods in the use of markets as opposed to networks for exchange. 
Homogeneous goods can be compared exclusively on the basis of price differences. Several 
homogeneous products are traded on organized exchanges where supply and demand are 
directly matched. Many other homogeneous products are sold on a decentralized market 
where the ‘invisible hand’ of the price mechanism takes care of coordination. Although not 
frictionless, matching resembles a perfectly competitive centralized market, where the 
comparison is based on prices as the only relevant characteristic. For these products, 
reference prices are often published, illustrating that the price mechanism guides allocation 
through the possibility for international arbitrage of price differences. Differentiated 
products cannot be compared on the basis of prices alone. Price differences must be 
adjusted for differences in characteristics and quality between the varieties. The relative 
importance of the various characteristics differs across countries depending on the available 
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supply and preferences that prevail (Rauch, 1999). In the end, each variety has its own 
unique blend of characteristics. The product is ‘branded’, and has its own supplier. Because 
of the difficulty of comparing differentiated products, differentiated products cannot be 
traded on organized exchanges. Moreover, information costs are so high that international 
arbitrage by specialized traders across varieties is not feasible either. Instead, differentiated 
products are traded through networks by search and match between traders, customers and 
suppliers. Rauch (1999) argues that the process of search is facilitated by factors that 
improve the information flow and knowledge of foreign markets. He refers to shared 
language, colonial links and geographical proximity as search-enabling factors, because 
they increase bilateral familiarity and decrease ‘psychic distance’ (see Frankel, 1997). 
Rauch (1999) identifies three product groups that reflect the ‘network versus market’ 
distinction in trade: products traded on organized exchanges, reference-priced products and 
differentiated goods. The network theory of trade hypothesizes that search costs are most 
important for the pattern of trade in differentiated products and least important for products 
that are traded on organized exchanges. 
 
2.3.2  Insecurity of property and trade 
An alternative explanation for unobserved trade costs focuses on variation in institutional 
effectiveness across countries. A poor institutional environment, in terms of property rights 
protection and contract enforceability, entails negative externalities for private transactions 
and consequently raises transaction costs. As a result, the quality of governance is an 
important determinant of economic growth and development (see, e.g., Olson, 1996). 
Institutional economics has recently been extended into the field of international economics 
(see, e.g., Wei, 2000; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Dixit, 2004). This approach states 
that insecurity of property and contract enforcement imposes high costs on trade. Rodrik 
(2000) argues that the transaction-costs problem of contract enforcement is aggravated for 
international trade, compared to domestic exchange. International trade involves at least 
two jurisdictions, which makes contract enforcement more difficult. This discontinuity in 
the political and legal system increases uncertainty and the risk of opportunistic behaviour 
by either party to the exchange. Accordingly, differences in the effectiveness of legal and 
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policy systems in providing law and order, securing contract enforcement and facilitating 
trade is an important determinant of bilateral trade costs. Besides the level of the quality of 
institutions, the similarities of institutions between two countries could also affect bilateral 
trade costs. With more similar institutions, enforcement of international contracts is easier 
and uncertainty is reduced (see, e.g., De Groot et al., 2004). 
In this chapter, we investigate whether the impact of differences in institutional 
quality on bilateral trade depends on the type of product that is being traded. We would 
generally expect the costs of insecurity and differences in contract enforceability to be 
lowest for organized-exchange products. Specialized traders can diversify systemic risk of 
opportunistic behaviour by ordering from many different suppliers, without any concern 
left for final customers. For reference-priced commodities, the need for more case-specific 
search raises search costs and creates an incentive to enter into closer relations. Trade will 
increasingly avoid environments with very different institutional settings. The largest effect 
is expected for trade in differentiated goods.  
 
2.3.3  Cultural differences as trade barrier 
Many studies have extended the basic trade-flow gravity equation with (dummy) variables 
indicating whether the trading partners share a common language, religion, and/or colonial 
past (Geraci and Prewo, 1977; Frankel, 1997; Boisso and Ferrantino, 1997; Yeyati, 2003; 
Guiso et al., 2009). Most studies find that these variables have significant positive effects 
on the magnitude of international trade flows. Although this indicates that these variables 
matter, they only capture cultural familiarity, in the sense that the trading partners will have 
more knowledge of each other’s culture and will find it easier to communicate and share 
information (Rauch, 1999; 2001).  
We go beyond cultural familiarity by focusing on cultural distance, which is defined 
as the extent to which the shared norms and values in one country differ from those in 
another (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Hofstede, 2001). It is generally acknowledged that a large 
cultural distance raises the costs of international trade, as large cultural differences make it 
difficult to understand, control, and predict the behaviour of others (Elsass and Veiga, 
1994). This complicates interactions (Parkhe, 1991), thus impeding the realization of 
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business deals. Some of the most notable difficulties associated with cross-cultural 
interaction include those associated with understanding, and particularly those associated 
with differences in perceptions of the same situation. Differences in perceptions complicate 
interactions, make them prone to fail, and hinder the development of rapport and trust – 
factors that generally facilitate the interaction process and lower the costs of trade (Neal, 
1998). This suggests that a large cultural distance between countries reduces the amount of 
trade between them.  
However, cultural differences can also have a positive impact on trade. When 
entering foreign markets, companies have to decide whether to export products to another 
country or open a factory to start local production. The trade-off between producing locally 
and producing at a single site to benefit from scale advantages is known as the proximity-
concentration trade-off. The literature on trade and horizontal foreign direct investment 
(FDI) suggests that the trade-off between various modes of serving foreign markets may 
result in a positive effect of cultural and institutional distance on trade (Brainard, 1997; 
Helpman et al., 2004). An increase in cultural distance is likely to raise the costs of bilateral 
FDI more than the costs of bilateral trade, because FDI involves a higher stake in the local 
foreign market. Resource commitment, in the form of asset specific investments, is higher 
for FDI than for trade. Moreover, cultural differences are likely to affect the variable costs 
of direct local presence via FDI more than the cost of trading, as the transaction costs of 
managing and producing locally are relatively more substantial. If the costs resulting from 
cultural differences rise, companies may therefore prefer to focus on exports rather than 
FDI. This may lead to a substitution of local presence by trade. The total effect of cultural 
distance on trade then consists of a direct, negative effect and a positive substitution effect 
from FDI to trade. The total effect could therefore be either positive or negative. 
Lankhuizen et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence for the existence of the 
proximity-concentration trade-off. They show that the share of horizontal FDI in total 
foreign sales increases with geographical distance and decreases with differences in 
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language, culture and institutions. This implies that cultural differences are indeed more 
important for horizontal FDI than for trade.9  
Cultural diversity can also have a positive influence on international trade through 
specialization. Wherever there are large differences between countries, there are larger 
opportunities for specializing in the production of specific goods, which can be exchanged 
via international trade. In the end, the effect of cultural distance on trade is an empirical 
question. 
                                                 
9 Export and FDI can be substitutes in case of horizontal FDI (sales to the local market). Although the bulk of 
FDI is horizontal in nature (see, e.g., Brakman et al., 2010), vertical FDI has increased due to fragmentation 
of production. In this case, trade and FDI are complements. Hence we would expect a negative effect of 
cultural and institutional distance on both vertical FDI and trade. Therefore, this type of FDI does not lead to a 
positive substitution effect from FDI to trade. A similar reasoning applies to international outsourcing and 
resulting trade. Den Butter and Hayat (2008) argue that the asset specificity of the inputs also matters for the 
trade-off between vertical FDI and outsourcing. As the asset specificity of the inputs increases, contracting 
costs increase as well, which makes it more likely that firms will produce the inputs themselves rather than 
outsource the production. They empirically show that for the case of the Netherlands and China, the 
likelihood that Dutch firms choose for vertical FDI instead of for outsourcing is higher for differentiated 
inputs than it is for homogeneous inputs.  
 
2.4  Data and estimation method 
 
2.4.1  Trade data  
As the dependent variable we use bilateral trade flows between two countries, measured in 
thousands of US dollars. For this variable we used the database compiled by Feenstra et al. 
(2005), which is based on trade data from the United Nations. The database covers bilateral 
trade between 1962 and 2000. For the purpose of this study only cross-sectional data are 
required, so we only used data for the year 2000. The data are classified according to the 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) revision 2 at the 4-digit level. The SITC 
is a system that provides codes for product types. At the 4-digit level the classification 
distinguishes about 800 different product types.  
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To compare our results with those of Rauch (1999) we use the same set of countries as he 
did, as far as possible. The 55 remaining countries are listed in Appendix 2.A. It is possible 
that the value of a trade flow reported by the exporter differs from the trade flow reported 
by the importer. When this is the case the value reported by the importer is used because 
these data are generally more reliable (Feenstra et al., 2005). When there is no record from 
the importing country available we use the record from the exporting country.  
According to the database, the total amount of trade in 2000 between the 55 countries 
used in this study was about 5.3 trillion US dollars. The three Rauch groups, which are 
differentiated goods (N), reference-priced goods (R) and goods that are traded on an 
organized exchange (W), respectively account for 64 percent, 16 percent and 10 percent of 
total trade. These shares do not add up to 100 percent, because not all 4-digit SITC codes 
are attributed to one of the three categories. Table 2.1 shows information on total trade 
flows, classified according to 1-digit SITC codes and the three Rauch groups. It reveals that 
SITC group 7 (machinery and transport equipment) is by far the most important SITC 
group in terms of trade: 44 percent of total trade value is in this category. As the whole 
group falls under the category of heterogeneous products, it even accounts for almost 60 
percent of total trade in heterogeneous products. Second largest are the manufactured goods 
(SITC 6), which are more or less equally divided over the heterogeneous and reference-
priced goods. Manufactured goods together with chemicals (SITC 5) are the most important 
reference-priced goods and cover about two thirds of trade in that category. Goods traded 
on organized exchanges are predominantly mineral fuels (SITC 3, 60 percent).  
 
2.4.2  Multidimensional distance  
A main contribution of our analysis of trade patterns at the product group level is the 
introduction of multiple dimensions of distance, with an explicit distinction between 
cultural and institutional differences. We use these distance measures in addition to the 
links variable used by Rauch (1999), which indicates whether or not two countries share a 
language or have colonial ties.  
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Table 2.1. Shares of differentiated, reference-priced goods and goods traded on organized 
exchanges in 1-digit SITC revision 2 product group, 2000 
Notes: N = Differentiated goods, R = Reference-priced goods and W = goods traded on an organized 
exchange. Numbers between square brackets show the importance (in percentages) of each 1-digit SITC 
group for the whole category, whereas the main figures in each column show the total value of trade for each 
4-digit SITC-group and its subdivision in percentages. For example, when we look at SITC-group 0, total 
trade value is 282 billion, which can be subdivided in 19 percent N, 46 percent R, 34 percent W and 1 percent 
not classified. Trade in the SITC-group 0 accounts for 5 percent of total trade, 2 percent of N, 15 percent of R, 
17 percent of W, and 1 percent of not classified. 
 
Regarding the role of cultural differences, previous research has typically used measures of 
cultural (un)familiarity, such as dummy variables indicating whether the trading partners 
share a common language, religion, and colonial past (see, e.g., Srivastava and Green, 
1986; Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; De Groot et al., 2004). We also distinguish the 
separate effect of cultural (dis)similarity across countries, which is based on the well-
established cultural framework of Hofstede (1980; 2001). Our measure for cultural distance 
combines its four original cultural dimensions: (i) power distance, (ii) uncertainty 
Product group Trade value 
in billions 
USD 
Share of N 
in % 
Share of R 
in % 
Share of W 
in % 
Share of not 
classified 
in % 
0: food and live animals 282 [5] 19 [2] 46 [15] 34 [17] 1 [1] 
1: beverages and  
     tobacco 46 [1] 10 [0] 79 [4] 9 [1] 2 [0] 
2: crude materials,  
     inedible, except fuels 178 [3] 31 [2] 48 [10] 21 [7] 0 [0] 
3: mineral fuels,  
     lubricants and related  430 [8] 1 [0] 12 [6] 78 [60] 9 [7] 
4: animal and vegetable  
     oils, fats and waxes 14 [0] 9 [0] 10 [0] 63 [2] 18 [0] 
5: chemicals and related  
     products 513 [10] 46 [7] 53 [32] 1 [1] 0 [0] 
6: manufactured goods 721 [14] 45 [10] 39 [33] 9 [12] 7 [10] 
7: machinery and  
     transport equipment 2310 [44] 85 [59] 0 [0] 0 [0] 15 [66] 
8: miscellaneous  
     manufactured articles 697 [13] 95 [20] 0 [0] 0 [0] 5 [7] 
9: commodities and  
     transactions n.e.s. 101 [2] 50 [2] 0 [0] 5 [1] 45 [9] 
Total 5292 [100] 64 [100] 16 [100] 10 [100] 10 [100] 
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avoidance, (iii) individualism and (iv) masculinity.10 Cultural distance captures the extent 
of differences in norms and values between countries, and hence allows us to go beyond 
more traditional measures of cultural familiarity. 
Previous research has measured the institutional dissimilarity between trading 
partners through a dummy variable indicating whether the partners had comparable 
governance quality levels (De Groot et al., 2004). We apply a measure that captures the 
extent to which these quality levels differ. Institutional distance is calculated on the basis of 
a database compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2003). They combined cross-country indicators on 
governance from different sources in a factor analysis, and constructed six indicators for the 
quality of institutions. These indicators are (i) voice and accountability, (ii) political 
stability, (iii) government effectiveness, (iv) regulatory quality, (v) rule of law and (vi) 
control of corruption.  
Bilateral cultural and institutional distance are both measured using the Kogut-Singh 
(1988) index. This index provides a single comparative measure based on the differences 
between two countries in multiple dimensions. It is constructed by taking a weighted 
average of the squared difference in each dimension. With D distinct dimensions this 
yields:  
2
1
( )1 ,
D
di dj
ij
d d
S S
KS
D V
   (2.3)
where KSij is the (Kogut-Singh) distance variable, Sdi is the value of dimension d for 
country i, Sdj is the value of dimension d for country j, and Vd is the sample variance in 
dimension d. A complete description of the data and data sources of all variables included 
in our gravity model is provided in Appendix 2.A.  
                                                 
10 Later Hofstede added long-term orientation as a fifth dimension, but this dimension is available for only a 
few countries and therefore not included here. 
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2.4.3  Estimation method 
Although most countries do trade with each other, they do not necessarily trade in every 
product category. Given our focus on trade at a disaggregate level, this implies that there is 
a number of zero-trade-flows in our sample. Simply neglecting the zero flows may 
seriously bias the results of an OLS regression analysis based on a loglinear transformation 
of the gravity equation. The 55 countries from our sample have 2752 bilateral trade flows, 
out of a possible 2970. When only the products traded on organized exchanges are 
considered, only 2265 country pairs with a positive trade flow remain. This amount of zero 
flows can get much larger as more specific product groups are considered. At a 1-digit 
SITC level as much as 60 percent (SITC 4) of the country pairs do not trade.  
In order to address the potential bias caused by the neglect of zero-flows, we estimate 
a sample selection model to take into account zero-valued bilateral trade flows in the 
sample. This model, also known as the Tobit II model (Verbeek, 2004), specifies a probit 
selection equation for the decision whether or not to trade, in addition to the standard log-
linear gravity equation that models the volume of bilateral trade.11 Economic reasoning 
suggests that the selection equation should at least contain those explanatory variables also 
included in the gravity equation.  
The sample selection model can be estimated using two different approaches. First, 
the parameters in both parts of the model can be jointly estimated using maximum 
likelihood. Alternatively, the model can be estimated in two steps (Heckman, 1979). The 
first step estimates a probit selection equation using maximum likelihood. From the 
parameter estimates in the selection equation, we can compute the inverse Mill’s ratio for 
each country pair, denoted λij (also known as Heckman’s lambda). If we include Heckman’s  
                                                 
11 Alternatively, some authors estimate the gravity model using Poisson regression (see, e.g., Santos-Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006). However, Poisson regression pertains mostly to a context in which data are counts, rather 
than (essentially continuous) monetary values. Furthermore, Poisson estimation does not work well if 
outcomes are (very) large. So far, the discussion on the appropriateness and value-added of Poisson methods 
in this context remains an open issue in the literature. See, for example, Martínez-Zarzoso (2013) for a 
critique of Poisson regression in the context of modelling bilateral trade patterns. Therefore, we prefer to 
pertain to the conventional log-linear specification and concomitant estimation methods, using a selection 
model to explicitly acknowledge the special nature of zero flows.  
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lambda as an additional regressor in the second-stage estimation of the gravity equation, the 
remaining residual is uncorrelated with the selection outcome, and the gravity model 
parameters can be estimated consistently with OLS. The parameter estimated for 
Heckman’s lambda in the second-stage regression captures initial selection bias in the 
residual of the gravity equation.  
In our estimations, we use the first approach, based on full maximum likelihood 
estimation of the parameters in the sample selection model. There are two reasons for this, 
as described by Verbeek (2004). First, the two-step estimator is generally inefficient and 
the OLS regression provides incorrect standard errors, because the remaining residual is 
heteroskedastic, and λij is not directly observed but estimated from the first-stage regression 
equation. Second, the two-step approach will not work very well if λij varies only to a 
limited extent across observations and is close to being linear in the regressors. This is 
related to potential identification problems that occur if the explanatory variables in the 
selection and regression equation are identical. In this case, the two-stage sample selection 
model is only identified because λij is a non-linear function of the regressors whereas these 
regressors enter (log-)linearly in the gravity equation (see Vella, 1998). The full maximum 
likelihood estimation provides an integrated approach to estimate the parameters in both the 
selection and regression equations, instead of relying on the second-stage estimation of an 
extended (log-)linear gravity equation using OLS. To conform to earlier empirical 
applications in trade modelling, we have included an additional regressor in the selection 
equation nevertheless.  
On the matter of identification, Verbeek (2004, p. 232) notes that: “the inclusion of 
[regressor] variables in [the selection equation] in addition to those [already in the 
regression model] can be important for identification in the second step”, but adds: “often 
there are no natural candidates and any choice is easily criticized”. We follow Helpman et 
al. (2008) in using an indicator for common religion as an additional regressor in the 
selection equation for this purpose. However, if this regressor is incorrectly omitted from 
the gravity equation, the estimation results may suffer from omitted variables bias and lead 
to spurious conclusions on the existence of sample selection bias (Verbeek, 2004). To 
perform some sensitivity analysis on the implied exclusion restriction with respect to the 
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religion variable, we also estimate a sample selection model including the religion indicator 
in the gravity equation as well. 
 
2.5 Estimation results 
This section discusses the results of our analyses. Section 2.5.1 updates the analysis by 
Rauch (1999) by (i) considering a more recent time period and (ii) applying recently 
developed estimation techniques. Section 2.5.2 continues by elaborating on the importance 
of other intangible barriers to trade. In Section 2.5.3, we look at more disaggregate product 
groups.  
 
2.5.1  An update of Rauch (1999)  
The results in Table 2.2 are obtained using a specification similar to the specification used 
by Rauch (1999). Our analysis is based on data for 2000, whereas Rauch used data for 
1990. A minor difference in the specification is that we include a generic dummy for 
common trade bloc membership while Rauch (1999) included a dummy for common 
membership of the EEC and for common membership of the EFTA. Table 2.2 shows the 
results for the total amount of trade, the trade in heterogeneous goods (N), trade in 
referenced-priced goods (R) and trade in goods which are traded on organized exchanges 
(W). The coefficients are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with a balanced 
sample. Only the country pairs that engage in trade in all four groups are included in the 
analysis. From the 2970 possible country pairs, 2142 (72 percent) engage in trade in each of 
these categories. 
The results in Table 2.2 are comparable with those obtained by Rauch (1999) for the 
year 1990, which is the most recent year he used. The explained variation of trade is of the 
same order of magnitude, ranging from around 0.4 for homogeneous goods to around 0.7 
for heterogeneous goods and aggregate trade. Also the signs and sizes of the estimated 
coefficients are comparable. The expected coefficient for the product of the GDP of both 
countries is around one, which would imply that doubling the GDP of one of the countries 
would also double their bilateral trade. Our estimates are usually close to one, but always 
smaller than one. This implies that larger countries are on average less open, which is an 
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often found result. We find a similar pattern as Rauch (1999) for the GDP and per capita 
GDP coefficients, which tend to decrease as one moves from trade in heterogeneous goods 
towards trade in goods that are traded on organized exchanges. However, we do not find a 
clear pattern for the effect of links. The size of the adjacency effect is clearly increasing as 
the products become more homogeneous. For goods traded on organized exchanges the 
adjacency effect is particularly high. 
 
Table 2.2. An update of Rauch’s analysis – OLS  
Notes: robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance levels are indicated by  
*** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
 
 Dependent variable: ln of trade in each product group 
Product group Total Differentiated Reference 
priced 
Organized 
exchange 
Ln(GDPi x GDPj)  0.83*** 0.96*** 0.81*** 0.74*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ln(GDP per capitai  
     x GDP per capitaj) 
0.57*** 0.74*** 0.51*** 0.16*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Ln(distance)  – 0.66*** – 0.81*** – 0.67*** – 0.66*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
Adjacency  0.22** – 0.03 0.33*** 0.75*** 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.10) (0.17) 
Links  0.56*** 0.66*** 0.60*** 0.61*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
Common trade bloc   
     membership 
0.68***  0.78*** 0.89*** 0.82*** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) 
Country dummies No No No No 
R2 0.75 0.69 0.67 0.40 
Total observations 2142 2142 2142 2142 
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Table 2.3. An update of Rauch’s analysis – OLS (including country dummies) 
Notes: robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance levels are indicated by  
*** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
 
In Table 2.3 we expand the previous analysis by adding country-specific dummies to 
control for country-specific multilateral trade resistance, consistent with Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003). The effects of GDP and distance tend to increase whereas the effect of a 
common trade bloc membership decreases. The effect of links now also has a clear pattern, 
being high for heterogeneous goods and relatively small for goods traded on organized 
exchanges. It is also interesting to see that the effect of sharing a common border becomes 
much smaller for reference-priced goods and for goods traded on organized exchanges. At 
the same time, distance decay becomes more pronounced. The estimators for distance and 
for the adjacency dummy are closely related to each other, as the positive result for a 
common border is partly caused by mismeasurement of the distance (Head and Mayer, 
 Dependent variable: ln of trade in each product group 
Product group Total Differentiated Reference 
priced 
Organized 
exchange 
Ln(GDPi x GDPj)  0.79*** 0.90*** 0.85*** 0.73*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
Ln(GDP per capitai  
     x GDP per capitaj) 
1.04*** 1.22*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
Ln(distance)  – 0.72*** – 0.78*** – 0.86*** – 0.95*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
Adjacency  0.23* 0.17 0.14 0.37* 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.20) 
Links  0.53*** 0.66*** 0.60*** 0.36*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Common trade bloc  
     membership 
0.60***  0.68*** 0.64*** 0.69*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Country dummies 54 54 54 54 
R2 0.83 0.79 0.77 0.50 
Total observations 2142 2142 2142 2142 
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2010). This may suggest that the distance effect can be estimated more accurately, or that 
the functional form works better when including country dummies. 
We subsequently apply the sample selection model instead of OLS. The results are 
depicted in Table 2.4. The use of the selection model only marginally changes the results. 
There is a clear pattern present for five variables: GDP, GDP per capita, distance, links and 
common trade bloc membership. The GDP coefficient for differentiated goods (0.88) is 
higher than for referenced-priced goods (0.85) and for goods traded at organized exchanges 
(0.72). A similar pattern was found by Rauch (1999). The pattern for the GDP per capita is 
even more pronounced, ranging from 1.26 for heterogeneous goods to 0.65 for 
homogeneous goods. This suggests that heterogeneous goods are income elastic while 
homogeneous goods are income inelastic. Since we use the product of GDP per capita of 
the exporter and the importer, it is also possible that high-income countries export relatively 
more heterogeneous goods than homogeneous goods. This could be caused by comparative 
advantages of high-income countries in producing heterogeneous goods. 
For the links variable we also find the same pattern as Rauch (1999). For all three 
product categories trade will be higher when the trading partners have colonial links or 
share a common language. The size of this effect increases with the extent of differentiation 
of the products. This reconfirms one of the main conclusions of Rauch (1999) and is 
consistent with his network/search theory.  
According to the network/search view, distance would reduce trade in heterogeneous 
goods more than it would reduce trade in homogeneous goods. The results of Rauch (1999) 
confirmed this hypothesis and are consistent with those found in Table 2.2. However, when 
we add country dummies (Table 2.3) and apply the Heckman selection model (Table 2.4), 
the results suggest the opposite effect. Physical distance reduces trade more for 
homogeneous goods. A possible explanation for this is that for homogeneous goods, 
exactly the same good can be imported from many countries. Because of the nature of these 
goods, it does not matter where the goods come from. Heterogeneous goods are probably 
produced in fewer places. Moreover, if similar but differentiated goods are produced in 
multiple places, they may vary in quality, giving more reason to trade the goods over a 
larger distance. Second, when goods are traded on organized exchanges, intangible trade 
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costs probably play a smaller role. There is less need for negotiation over the properties of 
the product or the price. Therefore, the importance of tangible costs like transportation 
costs, relative to the importance of intangible transaction costs, is likely to be higher for 
homogeneous goods than it is for heterogeneous goods. Note that this may either increase 
or decrease distance decay, depending on the relative importance of transportation costs 
and intangible transaction costs in explaining the marginal effect of distance on trade. 
 
Table 2.4. An update of Rauch’s analysis – Heckman selection model (including country 
dummies) 
Notes: robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance levels are indicated by  
*** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
 
Tariffs are also a form of tangible trade costs. The idea behind the common trade bloc 
variable is that it acts as a proxy for tariffs and other forms of trade protection, which 
should be lower when both countries are a member of the same trade bloc. Common trade 
 Dependent variable: ln of trade in each product group 
Product group Total Differentiated Reference 
priced 
Organized 
exchange 
Ln(GDPi x GDPj)  0.82*** 0.88*** 0.85*** 0.72*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
Ln(GDP per capitai  
     x GDP per capitaj) 
1.09*** 1.26*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.10) 
Ln(distance)  – 0.85*** – 0.81*** – 0.92*** – 0.95*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
Adjacency  0.08 0.12 0.06 0.39* 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.23) 
Links  0.61*** 0.69*** 0.63*** 0.31** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) 
Common trade bloc  
     membership 
0.56***  0.63*** 0.65*** 0.71*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) 
Country dummies 54 54 54 54 
Uncensored obs. 2752 2627 2586 2265 
Censored obs. 164 289 330 651 
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bloc membership can therefore be expected to be more important for homogeneous goods. 
This is confirmed by the pattern for the trade bloc coefficient. This coefficient is, like the 
distance coefficient, higher for the group of products that is traded on organized exchanges 
(0.71) than for referenced-priced goods (0.65) and for differentiated goods (0.63). An 
alternative explanation is that trade protection is more severe for goods traded on organized 
exchanges.  
 
2.5.2  The impact of cultural and institutional distance 
We now turn to the impact of cultural and institutional dissimilarities. Table 2.5 extends the 
specification in Table 2.4 with two variables reflecting these intangible barriers to trade. 
The coefficients for the other variables, that were already included in Table 2.4, are hardly 
affected by the inclusion of institutional and cultural distance, so we will focus on the 
results for institutional and cultural distance. Based on the discussion in Section 2.3, the 
expected sign of the effect of cultural and institutional distance is ambiguous. On the one 
hand a negative effect on bilateral trade could be expected, because trade costs increase 
with cultural and institutional distance. Then the negative effect is expected to be more 
pronounced for goods that are more differentiated, because higher asset-specific 
investments in trade relations imply a greater risk of exposure to differences in culture and 
institutional quality. However, on the other hand, high cultural and institutional differences 
lower the attractiveness of serving foreign markets with FDI and may lead to substitution 
by trade flows. The total effect of cultural and institutional distance on trade could then 
even be positive. The empirical analysis is needed to assess the relative importance of both 
opposite forces. 
The empirical findings reported in Table 2.5 provide support for the latter 
explanation. Cultural and institutional distance are statistically insignificant determinants 
for total trade and trade in group N (which accounts for the bulk of the total trade). 
Furthermore, the coefficient of cultural distance is becoming more negative as the product 
groups become more homogeneous. This result contradicts the expectation from the first 
explanation, which states that cultural distance is especially important for heterogeneous 
goods and that cultural distance is less important for goods that are traded on organized 
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exchanges. This latter group is the only product group where cultural distance has a 
statistically significant negative effect on trade. For institutional distance the results do not 
confirm the traditional hypothesis either. This variable is statistically insignificant for 
aggregate bilateral trade and trade in heterogeneous goods, significant and negative for 
reference-priced goods, and significant and positive for goods traded on organized 
exchanges.  
 
Table 2.5. The role of cultural and institutional distance – Heckman selection model 
(including country dummies) 
Notes: robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance levels are indicated by  
*** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
 
 Dependent variable: ln of trade in each product group 
Product group Total Differentiated Reference 
priced 
Organized 
exchange 
Ln(GDPi x GDPj)  0.83*** 0.88*** 0.85*** 0.71*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
Ln(GDP per capitai  
     x GDP per capitaj) 
1.08*** 1.24*** 0.71*** 0.67*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) 
Ln(distance)  – 0.86*** – 0.82*** – 0.91*** – 0.93*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
Adjacency  0.09 0.13 0.00 0.39* 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.23) 
Links  0.62*** 0.71*** 0.62*** 0.25* 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) 
Common trade bloc  
     membership 
0.57***  0.62*** 0.60*** 0.78*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13) 
Cultural distance 0.02 0.04 – 0.02 – 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
Institutional distance  0.01 – 0.01 – 0.06*** 0.10*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Country dummies 54 54 54 54 
Uncensored obs. 2752 2627 2586 2265 
Censored obs. 164 289 330 651 
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Substitution between trade and FDI provides a possible explanation for the pattern of 
cultural distance that we find. As cultural distance increases, substitution from FDI to trade 
may occur, under the assumption that cultural distance is more harmful for FDI than for 
trade. Bergstrand and Egger (2010) and Lankhuizen et al. (2011) studied the determinants 
of trade in final goods, trade in intermediate goods, and FDI stocks. Their results suggest 
that language is much more important for FDI than for trade, which indicates that cultural 
barriers are indeed more important for FDI. The findings for the three product groups could 
be interpreted, according to this line of thought, as follows: the substitution effect from FDI 
to trade appears to increase as products are less homogeneous. This could actually reflect 
that the substitutability of different suppliers in trade is smaller for more differentiated 
goods, implying that the bilateral relation changes form in the face of higher cultural and 
institutional distance. For homogeneous goods, on the other hand, importers may rely on 
exporters that are relatively close in terms of culture and institutions. Substituting away in 
both trade and FDI relations from suppliers that are more distant is easier. This line of 
reasoning is consistent with the findings for the effect of cultural distance on trade across 
product groups. A qualification on this explanation should be that, ceteris paribus, we 
expect FDI to be a more attractive option for differentiated types of goods. Because trade 
costs related to search and insecurity are expected to be higher for more differentiated 
goods, FDI becomes relatively more attractive. Because these trade costs increase more 
with distance and other barriers, while FDI costs increase similarly for all types of goods, 
we would expect a smaller percentage substitution from FDI to trade for differentiated 
goods.  
The pattern for institutional distance does not correspond to the hierarchy following 
from the FDI-trade substitution, however. It could be expected that institutional distance 
does not have a strong effect on trade in group W, because country-specific institutions are 
not that relevant for goods that are traded on organized exchanges. Organized exchanges 
form an institutional framework in itself. The effect, however, is actually statistically 
significant and positive, suggesting a high substitution from FDI to trade. A possible 
explanation for this is that homogeneous goods are generally produced by countries with 
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relatively low institutional quality and exported to countries with relatively high 
institutional quality.12  
 
2.5.3  More detailed product groups 
The above results clearly reveal that the effects of tangible and intangible barriers to trade 
vary according to the type of product that is being traded. As a final extension to the 
analysis we now look at even more disaggregate product groups. We consider the ten 1-
digit product categories distinguished in the SITC classification. The results are presented 
in Table 2.6.  
 A result that stands out is the substantial heterogeneity in the estimated coefficients 
for the different product groups. The GDP variable, for example, ranges from 0.51 to 0.90. 
The GDP per capita variable has an even larger range, between 0.47 and 1.54. Striking is 
also the variation in the impact of physical distance ranging from –0.56 for beverages and 
tobacco to –1.42 for mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials. The markets for the 
latter goods can thus be characterized as highly localized.  
There are three product groups (SITC 0, 2 and 4) that have a relatively low 
coefficient for GDP per capita and a relatively high coefficient for the trade bloc variable. 
As such, the results for these three categories strongly resemble those of the goods traded 
on organized exchanges (see Table 2.5). As shown in Table 2.1, these three product groups 
also contain relatively high shares of homogeneous products.  
 
                                                 
12 We have also included institutional quality as a separate explanatory variable (although it is strongly 
correlated with GDP per capita). Institutional quality especially stimulates trade for the differentiated product 
group, which accounts for the bulk of the total trade. For reference-priced goods and goods that are traded on 
organized exchanges, the institutional quality does not significantly increase trade. This confirms the 
prediction of the insecurity view on trade costs that the effectiveness of the formal institutional framework of 
a country in enforcing property rights matters particularly for differentiated products and not so much for 
homogeneous goods. In specifications that include country dummies, the level of institutional quality is 
controlled for by the dummy parameters.  
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An interesting result is that cultural distance has a negative coefficient for all 1-digit 
product groups, except for machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7), for which it is 
significantly positive. This product group has a particularly large share in total trade. Table 
2.1 shows that machinery and transport equipment account for over 40 percent of the total 
trade between the countries in our sample. This implies that this product group is probably 
responsible for the statistically insignificant effect which was found for total trade and trade 
in heterogeneous goods. For the other product groups, culture does seem to impose a barrier 
to trade.13 When ignoring all trade in SITC 7, cultural distance has a coefficient of –0.04, 
with a p-value of 0.1. 
                                                 
13 The effect of cultural distance on food and live animals (SITC 0) is not particularly large, even though this 
product group is generally considered as a culture-specific product. This could be explained by a preference 
for variety. Since some food-related products are only produced in certain countries, they can only be 
imported from countries with a different culture. This effect would reduce the negative effect of cultural 
distance on trade.  
 
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on the importance of intangible barriers to trade in explaining 
variation in bilateral trade. As such, the analysis expands in several ways upon the seminal 
work by Rauch (1999). The new elements as compared to Rauch are that (i) we consider a 
more recent time period, (ii) we apply more appropriate estimation techniques, (iii) we 
consider intangible barriers to trade in much more detail, and (iv) we consider more refined 
product categories.  
Our results confirm the network/search theory specified in Rauch (1999) with respect 
to the effect of linguistic or colonial links. The effect of linguistic or colonial links is larger 
for more differentiated goods. However, geographical distance shows the opposite pattern 
when we control for omitted variable bias due to multilateral resistances and account for 
selection bias due to zero valued trade flows: it is most important for trade in homogeneous 
goods. This qualifies the importance of non-traditional distance types relative to 
geographical distance for heterogeneous products. The analysis of additional cultural and 
institutional distance variables suggests that these effects are rather heterogeneous for 
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different product types. Cultural distance exercises a negative influence and institutional 
distance a positive influence on goods traded on organized exchanges, while both variables 
are statistically insignificant for trade in differentiated goods. A possible explanation for the 
positive effect can be found in the trade-off between FDI and trade. Zooming in on more 
disaggregated product groups provides further insights on the effect of different dimensions 
of distance. An interesting result is that for nine out of ten groups cultural distance does 
have a negative effect on trade. 
Although some clear patterns are discernible from the presented evidence, our results 
also point to a number of opportunities for future research. Particularly promising is to 
delve deeper into the determination of more homogeneous product groups, extending the 
classification into three groups proposed by Rauch (1999). An interesting way forward 
could be to consider trade for more refined product groups and classify them into 
homogeneous groups based on key characteristics of gravity equations estimated for these 
groups. Such classifications should acknowledge the multidimensionality of distance. A 
recent study that considered an endogenous classification of product groups is Lankhuizen 
et al. (2012). Analyses for more refined product groups will further increase our 
understanding of the product-specific barriers to trade and as such have substantial policy 
implications in view of the continued attempts to further enhance free trade and exploit the 
returns from specialization. More attention should also be devoted to the proximity-
concentration trade-off. So far, we have considered trade in isolation and thus neglected 
foreign direct investments as an alternative mode of entering foreign markets. Also for 
foreign direct investments, the pay-off from considering investments at a disaggregate level 
is likely to be substantial, although data problems are particularly severe in this research 
domain.  
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Appendix 2.A     Description of the dataset 
The countries included in the analysis (in alphabetical order) are Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Libya, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, India, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, Egypt, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.14 
 
The variables included in the analysis and their respective sources are as follows:  
 For the size of the countries we use the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Additionally we include a variable for the GDP per capita. Both GDP and GDP per 
capita are obtained for the year 2000 from the Penn World Table, Mark 6.2.  
 The distance between each pair of countries is obtained from the Centre d’Etudes 
Prospectives et d’Information Internationales (CEPII). This database offers several 
measures of distance. This study uses the simple distances, which are obtained from 
the latitudes and longitudes of the city with the largest population in the country. 
This distance is measured ‘as the crow flies’ by the great circle formula and is 
measured in kilometres. Alternative measures for distance use the capital city rather 
than the city with the largest population or take the population distributions into 
account. The city with the largest population is chosen here because it is expected to 
be a better indicator for economic activity than the capital city.  
                                                 
14 Compared to the set of countries used by Rauch, our sample does not contain Yugoslavia, which  no longer 
existed in 2000. Algeria, Bolivia, Iceland, Taiwan, Paraguay, Sudan and Tunisia are excluded because of a 
lack of data on the cultural indicators.  
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 The adjacency variable is a dummy which equals 1 when the two countries included 
in the country pair are adjacent. Countries are considered to be adjacent when they 
have a land border or a small body of water as a border. The adjacency variable is 
also obtained from the CEPII database.  
 The data on trade blocs are obtained from OECD data. A distinction is made 
between 24 different trade blocs. A dummy variable is constructed which equals 1 if 
both countries are a member of at least one mutual trade bloc in the year 2000 and 0 
otherwise. The trade blocs considered are: EU, CANUS, NAFTA, APEC, 
ANDEAN, CACM, MERCOSUR, GR3, LAIA, CARICOM, CBI, EAC, EMCCA, 
ECOWAS, CMESA, IOC, SADC, ECWA, WAEMU, SACU, ECCGL, ASEAN, 
GCC and SAARC. 
 The links variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if both countries share a 
common official language or one country has ever colonized the other country. 
Countries may have multiple official languages. The data on languages and colonial 
ties have been compiled by CEPII.  
 The data on cultural dimensions are obtained from Hofstede (2001). Data on 
additional countries have been kindly provided after personal correspondence (see 
Linders, 2006). His indicators for (i) power distance, (ii) uncertainty avoidance, (iii) 
individualism and (iv) masculinity are used to construct a Kogut-Singh index for 
cultural distance. 
 The data on institutional indicators are obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2003). The 
Kogut-Singh index for institutional distance is constructed using their indicators for 
(i) voice and accountability, (ii) political stability, (iii) government effectiveness, 
(iv) regulatory quality, (v) rule of law and (vi) control of corruption.  
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 The instrument we use in the Heckman selection model (see also Section 2.4.2) is a 
variable that indicates whether two countries have the same main religion. This 
dummy variable is constructed using data from the CIA World Factbook. These 
data are obtained from surveys at different points in time. The surveys are not all 
taken in the year 2000, but this should not have a significant effect because the main 
religion of a country is very persistent over time. The CIA World Factbook provides 
data on the share of the population that practice certain religions. Since there are 
many similar religions, for this study they have been aggregated into seven groups: 
Buddhists, Catholics, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, Orthodox-Christians, and Protestants. 
For each country the religion with the highest share is marked as the main religion. 
The dummy variable is constructed by assigning a value of 1 if the countries have 
the same main religion and a value of 0 if they do not. 
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3 The effects of outsourcing on firm 
productivity  
 
3.1  Introduction15 
Outsourcing is one of the driving forces behind the process of fragmentation and 
specialization of the production process. It involves buying intermediate goods or services, 
which were previously produced inside the firm, from a third party (Görg et al., 2008). This 
phenomenon is not new, as people in early times already realized that is was better to 
divide tasks rather than doing everything yourself. For example, a baker that decides to buy 
grain from a farmer instead of growing the grain himself is also outsourcing a task. 
However, it is relatively new that firms are outsourcing parts of their production process 
abroad. While outsourcing used to be a local or domestic phenomenon, technological 
advances in, for example, transportation methods, allowed firms to buy intermediate goods 
from other countries as well. Balassa (1967) and Findlay (1978) referred to this as vertical 
specialization. Krugman (1995) described this process as ‘slicing up the value chain’. 
Besides internationally outsourcing the production of intermediate goods, it is also 
becoming more common to internationally outsource services. An often used example of 
this is the Indian call centre employee calling customers of American firms. This became 
possible due to a large decline of communication costs, caused by advances in information 
and communication technology.  
Due to the displacement of jobs that is caused by outsourcing, outsourcing generally 
has a negative annotation, especially when it involves international outsourcing. Since most 
economic activity in developed countries comes from the service sector, the possibility of 
internationally outsourcing services increased the fear of job losses. While economic trade 
                                                 
15 This chapter is based on joint work with Henri de Groot (VU University Amsterdam). 
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theory suggests that countries will not lose employment, even if another country has an 
absolute advantage in everything (Ricardo, 1817), outsourcing is also expected to have 
negative effects in the form of distributional effects and temporary unemployment. 
On the other hand, outsourcing could increase the productivity of firms. There is a 
trade-off between production costs and transaction costs. Outsourcing could reduce the 
production costs, but it will increase external transactions costs, which are the result from 
dealing with a third party. Outsourcing could lead to an increase in firm productivity if it 
reduces production costs more than it increases transaction costs. Hence, outsourcing can 
become more attractive when the difference in production costs increases or when advances 
are made in transaction technology. Therefore, innovations that reduce transaction costs 
could make outsourcing more attractive and increase productivity. Den Butter et al. (2008) 
also show that trade innovations can explain productivity at the national level. Abraham 
and Taylor (1996) mention three main reasons that can explain why outsourcing can 
decrease production costs. The first reason is that a third party could potentially produce the 
intermediate cheaper than the firm itself, for example due to lower wages. This is 
particularly relevant for international outsourcing, as wages can differ substantially 
between countries. Abraham and Taylor also mention that even domestic outsourcing can 
reduce the wage bill, for example when the outsourcing firm is unionized and the contractor 
is not. The second reason is associated with the cyclicality of output. When a firm 
experiences cyclical output over time, it may not have enough capacity for the peak 
periods, since this implies having too much capacity in periods with less demand. Instead, 
the firm could choose to outsource part of the production process in the peak periods. The 
third reason is economies of scale. If for some part of the production process economies of 
scale apply, costs will be lower if all firms outsource this particular part to another party. 
For example, many small firms outsource their wage administration to specialized 
accountancy firms.  
Although there are sound theoretical arguments that support the idea that outsourcing 
could improve firm productivity, empirical research on this issue has been relatively limited 
(Geishecker et al., 2008). An important reason for this is the difficulty of measuring 
outsourcing. The studies that initially investigated the relationship between outsourcing and 
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productivity used sectoral data and obtained mixed results. Examples are Egger and Egger 
(2006), using European data on manufacturing sectors, and Amity and Wei (2004), using 
data on US manufacturing sectors. Egger and Egger (2006) found a negative productivity 
effect of international outsourcing in the short run and a positive effect in the long run. 
Amiti and Wei (2004) found no impact of international outsourcing of materials and a 
positive impact of international outsourcing of services.  
Since microdata became better available, several studies investigated the effect of 
outsourcing on the level of the firm. For an overview of empirical studies, see Olsen 
(2006). Although the results of these studies still vary, possibly due to differences in the 
country, sector, time period, or outsourcing measure, the majority of the studies seem to 
find either no statistically significant impact or a positive impact. For example, Girma and 
Görg (2004) used microdata for firms in the UK and found a positive effect of outsourcing 
on the level of productivity for chemical and engineering firms, but no impact of 
outsourcing on the growth of productivity. Görg and Hanley (2005) considered firms in 
Ireland, and found a positive impact on productivity of international outsourcing of 
materials and no significant impact of international outsourcing of services. These studies 
measure outsourcing by using the costs of (imported) intermediates of the firm.  
This chapter uses a different approach, by using a survey that explicitly asks firms 
about their outsourcing activities. The advantage of this approach is that we can be fairly 
certain whether a firm indeed outsourced, whereas the measure based on the costs of 
intermediates of the firm can also be influenced by other factors. The disadvantage is that 
we do not know the timing and the extent of outsourcing, since the survey only provided a 
binary variable on outsourcing in the period 2001–2006. A study that uses data from the 
same survey, but for German firms, is Wagner (2011). He found that firms that outsourced 
internationally were larger and more productive. He also shows that these firms were 
already more productive before the period of outsourcing, indicating a selection effect. This 
result is also found in the literature on exporting, which suggests that such a selection effect 
does indeed explain why exporting firms are more productive than non-exporting firms. 
See, for example, a literature survey by Bernard et al. (2007). An example of a survey-
based study on international outsourcing of Dutch firms is Van Gorp (2010). She used a 
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survey that was held in 2009 and included about 700 Dutch firms of which 55 percent 
employed more than 100 full-time equivalents. These firms were not linked to productivity 
data from Statistics Netherlands, but the survey did include some questions on whether the 
firm considered the outsourcing to be successful. About half of the firms responded that 
they largely or completely achieved their objectives on cost savings. 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by using microdata for Dutch firms. 
It investigates whether firms that outsourced are more productive than firms that did not 
outsource. Another contribution of this chapter is that it distinguishes between four 
different types of outsourcing, which are international outsourcing of core activities, 
domestic outsourcing of core activities, international outsourcing of support activities, and 
domestic outsourcing of support activities. Many previous studies focus either on 
outsourcing in general or specifically on international outsourcing, but do not distinguish 
between both types. This chapter does not only investigate whether firms that outsource are 
more productive, but also whether they were more productive before they started 
outsourcing, and whether there is a productivity increase over time. The structure of this 
chapter is as follows. The next section gives an overview of the microdata with some 
stylized facts. Section 3.3 explains the indicators for productivity that are used. Section 3.4 
presents the results for cross-sectional estimations and for fixed effects estimations. The 
main conclusions will be discussed in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2  Data description 
 
3.2.1  Outsourcing data 
One of the reasons for the relatively small amount of empirical research on outsourcing and 
productivity is the lack of data on outsourcing. This chapter uses a survey by Eurostat, 
which was deployed in twelve European countries in 2007. Some descriptive statistics of 
this survey for Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden are published by 
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Statistics Denmark et al. (2008).16 This study only uses the data that were obtained from 
firms in the Netherlands, which were kindly provided by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The 
Dutch survey was sent to 1,503 firms in the non-financial business economy which had at 
least 100 employees in 2007 and received 1,002 responses.17 
The survey asked firms whether they had outsourced in the period 2001–2006. The 
phrasing of the question was prescribed by Eurostat as: What type of functions has your 
enterprise sourced in the period 2001–2006? The survey distinguished between 
outsourcing of core business functions, and several types of support business functions. It 
was possible to check a box for domestic outsourcing, for international outsourcing, and for 
no outsourcing. The exact survey question as it was asked in the Dutch survey is included 
in Appendix 3.A. Note that the measure of outsourcing that is used in this chapter is not a 
perfect measure. It is only a binary measure which is measured over a relatively large 
period of time. We only know that a firm outsourced between 2001–2006, but not when it 
actually took place. This makes identification of the effect more difficult. Additionally, we 
do not know if the firm outsourced once in this period or multiple times, or what the 
magnitude of outsourcing was. Finally, we also do not know whether firms did or did not 
outsource before 2001.  
Most of the firms (74.2 percent) did not outsource any activities between 2001 and 
2006. International outsourcing (15.6 percent) occurred slightly more often than domestic 
outsourcing (14.1 percent). Figure 3.1 contains a Venn diagram that shows the share of 
firms that outsourced domestically, internationally, or both. 
                                                 
16 It is possible that some descriptive statistics reported in this chapter differ slightly from those reported by 
Statistics Denmark et al. (2008). These differences can occur because the latter study used weights based on 
sector and size class, while this study does not. 
17 The 1,503 firms were selected from a population of 4,633 firms that met the selection criteria. They were 
selected using stratified sampling, using twelve strata based on size (100–200 employees, 200–500 
employees, more than 500 employees) and activity (high tech manufacturing, medium and low tech 
manufacturing, knowledge intensive business services, other activities). See also Statistics Denmark et al. 
(2008). 
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Figure 3.1. Outsourcing shares by destination 
 
 
The share of firms that outsourced domestically and internationally are also shown for each 
business function in Table 3.1. The number of firms that outsourced the same activity both 
domestically and internationally is negligible. Second, Table 3.1 suggests that firms that 
outsource an activity that is considered to be part of their core business, are more likely to 
outsource internationally (9 percent) than domestically (4 percent). For almost all types of 
support activities, the share of firms that outsourced them domestically is larger than the 
share of firms that outsourced them internationally. The most popular type of support 
activities to outsource were ICT services (6 percent domestic and 4 percent international).  
We combined the answers on the questions about support business functions in 
order to create four different binary measures for outsourcing: domestic outsourcing of core 
functions, domestic outsourcing of support functions, international outsourcing of core 
functions and international outsourcing of support functions. The small number of firms 
that outsourced both domestically as well as internationally are included in both measures. 
 
 
 
 
No outsourcing 
74.2 % 
 
Domestic 
10.3 % 
 
Both 
 3.8 % 
 
International 
11.8 % 
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Table 3.1. Outsourcing shares by activity and destination (in percent) 
 
Table 3.2 gives an overview of these four types with the share of firms that have been 
engaged in each type of outsourcing in the period 2001–2006. This table confirms that core 
activities are most often outsourced internationally, while support activities are more often 
outsourced domestically. Domestic outsourcing of core functions is relatively rare, while 
the other three types of outsourcing are about equally common. In the period 2001–2006 
about 26 percent of the firms outsourced at least some of its business functions. This 
percentage is lower than the sum of the four types in Table 3.2, because some firms were 
engaged in multiple forms of outsourcing. About 10 percent of the firms only outsourced 
domestically, 12 percent only outsourced internationally, and 4 percent did both. This 
means that about 16 percent of the firms outsourced internationally, which is a bit lower 
than the result from the survey by Van Gorp (2010), who found that about 29 percent of the 
respondents had outsourced internationally at least once in the period before 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 Only domestic 
outsourcing 
Only 
international 
outsourcing 
Both types of 
outsourcing 
Core business functions:    
Production of goods and services for the  
     market 4 9 1 
Support business functions:    
Distribution and logistics 4 3 0 
Marketing, sales and after sales services,  
     including help desks and call centres 3 2 0 
ICT services 6 4 0 
Administrative and management functions 5 3 0 
Engineering and related technical services 2 1 0 
Research and development 1 2 0 
Other types of functions 1 0 0 
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Table 3.2. Outsourcing shares of outsourcing variables (in percent) 
Type Core 
4.7 9.7 
Support 11.9 10.0 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the share of firms that outsourced (internationally) for six sectors, which 
are based on the classification by Pavitt (1984). The Pavitt classification classifies sectors 
based on their sources of technology, requirements of the users, and appropriability regime 
(Pavitt, 1984). This classification contains eight sectors, which are defined in Table 3.3. 
Our dataset only contains firms that fall in six of these Pavitt sectors, since there are no 
firms from the mining and quarrying (primary) sector or from the financial intermediation 
(information intensive) sector. 
 
Figure 3.2. Outsourcing shares, by Pavitt sector 
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Note: KIBS stands for knowledge-intensive business serivces 
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The ordering of the Pavitt sectors indicates that it is relatively difficult to outsource 
knowledge intensive business services (KIBS), while outsourcing in the specialized 
suppliers sector (which produces machinery and equipment) is relatively easy. This is 
consistent with the observation that the production process of goods is generally more 
fragmented than that of services. Outsourcing shares are also relatively low in scale-
intensive sectors, which is consistent with the idea that outsourcing reduces the possibilities 
of benefiting from economies of scale. 
 
Table 3.3. Pavitt sectoral classification 
Pavitt sector    
  
Industries 
Primary Mining and quarrying 
Science based Chemical products 
Specialized suppliers Machinery and equipment 
Scale-intensive Food, beverages and tobacco; Metal products;  
     Electricity, gas and water; Construction;  
     Transport; Communication 
Supplier dominated Textile, clothing and leather products; Wood,  
     paper and printing; Other manufacturing 
Information intensive Financial intermediation 
Knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) Computer services; Other business services 
Traditional services Wholesale trade; Retail trade; Hotels and  
     restaurants; Real estate and renting 
Note: there are no firms from the primary sector or the information intensive sector in the outsourcing survey. 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the shares for domestic and international outsourcing by size category. It 
shows the five quintiles based on the number of employees in 2007. It illustrates that larger 
firms are more likely to outsource, both domestically and internationally. Since these firms 
were already larger before the outsourcing period of the survey, it suggests a selection 
effect. 
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Figure 3.3. Outsourcing shares, by size quintiles 
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Note: size quintiles are based on the number of emloyees in 2007. 
 
Table 3.4 also suggests a relationship between outsourcing and the export activities of 
firms. Firms that outsourced during the period 2001–2006 are more likely to export than 
firms that did not outsource. The information on exports is based on the production 
statistics. Since this also is a survey, the information on exports was not available for all 
firms in the outsourcing survey. We were able to match 723 of the firms in the outsourcing 
survey with at least one year of the production statistics. Table 3.4 shows the exporting and 
outsourcing status for these 723 firms. Most of these firms exported in at least one year 
(79.5 percent) and a minority of them outsourced (28.2 percent). For the group of firms that 
exported, the share of firms that outsourced was about 30 percent, while for the group of 
firms that did not export, the share of firms that outsourced was about 22 percent.  
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Table 3.4. Outsourcing and exporting shares 
 
For the firms that outsourced internationally (156), the survey also asked about their 
motives for doing so, and to which country or countries they outsourced. The survey 
suggested fourteen motives, and asked the firms to indicate whether each motive was 
considered to be very important, of some importance, not important, or not 
applicable/unknown. Table 3.5 shows for each motive the share of firms that considered it 
to be very important (column 1) or at least of some importance (column 2). Some of the 
motives suggested by the survey are overlapping. For example, costs reduction is also a 
way of improving or maintaining competitiveness. The most important motive for 
outsourcing internationally seems to be a reduction of labour costs. This is not surprising, 
since the wage level in the Netherlands is relatively high, and this means that large 
reductions in labour costs can potentially be made by employing employees in less 
developed countries. Other important motives are improving logistics, strategic decisions, 
and reducing other costs than labour costs. Many of the most important motives seem to 
focus on cost reduction. This is consistent with the study by Van Gorp (2010), who finds 
that cost savings was most often mentioned as the most important objective. 
 Observations Number of firms 
that outsourced 
Share of firms that 
outsourced (in 
percent) 
Firms that did not export 148 33 22.3 
Firms that exported 575 171 29.7 
All firms 723 204 28.2 
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Table 3.5. Most important motives for outsourcing (in percent) 
 
The importance of the reducing labour costs suggests that most of the firms outsource their 
activities to less developed countries. The list of the most popular destination countries for 
outsourcing, which is shown in Table 3.6, confirms this. This table contains all destination 
countries that had a share of at least four percent for either outsourcing of core activities or 
outsourcing of support activities. The five most popular destination countries of 
outsourcing core activities are Poland (20 percent), China (19 percent), Czech Republic (19 
percent), Germany (12 percent) and India (12 percent). Except for Germany, all of these 
countries have a considerably lower GDP per capita than the Netherlands (Penn World 
Table, Mark 7.1). 
Motive 
 
Very important Of some importance 
+ very important 
Reduction of labour costs 63 83 
Improved logistics 49 76 
Strategic decisions taken by the group head 44 69 
Reduction of costs other than labour costs 24 66 
Access to new markets 22 44 
Focus on core business 21 43 
Following the behaviour of competitors/clients 17 47 
Improved/maintained competitiveness 15 34 
Access to specialized knowledge/technologies 12 34 
Improved quality or introduction of new products 10 29 
Other motives 10 29 
Tax or other financial incentives 5 28 
Lack of available labour 4 19 
Less regulation affecting the enterprise 2 3 
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Table 3.6. Most popular destination countries for international outsourcing 
Note: the unrounded percentages add up to more than 100 percent (161 percent for core activities and 158 
percent for support activities), because some firms outsourced to multiple countries. 
 
It is also interesting to see that distance seems to be important. Relatively many firms 
outsource to countries in Eastern Europe, which have higher wages than countries like India 
and China, but are much closer to the Netherlands. Due to a combination of relatively low 
wages and a short distance to the Netherlands, Eastern Europe is the most popular 
destination for outsourcing of core activities, with a share of 40 percent of the core 
Ranking 
(based on 
column 3) 
Country 
 
Outsourced core 
activities to this 
country (in percent) 
Outsourced support 
activities to this 
country (in percent) 
1 Poland 20 9 
2 China 19 6 
3 Czech Republic 19 12 
4 Germany 12 18 
5 India 12 18 
6 Hungary 9 2 
7 Slovakia 6 4 
8 Belgium 4 13 
9 Italy 4 3 
10 Romania 4 3 
11 Malaysia 4 3 
12 France 2 13 
13 United States 2 8 
14 United Kingdom 1 13 
15 Switzerland    < 1 4 
16 Other Asia 13 8 
17 Other EU-15 11 11 
18 Other Americas 6 3 
19 Africa 5 1 
20 Other Eastern Europe 6 4 
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activities outsourced internationally.18 Asia is the second most popular area, with a share of 
30 percent. Germany (12 percent) and Belgium (4 percent) are relatively popular as well, 
but the conceptual difference between domestic outsourcing within the Netherlands and 
outsourcing to a neighbouring country is not very large, especially if the firm is located 
close to the border. The country shares for outsourcing of support activities show 
significant differences from the country shares of outsourcing core activities. For support 
activities, the most popular destination countries are Germany (18 percent), India (18 
percent), Belgium (13 percent), France (13 percent) and the United Kingdom (13 percent). 
Except for India, these countries are all adjacent or very close to the Netherlands. Of all the 
support activities that were outsourced internationally, 45 percent was outsourced to 
countries within the EU-15, which makes the EU-15 the most popular destination area for 
outsourcing support activities, followed by Asia (22 percent) and Eastern Europe (22 
percent).18  
 
3.2.2  Production data 
The second data source is the production statistics database, which is also obtained from 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS). These data are used to determine productivity at the firm 
level. The production statistics are based on several surveys, which are sector specific. We 
used the data covering the sectors mining, industry, construction, wholesale, retail, services, 
research and development, and transport. The survey does not follow all firms over time; 
rather it randomly selects a number of firms every year. However, the firms that have at 
least 100 employees are surveyed every year. Our data cover the period 1993 to 2008. The 
database contains the annual output and cost components according to the KLEMS 
framework. This includes total output (Q), capital costs (K), labour costs (L), energy costs 
(E), costs of materials (M) and costs of services (S). Table 3.7 shows how output and the 
cost components are defined.  
                                                 
18 These shares are calculated by dividing by the number of combinations of firms and destination countries 
and therefore add up to 100 percent. The shares in Table 3.6 are divided by the number of firms that 
outsourced internationally and therefore add up to more than 100 percent. 
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Table 3.7. Output and input measures in the KLEMS framework 
 
In some cases (for Q, M and S) the definition of the cost components differs between small 
and large firms. The purchase value of trade goods is not included on both the output side 
(Q) and input side (M). The output of a trading firm is therefore equal to the margin over 
 Description small firms Description large firms 
Output (Q) turnover main activity 
+ turnover from trade and other 
activities 
-/- purchase value of trade goods 
+ other income n.e.s. 
turnover main activity 
+ turnover from trade and other 
activities 
-/- purchase value of trade goods 
+ other income n.e.s. 
+ inventory changes 
+ income from employees stationed 
elsewhere 
+ received payments from insurance  
+ activated costs of investments 
Capital (K) depreciation on fixed assets 
+ interest on debt 
depreciation on fixed assets 
+ interest on debt 
Labour (L) total labour costs, including taxes total labour costs, including taxes 
Energy (E) energy costs energy costs 
Materials (M) purchase value of turnover 
-/- purchase value of trade goods 
purchase value of used materials in 
production process 
+ purchase value of other materials 
+ outsourcing costs 
+ purchase value n.e.s. 
Services (S) cost of transportation 
+ housing costs 
+ other personnel costs 
+ sales costs 
+ communication costs 
+ costs of services from third parties 
+ other costs 
cost of transportation 
+ housing costs 
+ other personnel costs 
+ sales costs 
+ communication costs 
+ costs of services from third parties 
+ other costs 
-/- taxes on vehicles 
-/- environmental taxes 
-/- real estate taxes 
-/- other cost price increasing taxes 
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the turnover. The measure of capital (K) only includes the depreciation on fixed assets and 
interest payments. This leads to some drawbacks. First, the value of fixed assets on the 
balance sheet is not always the same as the economic value of these assets. Second, the 
measure of K is affected by the extent to which the firm is financed by debt or equity. K 
will be lower for a firm that is fully financed by equity, as it does not pay any interest. 
However, there is of course a shadow cost to using equity, which is not taken into account. 
The optimal measure of K would include the equity of the firm, multiplied by a firm-
specific discount rate that depends on the risk level of the equity. However, due to 
considerations of data availability, we follow the definitions of the KLEMS framework. 
We used the main economic activity of the firms to classify them into 26 sectors. 
Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.B shows the SBI 1993 codes for this classification, as well as the 
number of observations that are available in the outsourcing survey and in the production 
data, for each sector. The average values of the key variables from the production data are 
provided for each year and for each sector in Table 3.15 and Table 3.16 in Appendix 3.C. 
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show the development over time of the average cost shares of 
labour and intermediates (E + M + S). These are unweighted averages and are based on all 
firms that were available. It was not feasible to use a balanced panel of firms, because the 
number of firms that was available in all years of the period 1993–2008 was very low. 
Therefore, it is possible that the development of the cost shares is affected by the 
composition of firms that were available. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show that, until the year 
2000, the average cost shares of labour and intermediates were very similar between the 
group of firms that outsourced and the group of firms that did not outsource. From 2000 
onwards, the outsourcing firms were characterized by a lower labour share and a higher 
share of intermediates, which is consistent with the definition of outsourcing. When a firm 
outsources part of its activities, it will buy the intermediates from a third party instead of 
producing them within the firm. This causes the share of intermediates in total inputs to 
increase. The firm will require less labour, which causes the share of labour in total inputs 
to decrease. Some labour will still have to be allocated to manage the outsourcing contracts.  
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Figure 3.4. Development of average share of labour in total inputs, 1993–2007  
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Figure 3.5. Development of average share of intermediates in total inputs, 1993–2007 
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From the perspective of the firm, outsourcing should either result in less total costs for the 
same quality of intermediates or in an increased quality of intermediates for the same 
amount of total costs. Since we cannot observe the quality of intermediates, this is an 
argument for using values instead of volumes, since the values of intermediates should 
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capture the quality as well. From the perspective of the country, domestic outsourcing 
should lead to a more efficient allocation of jobs between firms within the country. In the 
case of international outsourcing, the employees that were previously performing the 
outsourced tasks will become available for more productive tasks than they used to 
perform. It is likely that they can be used for more productive tasks, because the fact that 
the task was outsourced internationally is an indication that the country has a comparative 
disadvantage for that particular task.  
 
3.3  Productivity measures 
The previous section described our data source for firm inputs and output. We use these 
data to create two indicators for firm productivity: (i) labour productivity and (ii) total 
factor productivity (TFP). This section explains how these measures are constructed. It also 
contains density functions of the productivity measures, to indicate potential differences 
between firms that did and firms that did not outsource. Section 3.4 will show the results of 
a more formal regression analysis about the possible relationship between outsourcing and 
productivity.  
 
3.3.1 Labour productivity 
We define labour productivity as the amount of output per unit of labour. Units of labour 
can be measured in different ways. For example, as the number of employees, the number 
of hours worked, or the amount of money spend on labour. We consider two measures for 
labour productivity, which are 
output per full-time equivalent: 
, ,ifte i
i
Q
fte
   (3.1)
and output per euro of labour costs (L): 
, .iL i
i
Q
L
   (3.2)
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The number of full-time equivalents is calculated based on the number of days worked, 
since data on hours worked is unavailable for most employees.19 This measure for labour 
productivity is only available for the period 2000–2008.  
The second measure for labour productivity uses labour costs as the denominator. 
This measure is available for the full period 1993–2008. An advantage of using labour costs 
is that it takes into account that employees are heterogeneous. After all, a high-skilled 
worker will most likely generate more output than a low-skilled worker. If the labour 
market is efficient, labour costs should fully compensate for productivity differences of 
employees. Therefore, this measure for labour productivity is less dependent on the 
heterogeneity of employees in the firm, and more on the labour intensity of the production 
process, and on the skills of the management in selecting the right employees. Figure 3.6 
and Figure 3.7 show the development of the average labour productivity for three groups of 
firms: for firms that did not outsource any activities during the 2001–2006 period, for firms 
that did outsource, and for firms that outsourced internationally. Figure 3.6 contains labour 
productivity as measured by output divided by full-time equivalents, for the period 2000–
2008. Figure 3.7 shows the development of the second measure for labour productivity, 
defined as output divided by labour costs, for the period 1993–2008.  
As Figure 3.6 shows, the average output per full-time equivalent of the firms in the 
outsourcing survey is about 200,000 euro.20 The average output somewhat decreases 
between 2000 and 2004 and increases after 2004, which may be related to the business 
cycle. The labour productivity is highest for firms that outsourced internationally and 
lowest for firms that did not outsource. This pattern is consistent over all years. The 
difference in labour productivity between these three groups of firms does not appear to 
change significantly over time. This indicates that firms with a higher labour productivity 
                                                 
19 We realize that this will underestimate the measure for labour productivity for firms with relatively many 
part-time employees. However, if there is a strong sectoral component of the share of part-time employees we 
are able to correct for this by including sector dummies. Moreover, it only causes an underestimation if the 
part-time employees work only part of the day. If they work full days, but less than five days per week, this 
will not affect the labour productivity measure, since the number of days worked is correct. 
20 The average is based on the firms for which output was available from the KLEMS data. Since this data 
source is not a balanced panel, the selection of firms that are used to calculate the average varies over time. 
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were more likely to outsource (internationally), but that the outsourcing did not have a large 
effect on their labour productivity. Figure 3.7 shows a similar picture for the average output 
per unit of labour costs. The ranking of the three groups of firms is exactly the same in all 
years. 
 
Figure 3.6. Average output per fte (in thousands of 2008 euros), 2000–2008  
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Figure 3.7. Average output per unit of labour costs, 1993–2008  
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To provide more insight into the differences of labour productivity across firms, we also 
show the density function of labour productivity. Figure 3.8 depicts the smoothed density 
functions for our two measures of labour productivity in 2000, for firms that did and for 
firms that did not outsource internationally in the period 2001–2006. Labour productivity, 
measured as output per unit of labour costs, was capped at 10. The second graph, 
containing output per full-time equivalent, was capped at 500. The reason for this is to 
avoid outliers affecting the scale of the figures. Both figures cover about 90 percent of the 
firms. For both measures of labour productivity, the distribution of firms that outsourced 
internationally is more to the right, compared to firms that did not outsource internationally. 
The density of firms with a relatively low labour productivity is higher for firms that did 
not outsource internationally, while the density of firms with a relatively high labour 
productivity is higher for firms that did outsource internationally.  
 
Figure 3.8. Smoothed density function for labour productivity, 2000 
A. Output per fte (in thousands 2008 euros) 
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Figure 3.8. Smoothed density function for labour productivity, 2000 
B. Output per unit of labour costs 
 
 
Since the survey question covered the period 2001–2006, this means that firms that 
outsourced internationally in that period already had a higher labour productivity before 
they started outsourcing. This suggests a selection effect, meaning that firms with a higher 
labour productivity are more likely to outsource internationally. This applies to both 
measures for labour productivity, indicating that these firms had a higher output per full-
time equivalent as well as a higher output per unit of labour costs. Note that it is possible 
that this is caused by other firm characteristics, like the economic activity of the firm. 
Section 3.4 contains results of regression analyses that adjust for these. 
Figure 3.9 contains the same graphs as Figure 3.8, but now for the year 2008 instead 
of 2000. These graphs show a similar picture as for the year 2000. This indicates that the 
firms that outsourced also had a higher labour productivity during and after the outsourcing 
was initiated. The difference between firms that did outsource internationally and firms that 
did not outsource does not appear to be significantly different across time. 
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Figure 3.9. Smoothed density function for labour productivity, 2008 
A. Output per fte (in thousands 2008 euros) 
 
 
 
B. Output per unit of labour costs 
 
 
3.3.2 Total factor productivity 
An alternative indicator for firm performance is total factor productivity (TFP), which takes 
into account the contribution of other inputs to output as well. TFP is defined as the firm-
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specific residual of an estimated production function. We estimate TFP by estimating 
production functions for several sectors, using all firms in the Netherlands for which the 
KLEMS data are available.  
Recently, there has been a renewed interest in the estimation of production functions 
as a result of an increase in the availability of plant-level data that allows for plant level 
productivity estimations (see, e.g., Syverson, 2011; Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). This 
renewed interest has also led to more advanced estimation methods than the traditional 
OLS estimations. An important drawback of the traditional estimation method is that 
productivity is likely to be correlated with the level of inputs, since the firm is able to 
observe its own productivity. This will cause OLS estimates to be biased. This problem was 
already recognized in Marschak and Andrews (1944). In the literature, it is usually referred 
to as the simultaneity problem (see Griliches and Mairesse, 1998, for an extensive 
overview). 
Solutions to this problem have been presented by Olley and Pakes (1996) and by 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Olley and Pakes (1996) use the investment decision of the 
firm as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. As this method requires data on annual 
investments, which are not available to us, we follow the solution described by Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003). Their solution is similar to that of Olley and Pakes (1996), but uses 
intermediate inputs, instead of investments, as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. 
In our dataset, intermediate inputs are available from the KLEMS framework. We take the 
sum of energy costs (E), costs of materials (M) and costs of services (S) as the proxy 
variable. Appendix 3.D gives a technical overview of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
approach for the case where value added is estimated as a function of capital and labour.  
A second potential problem with estimating production functions is the selection bias 
(Wedervang, 1965). This selection bias results from the relationship between productivity 
and the exit probability. This problem is most prominent when using a balanced panel (Van 
Beveren, 2012). Our analysis is based on an unbalanced panel, since there is only a small 
number of firms that were present in all 16 years. We refer Appendix 3.C for a general 
overview of the sample that was used for estimating the production functions. Table 3.17 in 
Appendix 3.C shows the number of occurrences of firms in the sample. Even in an 
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unbalanced panel, the selection bias may still be present, due to a potential negative 
correlation between the amount of capital and the exit decision of a firm. When a firm 
expects to exit, it is likely to decrease its capital stock in advance. This may cause a 
downward bias in the capital coefficient. Olley and Pakes (1996) propose to first estimate 
survivability as a function of capital and investment. Due to a lack of good data on 
investments, we were not able to follow this approach.  
We used the Stata syntax from Petrin et al. (2003) to estimate production functions 
for each of the 26 sectors which are defined in Table 3.14. Estimating a separate production 
function for each sector allows for heterogeneity between sectors in the production 
technology. We explain value added (VA) as a function of capital costs (K) and labour costs 
(L), and use intermediates as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. We choose to use 
value added as the dependent variable, rather than total output, because outsourcing affects 
the share of intermediates in total output. This would bias the results, since our estimates of 
TFP are based on the assumption of a homogeneous production function within sectors. If 
the input mix of a firm deviates from the optimal mix of the sector, as estimated by the 
production function, while still having the same output, it would get a positive error term. 
The reason for this is that a firm is considered to be more productive if it can obtain the 
same output with a suboptimal input mix. However, it is possible that the production 
technology is heterogeneous within sectors as well. The implication of this is that the 
change in TFP of firms which are moving away from the average input mix is being 
overestimated, and vice-versa for firms moving towards the average input mix. Firms that 
outsource are expected to move away from the average input mix since they substitute 
labour and capital for intermediates.  
In the KLEMS framework, all inputs are measured in cost units. This means, that the 
total wage bill is considered, rather than the number of hours worked. The advantage of this 
way of measuring inputs is that there is less reason for concern about quality differences of 
the output and of the inputs. We assume that market prices adequately pick up these quality 
differences. For example, a firm with high-skilled employees will generally produce more 
output with the same number of hours worked and will therefore have a higher TFP when 
this is estimated using the number of hours worked. This problem is avoided if wages 
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reflect individual productivity differences. By using the total wage bill instead, we avoid 
finding a spurious result caused by a possible relationship between the skill level of the 
employees and our measure for diversity. A disadvantage of using cost units rather than 
volumes is that price changes can affect TFP. For example, when input prices increase 
more than output prices, our estimates for TFP will decrease, even when the volumes 
remain unchanged. However, since we estimate production functions by sector, this is less 
problematic since output and input prices at the firm level often correlate within a sector. 
Our measure for TFP should be interpreted as an indicator for productivity relative to other 
firms in the same sector. Moreover, price changes are not necessarily exogenous, as the 
firm itself may negotiate better input prices or improve output prices, for example by a 
successful advertising campaign. In such cases, cost units are to be preferred over volumes. 
To avoid that general inflation affects the results, we deflated all output and input values by 
the CPI from Statistics Netherlands.  
We estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function, where value added (VA) is a 
function of some combination of the inputs capital (K) and labour (L): 
LK
itititit LKAVA
 , (3.3) 
with Ait representing the TFP of firm i in year t.  
Within the KLEMS framework, value added is defined as output (Q) minus inputs (E, 
M, S). Although less restrictive functional forms, like a transcendental logarithmic function, 
can be used, in practice the chosen functional form does not matter much numerically 
(Arnold, 2005). Moreover, we choose to follow the estimation method by Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003), which is only programmed for the Cobb-Douglas function (Petrin et al., 
2003).  
For all sectors, the sum of the estimated coefficients for capital and labour is lower 
than one, indicating decreasing returns to scale. After estimating the sector-specific 
production functions, the procedure by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) calculates the 
predicted value added, based on capital and labour inputs. The difference between the 
natural logarithm of the actual value added and the natural logarithm of the predicted value 
added represents the natural logarithm of Ai from equation (3.3), which we will refer to as 
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the TFP of the firm in the rest of this chapter. We adjusted the TFP by subtracting the 
average TFP of the sector in each year, so that the average TFP is zero for each sector in 
each year.  
Figure 3.10 shows the development of the average TFP for firms that were in the 
outsourcing survey. It shows that the average TFP deviates relatively much from zero. As 
explained in the previous paragraph, the average TFP for each sector in each year is set to 
zero for the entire population of Dutch firms for which we could estimate TFP. It turns out 
that the firms in the outsourcing survey were on average more productive compared to 
other firms in their sector. This is not surprising, as the survey was targeted at large firms, 
which are found to be more productive than smaller firms. The pattern of the average TFP 
deviation may be related to the business cycle. According to the Dutch national accounts, 
the Netherlands experienced relatively high GDP growth rates between 1994 and 2000. It is 
possible that large firms, which are overrepresented in this sample, benefit more from a 
boom than smaller firms. Additionally, we find that firms that outsourced in the period 
2001–2006 were more productive in all years compared to firms that did not outsource any 
activities. This means that firms that outsourced perform consistently better, even after 
adjusting for sectoral effects and for capital and intermediate inputs.  
 
Figure 3.10. Average TFP as deviation from the sector average, 1993–2008  
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Again, we also provide the distribution of TFP. Figure 3.11 shows the distributions of TFP 
in 2000, for firms that outsourced internationally and firms that did not do so. Figure 3.12 
does the same for the year 2008. Both figures indicate that the TFP of firms that outsourced 
internationally is positioned more to the right compared to firms that did not outsource 
internationally. A similar result was found for labour productivity. Just like for labour 
productivity, the firms that outsourced internationally have a higher TFP in 2000 as well as 
in 2008, which indicates that the difference is mainly caused by a selection effect. This is 
also consistent with Figure 3.10, which shows the development of the average TFP between 
1993 and 2008.  
 
Figure 3.11. Density functions for total factor productivity, 2000 
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Figure 3.12. Density functions for total factor productivity, 2008  
 
 
3.4  Estimation results 
The previous section explained how we constructed our measures for firm productivity. It 
also provided some graphical indications for the existence of productivity differences 
between firms that did or did not outsource. This section presents the estimation results to 
determine the relationship between outsourcing and productivity, both for the level of 
productivity as well as for the growth of productivity. This is done for two of the indicators 
for productivity, which are output per unit of labour costs and total factor productivity 
(TFP). The third indicator for productivity, output per full-time equivalent, is not included 
in this analysis, since it was only available from 2000 onwards, which makes it unsuitable 
to make a comparison before and after the outsourcing period.  
The relationship between outsourcing and output per unit of labour costs was 
estimated by regressing labour productivity on the four indicators for outsourcing, and 
sector and year dummies: 
4
, ,
1
,L it s t d d it it
d
y out   

     (3.4)
where αs is a sector-specific constant and yt is a year-specific constant. The sector and year 
dummies account for differences in productivity between sectors and for business cycle 
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effects, respectively. The model was estimated on firms with an output to labour costs ratio 
smaller than ten, to prevent outliers from influencing the results. This is particularly 
relevant for our measure for labour productivity, since it is a ratio, which can be extremely 
large if the denominator is very small. For the TFP measure this problem is less severe, 
since it is not calculated as a ratio. In the TFP regression we included all firms with a TFP 
between –2 and +2. Since TFP is measured as a logarithm, this means we included all firms 
that were between 13.5 percent and 739 percent as productive as the average of their sector. 
Almost all firms are within this range. For the regression for TFP, the sector and year 
dummies are not required, since our measure for TFP is already demeaned for each sector 
and year combination: 
4
,
1
.it d d it it
d
TFP out 

   (3.5)
 
3.4.1 Labour productivity 
Table 3.8 shows the estimation results for labour productivity, measured as the natural 
logarithm of the ratio between output and labour costs. The estimations are done for the 
period 1993–2000 and for the period 2001–2008. The reason for making this distinction is 
that the outsourcing indicators are based on the period 2001–2006. A relationship between 
productivity and outsourcing in the first period would suggest a selection effect. However, 
it is also possible that firms that outsourced in the period 2001–2006 had also outsourced 
before this period. Therefore, this does not necessarily mean that such a relationship is 
purely due to a selection effect. Second, comparing the results for both periods could 
indicate an effect of outsourcing on the change of productivity. This issue will also be 
addressed later in this section, when we estimate a fixed effects model. In all pooled OLS 
regressions that contain multiple years, we adjusted the standard error for cluster-correlated 
data, since the same firms can be present in the data for multiple years, and their 
characteristics are likely to be correlated over time. A pooled OLS estimation without this 
correction would underestimate the standard errors (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
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The correction for cluster-correlated data is explained in Williams (2000) and the Stata 
syntax we used for this is explained in Rogers (1993).  
The estimation results that are shown in Table 3.8 include four outsourcing 
indicators, which are all dummy variables. A firm can have a dummy of one for multiple 
types of outsourcing. The reference group consists of the firms that did not outsource any 
activities in the period 2001–2006. In all estimations in Table 3.8, we controlled for sector 
and year effects, which are not reported. A constant is also included, but not reported, since 
it depends on the omitted sector and year dummy. Column 1 and column 3 in Table 3.8 are 
estimated using observations from the period 1993–2000, which is the period before the 
period where the outsourcing survey focused on (2001–2006). Column 2 and column 4 are 
estimated on the period 2001–2008. This period also includes two years after the survey 
period. The reason for this is that firms that outsource may initially experience some 
adjustment costs in the short run. By including the years 2007 and 2008 we ensure that we 
also capture the effects of outsourcing on the medium run.  
The first two columns of the table only distinguish between international and 
domestic outsourcing. The results show a positive relationship between international 
outsourcing and labour productivity, which is only statistically significant in the first 
period. This positive relationship is consistent with Figure 3.8B and Figure 3.9B, which 
showed that the distribution of firms that outsourced internationally was shifted to the right. 
This suggests that firms that outsourced internationally produced more output per unit of 
labour costs, at least before 2001, which implies a selection effect. 
Columns 3 and 4 also distinguish between international and domestic outsourcing, 
which increases the number of outsourcing indicators from two to four. For these four 
outsourcing indicators, only the variable international outsourcing of core activities was 
statistically significant (positive in both periods). Since the positive relationship already 
existed before 2001, and did not increase in the period after 2001, it suggests that firms 
with a higher labour productivity were more likely to outsource core activities 
internationally, and that this type of outsourcing had no strong effect on the level of labour 
productivity. 
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Table 3.8. Output labour cost ratio explained by outsourcing types (1993–2000 and 2001–
2008) 
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). Constant not reported when sector and year dummies are 
included. 
 
The results in Table 3.8 are based on estimations that did not correct for firm size. When 
we control for firm size, the results change somewhat, since firm size is correlated with 
outsourcing as well as with labour productivity. The positive correlation between firm size 
and labour productivity can, for example, be related to a higher capital intensity of large 
firms or stronger specialization of employees. In Table 3.9, we control for firm size, 
measured as the natural logarithm of output. The estimation results confirm that there is 
indeed a strong positive correlation between labour productivity and firm size. An increase 
of output by one percent is associated with an increase in labour productivity, measured as 
the ratio between output and labour costs, of 0.15 percent. When we control for firm size, 
the estimated coefficients for the outsourcing indicators generally decrease. The 
 Dependent: ln(Output / labour costs) 
International outsourcing 0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
  
Domestic outsourcing –0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
  
International outsourcing of core activities    0.12*** 
(0.05) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
Domestic outsourcing of core activities   –0.09 
(0.07) 
–0.02 
(0.05) 
International outsourcing of support activities   –0.00 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Domestic outsourcing of support activities   –0.01 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Sector dummies 22 22 22 22 
Year dummies 8 8 8 8 
Period 1993–2000 2001–2008 1993–2000 2001–2008
Observations 2660 5150 2660 5150 
Firm clusters 574 849 574 849 
R2 0.37 0.40 0.35 0.40 
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coefficients for international and domestic outsourcing become statistically insignificant. 
Therefore we show the results for outsourcing of core activities and support activities 
instead, in the first two columns of Table 3.9.  
 
Table 3.9. Output labour cost ratio explained by outsourcing types, controlling for firm size 
(1993–2000 and 2001–2008) 
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). Constant not reported when sector and year dummies are 
included. 
 
For firms that outsourced their support activities, the ratio between output and labour costs 
was about seven percent lower in the period 1993–2000 and six percent lower in the period 
2001–2008. For firms that outsourced their core activities, the relationship was statistically 
insignificant in the first period and just barely statistically significant and positive in the 
 Dependent: ln(Output / labour costs) 
Ln(firm output) 0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.15*** 
(0.02) 
0.15*** 
(0.01) 
Outsourcing of core activities 0.04 
(0.04) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
  
Outsourcing of support activities –0.07* 
(0.04) 
– 0.06** 
(0.03) 
  
International outsourcing of core activities    0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.06* 
(0.04) 
Domestic outsourcing of core activities   –0.13** 
(0.05) 
–0.03 
(0.05) 
International outsourcing of support activities   –0.06 
(0.05) 
–0.03 
(0.04) 
Domestic outsourcing of support activities   –0.03 
(0.05) 
–0.04 
(0.04) 
Sector dummies 22 22 22 22 
Year dummies 8 8 8 8 
Period 1993–
2000 
2001–
2008 
1993–
2000 
2001–
2008 
Observations 2660 5150 2660 5150 
Firm clusters 574 849 574 849 
R2 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.48 
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second period. Columns 3 and 4 distinguish between all four types of outsourcing. For 
these four outsourcing indicators, the only coefficients that are statistically significant are 
outsourcing of international core activities (positive in both periods) and outsourcing of 
domestic core activities (negative in the first period). These results suggest that firms of 
similar size with a higher labour productivity were slightly more likely to outsource core 
activities internationally, and that this type of outsourcing had no effect on the level of 
labour productivity. Additionally, firms of similar size that outsourced core activities 
domestically had a slightly lower labour productivity in the period 1993–2000, but this 
difference disappeared in the period 2000–2008, suggesting a small positive effect of this 
type of outsourcing on labour productivity. This will be further tested using a fixed effects 
model.  
The advantage of the fixed effects model is that all time-invariant characteristics of 
the firms are filtered out. However, an important limitation of our data is that we do not 
know exactly when the outsourcing took place. In a fixed effects model, the timing is 
important since it uses variation within the firm over time for identification. One way to 
create some variation over time within firms is by setting the outsourcing variables to zero 
before the year 2001 and to one in the years 2001 and onwards for firms that outsourced. 
For firms that did not outsource in the survey period, the variables remain zero for all years. 
In this way, the estimations from the fixed effects model will be based on a comparison of 
the change of productivity over time of firms that changed their outsourcing status with the 
change of productivity over time of firms that did not change their outsourcing status. This 
method assumes that all firms that outsourced in the survey period, started outsourcing at 
the start of the period and continued these contracts for the rest of the period. This is 
unlikely to be true, but it is not possible to determine when exactly they started outsourcing. 
An alternative assumption is that the expected probability of outsourcing increased over the 
survey period. This means that the probability of outsourcing was zero for all firms in all 
years before the outsourcing survey. For firms that answered that they outsourced 
somewhere in the period 2001–2006, we gradually increase the outsourcing indicator by 
1/6 each year. So in 2001 the indicator will be 1/6, in 2002 it will be 2/6, increasing to one 
in 2006, 2007, and 2008.  
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Table 3.10 shows the estimation results for the fixed effects model, using both types of time 
variation. Both models include year dummies to control for the business cycle. This is 
particularly important, because the outsourcing indicators are, by definition, positively 
correlated across time. The results from the fixed effects model are mostly consistent with 
the change in the coefficients between the two periods in the cross-sectional estimations: 
firms that internationally (domestically) outsourced core activities decreased (increased) 
their labour productivity compared to firms that did not do so. For the other two types of 
outsourcing, no statistically significant relationship was found. The two models show 
comparable results, although the standard deviations are smaller for the second model. 
 
Table 3.10. Output labour cost ratio explained by outsourcing types, fixed effects model 
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). Constant not reported when sector and year dummies are 
included. 
 
 
 
 Dependent: ln(Output / labour costs) 
Method of changing outsource variables Sudden (2001) Gradually (2001–2006)
International outsourcing of core activities  –0.09 
(0.07) 
–0.05** 
(0.02) 
Domestic outsourcing of core activities 0.12*** 
(0.05) 
0.11*** 
(0.05) 
International outsourcing of support activities –0.01 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Domestic outsourcing of support activities –0.00 
(0.05) 
–0.03 
(0.02) 
Period 1993–2008 1993–2008 
Year dummies 16 16 
Observations 7810 7810 
Number of groups 853 853 
Smallest group 1 1 
Average group 9.2 9.2 
Largest group 16 16 
Within R2 0.052 0.052 
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3.4.2 Total factor productivity 
Although labour productivity is an interesting characteristic of a firm, a better measure for 
its productivity is total factor productivity (TFP), since it also corrects for capital and 
intermediate inputs. Table 3.11 provides the estimation results for TFP, for the period 
1993–2000 and for the period 2001–2008. Sector and year dummies are not included, since 
the measure for TFP has been estimated on a sectoral level and is demeaned for each sector 
and year combination. This means that the average TFP of all firms in a particular sector in 
a particular year is always zero. However, these regressions only include firms that 
participated in the outsourcing survey, which is the reason why the constant is not zero. In 
fact, the constant is rather high, which implies that the outsourcing survey is biased to more 
productive firms. This is not very surprising, as it was targeted at large firms, which are 
found to have a higher average TFP than small firms.  
The first two columns show that domestic and international outsourcing have positive 
coefficients in both periods. The positive coefficient for international outsourcing confirms 
the results suggested by Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12. However, it is only barely statistically 
significant in the period 1993–2000, and not statistically significant in the period 2000–
2008. If we split these measures up according to core and support activities, the positive 
relationship between firms that outsourced internationally and TFP seems to come from 
firms that internationally outsourced support activities, and not from firms that 
internationally outsourced core activities. The coefficient for international outsourcing of 
core activities is negative and statistically significant at a ten percent significance level in 
the period 2001–2008. Since the relationship between international outsourcing of support 
activities and TFP was already positive in the period before the survey period, this indicates 
a selection effect, rather than a causal effect of outsourcing on TFP. For firms that 
internationally outsourced core activities the coefficient decreased over time, and for firms 
that domestically outsourced support activities the coefficient increased over time.  
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Table 3.11. Total factor productivity explained by outsourcing types (1993–2000 and 
2001–2008) 
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). Sector and year dummies are not included, since the 
measure for TFP is already demeaned for each sector and year combination. TFP is defined as the difference 
between the natural logarithm of the actual output and the natural logarithm of the predicted output. 
 
An alternative specification of the model also controls for the size of the firm. Table 3.12 
shows that there is a strong relationship between firm size, measured as the natural 
logarithm of total output, and TFP. An increase of the firm size of one percent is associated 
with an increase of TFP of 0.22 percent. Table 3.9 showed that a similar positive 
relationship also exists between firm size and labour productivity. After adjusting for firm 
size, the outsourcing coefficients generally decrease. This is caused by the positive 
correlation between outsourcing and firm size on the one hand, and between TFP and firm 
size on the other hand.  
 Dependent: TFP 
International outsourcing 0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
  
Domestic outsourcing 0.01 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
  
International outsourcing of core activities    –0.02 
(0.05) 
–0.08* 
(0.05) 
Domestic outsourcing of core activities   0.00 
(0.11) 
–0.03 
(0.08) 
International outsourcing of support activities   0.17*** 
(0.06) 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
Domestic outsourcing of support activities   0.02 
(0.06) 
0.08* 
(0.05) 
Constant 0.47*** 
(0.02) 
0.45*** 
(0.02) 
0.47*** 
(0.02) 
0.45*** 
(0.02) 
Period 1993–
2000 
2001–
2008 
1993–
2000 
2001–
2008 
Observations 2791 5491 2791 5491 
Firm clusters 598 877 598 877 
R2 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.013 
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Table 3.12. Total factor productivity explained by outsourcing types, controlling for firm 
size (1993–2000 and 2001–2008) 
 
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). Sector and year dummies are not included, since the 
measure for TFP is already demeaned for each sector and year combination. TFP is defined as the difference 
between the natural logarithm of the actual output and the natural logarithm of the predicted output. 
 
 
It is difficult to determine how the causality runs between outsourcing, TFP and size. For 
example, firms could be larger because they are more productive, or they could be more 
productive because they are larger. However, it does seem to be the case that firms that 
outsourced core activities had a lower TFP than firms with a similar size that did not 
outsource their core activities. Firms that outsourced support activities had a somewhat 
higher TFP compared to firms with a similar size that did not outsource any support 
activities, although this difference is not statistically at a ten percent significance level. 
 Dependent: TFP 
Ln(output) 0.22*** 
(0.02) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.02) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
Outsourcing of core activities –0.08** 
(0.04) 
–0.11*** 
(0.04) 
  
Outsourcing of support activities 0.06 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
  
International outsourcing of core activities    –0.08* 
(0.04) 
–0.12*** 
(0.04) 
Domestic outsourcing of core activities   –0.08 
(0.09) 
–0.12* 
(0.07) 
International outsourcing of support activities   0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
Domestic outsourcing of support activities   0.02 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
Constant –1.82*** 
(0.16) 
–1.83*** 
(0.10) 
–1.81*** 
(0.10) 
–1.81*** 
(0.10) 
Period 1993–
2000 
2001–
2008 
1993–
2000 
2001–
2008 
Observations 2791 5491 2791 5491 
Firm clusters 598 877 598 877 
R2 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.29 
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Table 3.13. Total factor productivity explained by outsourcing types, fixed effects 
estimations (1993–2008) 
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). TFP is defined as the difference between the natural 
logarithm of the actual output and the natural logarithm of the predicted output. 
 
To further explore a possible causal relationship between the types of outsourcing and TFP, 
we also use the fixed effects models that were discussed in the section on labour 
productivity (Section 3.4.1). The results presented in Table 3.13 are consistent with those of 
 Dependent: TFP 
Method of changing 
outsource variables 
Sudden 
(2001) 
Sudden 
(2001) 
Sudden 
(2001) 
Gradually 
(2001–
2006) 
Gradually 
(2001–
2006) 
Gradually 
(2001–
2006) 
Outsourcing of core  
     activities 
–0.10*** 
(0.02) 
  –0.13*** 
(0.02) 
  
Outsourcing of support  
      activities 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
  0.07*** 
(0.02) 
  
International outsourcing  –0.07*** 
(0.02) 
  –0.10*** 
(0.02) 
 
Domestic outsourcing  0.05** 
(0.02) 
  0.04** 
(0.02) 
 
International outsourcing of  
     core activities  
  –0.11*** 
(0.02) 
  –0.14*** 
(0.03) 
Domestic outsourcing of  
     core activities 
  –0.08** 
(0.04) 
  –0.05* 
(0.03) 
International outsourcing of  
     support activities 
  0.02 
(0.03) 
  0.03 
(0.03) 
Domestic outsourcing of  
     support activities 
  0.08*** 
(0.03) 
  0.11*** 
(0.03) 
Constant 0.48*** 
(0.004) 
0.48*** 
(0.004) 
0.48*** 
(0.004) 
0.48*** 
(0.004) 
0.48*** 
(0.004) 
0.48*** 
(0.004) 
Observations 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282 8282 
Fixed effects groups 880 880 880 880 880 880 
Min N 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Average N 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 
Max N 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Within R2 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.012 
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the OLS estimations in Table 3.11: firms that outsourced core activities decreased their TFP 
compared to firms that did not. And firms that domestically outsourced support activities 
increased their TFP compared to firms that did not. International outsourcing of support 
activities had no statistically significant effect.  
 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter investigated whether firms that outsourced are more productive than firms that 
did not outsource, and whether there exists a selection effect. To answer these questions we 
looked at three different measures for productivity: labour productivity measured as the 
ratio between output and labour costs, labour productivity measured as output per fte, and 
total factor productivity (TFP).  
The first conclusion is that larger firms are more productive than smaller firms. An 
increase of the firm size of one percent is associated with an increase of TFP of 0.22 
percent. The evidence on outsourcing is rather mixed and depends strongly on the type of 
outsourcing. The strongest relationship was found for firms that internationally outsourced 
support activities. These firms were statistically significantly more productive than firms 
that did not outsource any support activities internationally. Since the relationship already 
existed before the outsourcing survey period, this implies that more productive firms self-
select themselves into this type of outsourcing. This is similar to the positive selection 
effect that is found for firms in the Netherlands (Kox and Rojas-Romagosa, 2010). 
However, for the other types of outsourcing we did not find any selection effect. It is 
possible that self-selection effects are more likely to occur for exporting than for 
outsourcing, because exporting is a sign of being more productive than other firms, while 
outsourcing is a sign of being less productive than another firm. For exporting, a selection 
effect is likely to occur, because exporting requires some fixed cost that only the most 
productive firms are able to afford. Since similar fixed costs are present for (international) 
outsourcing, one could expect a selection effect to occur with outsourcing as well. 
However, firms only outsource when a third party can produce some part of the production 
process more efficiently than they can themselves. This becomes more likely when the firm 
itself is less productive. This would suggest that less productive firms are more likely to 
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outsource. This effect might cancel out the effect predicted by the existence of fixed costs, 
and could explain that such a selection effect is less prominent for outsourcing.  
Regarding the effect of outsourcing on the change in productivity, we found that firms 
that outsourced core activities decreased their TFP compared to firms that did not. And 
firms that domestically outsourced support activities increased their TFP compared to firms 
that did not. Domestic outsourcing of core activities had a barely significant negative effect 
on TFP, and international outsourcing of support activities had an insignificant positive 
effect. Obviously, firms will not decide to outsource if they expect a negative return. 
However, the fixed effects model predicts a negative return on international outsourcing of 
core activities. This could be caused by measurement or econometric problems, but it could 
also imply that international outsourcing of core activities was less successful than the 
firms thought it would be. It is possible that this is caused by higher than expected inter-
firm transaction costs. In the survey by Van Gorp (2010), the most often mentioned reasons 
for firms not achieving their objectives are governance, higher than expected costs, more 
time needed, lack of market potential, and cultural differences. Van Gorp (2010) mentions 
that about 17 percent of the internationally outsourced activities were relocated back to the 
Netherlands. The inter-firm transaction costs may be higher in the case of international 
outsourcing than in the case of domestic outsourcing, for example, in the case of cultural 
differences (see Chapter 2 for a discussion on cultural differences and international trade). 
Additionally, if something goes wrong at the insourcing firm, it might be more costly for 
the outsourcing firm in the case of core activities than in the case of support activities. 
These reasons might explain the result that firms that domestically outsourced support 
activities did increase their productivity while firms that outsourced core activities 
decreased their productivity.  
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Appendix 3.A     Survey on outsourcing 
This appendix contains the question from the Dutch survey that was most relevant for 
Chapter 3 and 4. The full set of questions from Eurostat can be found in Statistics Denmark 
et al. (2008). 
 
Welke activiteiten heeft uw bedrijf verplaatst, binnen of buiten de ondernemingengroep, in 
de periode 2001–2006? 
(aankruisen wat van toepassing is) 
 
Appendix 3.B     Sectoral classification 
The sectors used in this chapter are defined based on the SBI 1993 (Standaard 
Bedrijfsindeling 1993) classification, which is used by Statistics Netherlands.21 Table 3.14 
shows which SBI 1993 codes are used for each of these sectors.  
                                                 
21 This classification is very similar to the classifications from the European Union (nomenclature statistique 
des activités économiques dans la Communauté Européene, NACE) and from the United Nations 
(international standard industrial classification of all economic activities, ISIC). The first two digits of SBI 
1993 are the same to those of NACE revision 1 and ISIC revision 3.  
 Verplaatst Niet 
verplaatst 
 Binnen 
Nederland 
Internationaal  
Hoofdactiviteit    
Productie van goederen en diensten voor 
     de markt    
Ondersteunende activiteiten, zoals:    
Distributie en logistiek    
Marketing, verkoop en aftersales diensten, 
     inclusief helpdesks en callcenters    
ICT diensten    
Administratieve en staffuncties    
Constructie en gerelateerde diensten    
Research & Development    
Andere functies of activiteiten, namelijk:    
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Table 3.14. Sectoral classification based on SBI 1993 
 SBI 1993 codes Observations 
used for 
estimating 
production 
functions 
Observations 
available in 
outsourcing 
survey 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 01, 02, 05 0 0 
Mining and quarrying 10, 11, 14, 23 1,099 3 
Food, beverages and tobacco 15, 16 14,427 58 
Textile, clothing and leather products 17, 18, 19 6,390 10 
Wood, paper and printing 20, 21, 222 19,043 42 
Chemical products, rubber and plastic products 24, 25 10,617 81 
Other manufacturing (non-metallic mineral  
     products, recycling, utilities) 26, 37, 40, 42 5,669 25 
Basic metals and metal products 27, 28 19,043 54 
Machinery and equipment 29 13,492 79 
Office, electrical and communication  
     machinery, medical instruments 30, 31, 32, 33 9,152 46 
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 34, 35 5,244 27 
Other goods  36 5,572 41 
Construction 45 63,681 58 
Reparation and selling of motor vehicles 50 14,036 16 
Wholesale trade 51 78,312 60 
Retail trade 52 41,373 27 
Hotels and restaurants 55 13,157 12 
Transportation 60, 61, 62 18,116 33 
Transport and travel services 63 7,863 19 
Post and communication 64 1,933 9 
Financial services 65, 66, 67 0 0 
Real estate and renting 70, 71 4,634 13 
Computer services 72 12,245 48 
Other business services 73, 74, 221, 223 64,923 241 
Government, education, health and social work 75, 91, 80, 85 0 0 
Other services (waste disposal, recreational    
     activities, and not elsewhere specified) 90, 92, 93 19,043 0 
Total  429,505 1,002 
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This sector classification shown in Table 3.14 is the same sectoral classification that is used 
for estimating the production functions and total factor productivity (TFP). The 
classification is chosen in such a way that each sector has a sufficiently large number of 
observations in the general population of Dutch firms to allow estimating the sectoral 
production function. In the case of the outsourcing survey, it is possible that some sectors 
have a very small number of observations.  
 
Appendix 3.C     Overview of sample used for estimating production functions 
The production functions are estimated using all firms in the Netherlands for which the 
KLEMS data were available. Since the estimation required positive values for value added, 
capital inputs, labour inputs and intermediate inputs, we removed firms that had a non-
positive or missing value for at least one of these variables.22 About 430 thousand 
observations remained, with an average number of observations of almost 27 thousand per 
year. Table 3.15 shows the number of observations in each year, as well as the average 
value of each of the key variables. All values are adjusted to 2008 euros, using the Dutch 
consumer price index (CPI) from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). 
 
                                                 
22 Value added is not a variable in the original KLEMS database. We defined it as the difference between 
production (Q) and intermediate inputs (E + M + S).  
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Table 3.15. Number of observations and averages of key variables over time, 2008 prices 
 
Table 3.16 shows the number of observations for each sector, as well as the average value 
of each of the key variables. The sector classification is based on the SBI 1993 
classification. Appendix 3.B shows which SBI 1993 codes are classified in which sector.  
 
Year Observations Value added 
(x 1000) 
Capital costs 
(x 1000) 
Labour costs 
(x 1000) 
Intermediates 
costs 
(x 1000) 
1993 9,750 5,255 1,373 3,795 12,960 
1994 8,641 6,073 1,513 4,041 15,187 
1995 23,494 4,051 936 2,567 7,248 
1996 22,391 3,572 851 2,309 7,568 
1997 21,176 3,814 875 2,395 8,246 
1998 20,159 4,022 984 2,528 8,628 
1999 17,786 3,632 845 2,223 6,665 
2000 33,086 4,384 1,202 2,487 7,846 
2001 39,865 4,004 1,573 2,351 6,964 
2002 38,135 4,145 1,543 2,450 6,842 
2003 38,772 4,061 1,213 2,398 6,326 
2004 32,951 4,910 1,328 2,805 7,831 
2005 32,363 5,166 1,364 2,896 8,633 
2006 29,496 5,830 1,083 3,178 10,293 
2007 29,885 6,144 1,069 3,230 10,729 
2008 31,555 6,028 1,070 3,225 10,511 
1993–2008  429,505 4,657 1,199 2,714 8,384 
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Table 3.16. Number of observations and averages of key variables by sector, 1993–2008 
(2008 prices) 
Sector Obser-
vations 
Value 
added 
(x 1000) 
Capital 
costs 
(x 1000) 
Labour 
costs 
(x 1000) 
Intermedi-
ates costs 
(x 1000) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0     
Mining and quarrying 1,099 100,485 20,994 11,879 251,563 
Food, beverages and tobacco 14,427 12,394 2,237 4,969 36,185 
Textile, clothing and leather products 6,390 2,338 497 1,616 5,420 
Wood, paper and printing 19,043 4,046 838 2,847 9,075 
Chemical products, rubber and plastic  
     products 10,617 13,494 4,192 6,879 43,591 
Other manufacturing (non-metallic   
     mineral products, recycling, utilities) 5,669 5,333 1,326 3,214 9,234 
Basic metals and metal products 19,043 4,046 838 2,847 9,075 
Machinery and equipment 13,492 4,914 803 3,305 9,761 
Office, electrical and communication  
     machinery, medical instruments 9,152 9,196 1,818 6,537 18,550 
Motor vehicles and other transport  
     equipment 5,244 8,597 2,037 4,968 25,154 
Other goods  5,572 2,488 489 1,731 4,457 
Construction 63,681 2,661 404 2,111 6,278 
Reparation and selling of motor vehicles 14,036 2,968 490 1,369 3,627 
Wholesale trade 78,312 3,505 762 1,922 3,435 
Retail trade 41,373 3,011 1,024 2,005 2,028 
Hotels and restaurants 13,157 1,878 541 1,287 2,200 
Transportation 18,116 4,725 1,958 3,553 8,680 
Transport and travel services 7,863 5,890 2,084 2,976 12,044 
Post and communication 1,933 49,542 39,866 18,198 49,093 
Financial services 0     
Real estate and renting 4,634 5,861 4,579 1,021 5,791 
Computer services 12,245 4,300 737 3,289 3,786 
Other business services 64,923 3,566 462 2,625 3,845 
Government, education, health and  
     social work 0     
Other services (waste disposal,  
     recreational activities, and not  
     elsewhere classified services) 19,043 4,046 838 2,847 9,075 
All sectors 429,505 4,657 1,199 2,714 8,384 
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Table 3.17 shows how often firms occur in the data. In the period 1993–2008 we have data 
for about 153,000 unique firms. For almost half of them (about 71,000), we only have one 
year available. The other firms can be traced over at least two years. The average number of 
observations per firm is 2.8. Almost 400 firms are included in the data for every year in the 
period 1993–2008. Note that the survey is biased towards larger firms. Statistics 
Netherlands attempts to survey the largest firms in every year. Smaller firms are randomly 
selected every year.  
 
Table 3.17. Number of observations per firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Available 
years 
Number of firms Observations 
(column 1 x column 2) 
1 70,693 70,693 
2 28,159 56,318 
3 16,920 50,760 
4 10,239 40,956 
5 6,899 34,495 
6 4,945 29,670 
7 3,806 26,642 
8 2,780 22,240 
9 2,234 20,106 
10 1,537 15,370 
11 1,169 12,859 
12 1,034 12,408 
13 906 11,778 
14 892 12,488 
15 430 6,450 
16 392 6,272 
Total 153,035 429,505 
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Appendix 3.D     Technical description of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method 
This appendix describes the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) estimation method for the case 
where value added is a function of capital and labour, as it was described by Petrin et al. 
(2003). Assuming a Cobb-Douglas functional form, the relationship between these 
variables, in natural logarithms, is as follows (ignoring the firm subscript): 
0 ,t l t k t t tva l k          (3.6)
where ωt is the productivity component that is observed by the firm, and hence correlated 
with inputs, and where ηt is an error term, uncorrelated with inputs.  
It is assumed that kt and ωt are state variables and that the firm decides on its use of 
intermediates based on these variables: 
 , .t t t ti i k   (3.7)
Petrin et al. (2003) show that, under reasonable assumptions, the demand for intermediates 
it is monotonically increasing in ωt, so that ωt can be written as a function of kt and it: 
 , .t t t tk i   (3.8)
The method consists of two stages. Stage one estimates the coefficient for labour, while 
stage two estimates the coefficient for capital. In the first stage, the production function for 
value added is rewritten to: 
 , ,t l t t t t tva l k i     with 
   0, , .t t t k t t t tk i k k i       
(3.9) 
(3.10)
Now, t(kt,it) can be approximated as a third-order polynomial in kt and it, so that vat can be 
estimated using OLS, yielding a consistent estimator for βl. In the second step, the estimates 
of step one are used to determine the prediction of t:  
ˆ ˆˆ .t t l tva l    (3.11)
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The predicted values of ωt can be written as a function of any value of βk*: 
*ˆˆ .t t k tk     (3.12)
It is assumed that ωt is a function of its previous value and a shock in productivity: 
 1| .t t t tE      (3.13)
They estimate the expectation of ωt as a third order polynomial of ωt–1: 
 2 3
0 1 1 2 1 3 11[ | ] .t t t ttE                 (3.14)
Finally, kˆ  is defined as the value of βk* that minimizes the squared differences of the 
actual vat and the predicted vat: 
 * 2* 1ˆmin [ | ] .
k
t l t k t t t
t
va l k E

        (3.15)
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4 The effects of outsourcing on 
unemployment 
 
4.1  Introduction23 
The last few decades have shown a substantial increase in both domestic and international 
outsourcing. Outsourcing involves the purchase of intermediate goods or services from a 
third party, which were previously produced within the firm (Görg et al., 2008). Even 
though the definition of the word outsourcing has shifted somewhat towards that of 
offshoring (often used for international outsourcing), we use it to refer to both domestic and 
international outsourcing. Data from Statistics Netherlands show that the ratio between 
production and value added in the Dutch manufacturing sector increased from 3.4 in 1988 
to 4.4 in 2008. Furthermore, the importance of imported intermediaries has increased 
substantially over time. In 2009, the Dutch input-output table showed that 62 percent of 
Dutch imports (excluding imports for transit and re-exports) were used as intermediary 
inputs, while only 38 percent consists of final goods. Crino (2008) shows that the share of 
intermediaries in international trade has been increasing in almost all advanced economies. 
All these trends imply that the use of outsourcing is increasing.  
Even though the increased division of labour associated with outsourcing is likely to 
result in increased productivity and wages in the long run, the short-run transitional effects 
are less clear. Economic theory suggests that in the long run, outsourcing will have no 
effect on the total level of employment. In the long run, increased specialization and 
technological advancements that substitute labour result in higher productivity of labour, 
and hence in higher real wages, rather than in higher unemployment. It could have a long-
run effect of the composition of the type of jobs in a country. While outsourcing could 
                                                 
23 This chapter is based on joint work with Stefan Groot (VU University Amsterdam). 
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reduce the need for production jobs, it could increase the need for transaction jobs, since 
the outsourcing contracts need to be managed and monitored. However, outsourcing may 
have negative effects in the form of temporary unemployment and distributional effects, 
which can be harmful for social cohesion. The size of these transitional effects is not 
necessarily equivalent to the size of outsourcing, since other countries could also be 
outsourcing jobs to the Netherlands. Outsourcing is often associated with the displacement 
of jobs. When outsourcing is done domestically, it would at most lead to a regional shift in 
employment. However, as part of the process of internationalization, international 
outsourcing has become more relevant.  
There has been substantial attention of policy makers and the general public for the 
potential negative consequences of (especially international) outsourcing. Particularly when 
the economy is in recession, firms that relocate their activities to foreign countries often 
make the headlines. Since international specialization takes place according to comparative 
cost advantages, the transitional effects will be heterogeneous across employees that 
perform different types of tasks. The nature and size of such transitional effects are highly 
relevant from a policy perspective. On the one hand, if transition effects are substantial, 
knowledge about their nature is needed if policy makers want to provide support to those 
who are negatively affected. On the other hand, if there are no significant transitional 
effects, unfounded fear for outsourcing could result in protectionist measures that reduce 
productivity.  
 This chapter adds to the existing literature in at least three ways. First, even though 
the widespread public fear for outsourcing is related mostly to unemployment, most of the 
literature focuses on wages or broader employment patterns. The microdata that are used in 
this chapter allow us to directly estimate the impact of outsourcing on unemployment. 
Second, while most studies focus on only international outsourcing, we are one of the first 
to estimate the impact of both foreign and domestic outsourcing on unemployment in an 
integrated manner. Third, we estimate the effect of outsourcing on the probability of 
becoming unemployed as well as the effect of outsourcing on the probability of finding a 
new job after becoming unemployed.  
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Our aim is to add to the knowledge about the short-term effects of both domestic and 
international outsourcing, by considering the risk of involuntary job loss in firms that 
outsource part of their activities. For this purpose, we rely on a large set of microdata on the 
level of individual employees and firms, which were provided by Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS). We use data on unemployment benefits in order to determine when a job ended 
involuntarily. These data are linked to information about all employer-employee relations, 
which are based on the tax statements about wages that firms submit to the tax authority. 
This allows us to approximately identify the job that an employee had prior to receiving 
unemployment benefits. We use unique survey data to determine which firms did or did not 
outsource in the period 2001–2006, and relate this to the risk of involuntary job loss. This is 
done using duration and survival models, where the probability of involuntary 
unemployment is estimated, given the duration of the job and a number of variables related 
to individual workers and firms.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
previous theoretical and empirical literature that addresses the outsourcing decision of firms 
and the consequences of outsourcing for employees. Section 4.3 describes the data related 
to outsourcing, employers and employees, and unemployment benefits, that are used in our 
empirical analysis. This section also explains how these data were linked to each other. 
Section 4.4 explains the Cox proportional hazard model. The empirical results are discussed 
in Section 4.5, and the conclusions are summarized in Section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Previous literature 
A large theoretical literature has emerged that attempts to explain the determinants of 
outsourcing behaviour of firms. The advantages of outsourcing are mainly in the increased 
production efficiency through specialization that is offered by vertical disintegration. There 
are several reasons why outsourcing an activity can potentially be cheaper than producing it 
within the firm, for example due to lower wages (Autor et al., 2003; Diaz-Mora, 2008; and 
Girma and Görg, 2004). This is particularly relevant for international outsourcing, as wages 
can differ substantially between countries. Abraham and Taylor (1996) mention that even 
domestic outsourcing can reduce the wage bill, for example when the outsourcing firm is 
102 4 – The effects of outsourcing on unemployment  
 
 
 
unionized and the contractor is not. Economies of scale form another explanation. If for 
some part of the production process economies of scale apply, costs will be lower if all 
firms outsource this particular part to one other party. For example, many small firms 
outsource their wage administration to an accountancy firm.  
While outsourcing may increase production efficiency, the transaction costs 
associated with outsourcing parts of the production process limit the possibilities to benefit 
from vertical disintegration. This makes the decision on whether or not to outsource an 
important aspect of the optimization of the value chain. The literature that views the 
outsourcing decision of firms as a transaction costs optimization problem is largely based 
on the work of Williamson (1975, 1985 and 1991) and of Grossman and Hart (1986). This 
literature states that the decision to either produce a product within the firm, or to purchase 
it on the market, is essentially a trade-off between intra-firm transaction costs and inter-firm 
transaction costs. In this context, transaction costs should be defined as all costs that are 
associated with the commencement, execution, and compliance of a transaction (Den 
Butter, 2012). Intra-firm transaction costs are based on how internal processes are 
organized. Examples of intra-firm transaction costs are principle-agent costs, or the costs of 
searching for suppliers. Examples of inter-firm transaction costs are search costs, contract 
costs, and enforcing costs (Den Butter, 2012).  
Grossman and Helpman (2002) model domestic and international outsourcing in a 
general equilibrium framework, where firms outsource to either partners in the (advanced) 
North, or in the low-wage South. In this model, firms face a trade-off between friction costs 
when buying inputs from other firms, or the lesser production efficiency of a vertically 
integrated firm. Several extensions to this model have followed. In Antràs (2003), frictions 
do not only occur between firms (when outsourcing parts of the production), but also within 
integrated firms. Antràs and Helpman (2004) introduce heterogeneity in final goods and 
analyse the effects for international trade. They predict that a reduction in trade costs will 
result in relatively higher growth of inter-firm trade compared to intra-firm trade. In 
Grossman and Helpman (2004), the organization of firms as well as their location and the 
locations of their suppliers is the outcome of principal-agent relation between firms and 
their employees and suppliers. 
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Acemoglu et al. (2003) take a somewhat different approach, and develop a model where 
firms start to outsource activities as they move closer to the technological frontier, which 
enables them to relieve management and increase their focus on innovation. More 
generally, Bartel et al. (2008) argue that higher technological change results in more 
outsourcing because keeping up with the latest developments in production technology 
becomes more costly. In their view, the increased relative importance of outsourcing during 
the last decades is to some extent explained by changed expectations about technological 
progress. 
In the end, the decision of firms about the amount of vertical integration, the locations 
of their own subsidiaries, as well as their domestic and foreign suppliers, boils down to the 
simultaneous optimization of production costs and inter-firm and intra-firm transaction 
costs. Relocating activities that were previously performed within the firm to suppliers 
outside the firm, involves a changing employment structure. Furthermore, international 
outsourcing could result in shifts in relative demand for different types of labour, which 
may result in a changing wage distribution, because labour is rather immobile across 
national borders. It should therefore come as no surprise that the possible adverse effects of 
this trend on domestic wages and employment have attracted considerable attention from 
the scientific literature.  
Several theoretical papers address the relationship between international outsourcing, 
labour demand and wages (see, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a and Deardorff, 2001). 
Relatively simple extensions to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson trade 
models predict that low skilled workers will lose from international outsourcing (because 
they have to compete with large pools of low skilled labour). The more recent literature 
argues that globalization and biased technological progress have resulted in polarization of 
wages and employment (see, e.g., Autor et al., 2003).  
The theoretical literature has focused mainly on relative factor demand, which 
determines unemployment and wages of different types of workers, rather than 
unemployment. The reason for this is that such models often assume that labour markets 
are competitive. An exception to this are the articles by Mitra and Ranjan (2010) and Egger 
and Kreickemeier (2008). In the model of Mitra and Ranjan (2010), international 
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outsourcing is associated with an increase in wages and a decrease in unemployment if 
labour is mobile between industries. In fact, they find that domestic employment of a firm 
that outsources part of its activities to a foreign country may be higher than domestic 
employment of a firm that keeps all production within the home country. On the other 
hand, when labour is immobile between industries, unemployment may increase within 
sectors that outsource. Although labour could be immobile between sectors in the short run, 
in the long run this is unlikely. Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) predict that unemployment 
will increase in countries with low unemployment benefits, while it may decrease in 
countries with high unemployment benefits, albeit not when low skilled labour is 
outsourced to low wage countries.  
The empirical literature has focused mostly on wages, or on aggregate employment, 
and on international outsourcing. The evidence found by these studies is rather mixed. A 
negative impact on wages and employment is found by Feenstra and Hanson (1996b and 
2001), Scheve and Slaughter (2004), Crino (2010) and Baumgarten et al. (2010). Other 
studies found no significant effects of international outsourcing on wages or employment 
(Amiti and Wei, 2005; Mankiw and Swagel, 2006; Liu and Tefler, 2008; Criscuolo and 
Garicano, 2010). 
More recently, however, a number of studies has emerged that use microdata to 
estimate the effects of international outsourcing on unemployment. Egger et al. (2007) 
estimate a dynamic fixed effect multinomial logit model on Austrian microdata, and find 
that international outsourcing reduces both the probability that workers remain employed in 
the manufacturing sector, as well as the probability that individuals switch to the 
manufacturing sector. Liu and Trefler (2008) estimate the impact of international 
outsourcing in the service sector to India and China on a number of labour market 
outcomes, and find small negative or zero effects of international outsourcing on all labour 
market outcomes that were taken into consideration. Liu and Trefler (2011) find that 
imports of services from India and China are associated with the transition of workers 
towards lower paid occupations, and find that the probability of becoming unemployed 
increased by 0.9 percentage points. Much of the negative impact of international 
outsourcing, however, occurs when workers switch to lower quality occupations. Munch 
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(2010) finds that international outsourcing increases the unemployment risk in Denmark by 
about one percentage point. However, this effect is much larger for men, workers above 50 
and low-skilled workers. Bachmann and Braun (2011) also find rather heterogeneous 
results for different subgroups on the labour market when estimating the impact of 
international outsourcing on German unemployment. While outsourcing has no effect or 
even a slight positive effect on aggregate job stability, they find a negative effect for 
medium-skilled and older workers. 
 
4.3 Data and stylized facts 
This chapter uses two main types of data, which were provided by Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS). One is a linked employer-employee dataset and the other is a firm survey on 
outsourcing. This section describes the data on the linked employer-employee dataset and 
provides some descriptive statistics of the data. The firm survey on outsourcing has already 
been discussed in Chapter 3.  
The data used for the linked employer-employee dataset are part of a database 
referred to as the ‘Sociaal Statistisch Bestand’ (SSB). From this database, we use a branch 
called SSB-Banen and a branch called SSB-WW. The former contains information about 
all jobs in the Netherlands. This is based on the wage administration, which firms have to 
submit to the tax authority. This allows us to identify the start and end date of employer-
employee relations, their duration, and the fiscal wage. The second branch, SSB-WW, 
contains all the unemployment benefits in the Netherlands. This information comes from 
the ‘Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen’ (UWV), which is the Dutch 
governmental organization in charge of administrating unemployment benefits. We use the 
SSB-WW to determine the start and end date of the unemployment benefits.  
The advantage of using data on unemployment benefits is that it ensures that the job 
ended involuntarily. If we would only use data on whether or not someone gets a new job 
after the end of the current job, we would overestimate involuntary unemployment. The 
reason for this is that an employee can voluntarily end his job without getting a new job, for 
example because he starts his own company, retires, or takes a sabbatical. When an 
employee receives unemployment benefits, it is more likely that the job really ended 
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involuntarily, because employees that quit their job voluntarily are not eligible for 
unemployment benefits. It is not possible to determine how many employees do lose their 
job involuntarily, while not being eligible for unemployment benefits, but this group is 
likely to be rather small since the requirements for receiving unemployment benefits are not 
very strict. Employees are automatically insured for unemployment benefits. Under current 
regulations, the main requirement is a work history of 26 weeks in the past 36 weeks. This 
requirement should be met for all the employees in our data, since we only included jobs 
that lasted at least six months. Employees that are fired due to extreme misbehaviour are 
not eligible for unemployment benefits, so we do not observe this group as being 
involuntarily unemployed. However, this group is expected to be very small. 
The disadvantage of using data on unemployment benefits is that the match between 
end dates of jobs and start dates of unemployment benefits is not very good. We merged the 
data on end dates of jobs from the SSB-Banen with the data on start dates of unemployment 
benefits from the SSB-WW to determine which job was the cause for unemployment 
benefits. Under normal circumstances, when an employee loses his job he would be eligible 
for unemployment benefits shortly after the last day of his job. However, this was often not 
the case for the observations in our dataset. It is not clear why the dates did not match very 
well. It could be that end dates of jobs are not very well administered. To allow for some 
flexibility with respect to the matching of jobs with unemployment benefits, we allowed the 
dates to deviate by one month. This means that we considered a match to be successful if 
the unemployment benefits started within one month before or within one month after the 
end date of the job. The share of jobs that we were able to match to the start of receiving 
unemployment benefits in this way was still only 5.4 percent.  
The consequence of the poor matching results is that we underestimate the hazard rate 
of becoming unemployed. Jobs that end in involuntary unemployment, but could not be 
matched with the start of unemployment benefits within a month before or after the end 
date of the job, are not considered as involuntary unemployment in the model. Instead, 
these jobs leave the sample in the same way as jobs that are ended voluntarily. Although 
this problem will underestimate the base hazard rate, it should not affect the estimates of 
the explanatory variables in the model, assuming that these are not correlated with the 
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success rate of the matching between jobs and unemployment benefits. For the model that 
is applied to the probability of getting out of involuntary unemployment, it is not an issue at 
all, because in that model we do not require a match between the dates of the 
unemployment benefits and the new job: the first job that is observed is considered to end 
the status of unemployment.  
Table 4.1 presents a number of descriptive statistics for all jobs, jobs that did not end in 
involuntary unemployment, and jobs that did end in involuntary unemployment. This only 
includes jobs that existed for at least six months, had a size of at least two days per week, 
and earned at least the minimum wage. Workers that became involuntarily unemployed are 
relatively more often female and more often foreign workers born in middle and lower 
income economies.24 Employees that became unemployed on average earn somewhat 
higher wages than employees that did not become unemployed during the period that our 
data covers. This is likely to be related to the financial compensation that an employer has 
to pay when he ends an indefinite labour contract. This compensation is not required when 
the employer does not prolong a temporary contact. In that case the employee is still 
considered to be involuntarily unemployed and is eligible for unemployment benefits.  
Note that the average unemployment duration is an underestimation, because our data 
are censored at the end of 2008. Similarly, the share of unemployed individuals that will 
eventually find a new job will be somewhat higher than the share that finds a new job 
before 2009. Also note that the unemployment duration is defined here as the period 
between the start of involuntary unemployment and the start of a new job. Some people 
may not find a new job within the period covered by our data, but this does not necessarily 
imply that they are involuntarily unemployed for the full period. When unemployed 
individuals for example start their own business, start an education, or retire, they remain 
                                                 
24 We created a variable that indicates whether or not a person is born in a high-income foreign country and a 
variable that indicates whether a person is born in any other foreign country. We classified countries that had 
a GDP per capita of over 20,000 USD as a high-income country. According to the World Economic Outlook 
database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) these include Luxembourg, Norway, Qatar, Switzerland, 
Denmark, Australia, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, the United States, Canada, Ireland, Austria, Finland, 
Singapore, Belgium, Japan, France, Germany, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Italy, Kuwait, Hong Kong, New 
Zealand, Spain, Brunei, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Slovenia, Portugal, the Bahamas and South Korea. 
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unemployed in our data, but are no longer unemployed according to the definition used in 
most unemployment statistics. 
 
Table 4.1. Descriptive statistics, 2000–2008 
Note: standard deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics by industry for a number of key variables on 
employees. The highest incidence of unemployment can be observed among employees that 
were previously employed by a car manufacturer. In this industry, as much as 8.9 percent of 
the jobs ended in involuntary unemployment with unemployment benefits. There is no clear 
difference between manufacturing and services industries. For example, employees that 
work in the business services sector have the second highest probability of becoming 
involuntarily unemployed (6.7 percent). The lowest incidence of unemployment is observed 
in the sector other goods, where about 2.3 percent of the jobs ended in involuntary 
unemployment. Even though employees in the public sector have an even smaller 
probability of getting fired, they are not included in our sample because this sector is not 
included in the outsourcing survey (see Table 3.14 in Appendix 3.B). 
 
 
 All jobs Jobs not ending 
in involuntary 
unemployment 
Jobs ending in 
involuntary 
unemployment 
Number of observations 734,598 695,987 38,611 
Wage (in 2008 euros) 56,124 55,709 63,617 
(268,316) (261,532) (369,770) 
Age 39.47 39.53 38.38 
(11.75) (11.32) (10.61) 
Females 0.295 0.291 0.378 
(0.456) (0.454) (0.485) 
Foreign workers from high-income    
     countries 
0.040 0.041 0.037 
(0.197) (0.197) (0.190) 
Foreign workers from lower income  
     countries 
0.109 0.103 0.214 
(0.311) (0.303) (0.410) 
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Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics by industry 
 Obser-
vations 
(jobs) 
Average 
annual 
fiscal wage 
(in 2008 
euros) 
Percentage 
of jobs 
ending in 
unemploy-
ment 
Percentage 
of unem-
ployed that 
find a new 
job before 
2009 
Average 
unem-
ployment 
duration 
(in years) 
Mining and quarrying 1,441 70,215 2.3 83 0.78 
Food, beverages and tobacco 36,748 60,283 5.0 69 1.41 
Textile, clothing and leather  
     products 3,497 60,682 6.3 72 1.48 
Wood, paper and printing 16,840 56,540 5.9 77 1.29 
Chemical products, rubber and  
     plastic products 44,284 78,695 4.5 74 1.36 
Other manufacturing (non-metallic  
     mineral products, recycling,  
     utilities) 14,229 57,103 3.0 74 1.55 
Basic metals and metal products 19,873 51,080 5.7 85 1.02 
Machinery and equipment 26,481 55,033 4.5 83 1.09 
Office, electrical and 
     communication machinery,   
     medical instruments 41,683 69,128 3.7 74 1.17 
Motor vehicles and other transport  
     equipment 19,138 52,594 8.9 79 0.95 
Other goods 52,735 31,725 2.3 69 1.36 
Construction 31,556 53,140 3.5 83 1.13 
Reparation and selling of motor  
     vehicles 8,225 44,348 5.1 86 0.78 
Wholesale trade 24,060 56,432 6.1 84 0.91 
Retail trade 23,018 33,991 4.0 85 0.76 
Hotels and restaurants 15,487 32,263 4.9 85 0.93 
Transportation 15,699 43,206 3.4 83 0.80 
Transport and travel services 11,207 52,256 4.4 87 0.66 
Post and communication 8,744 53,358 5.0 87 0.71 
Real estate and renting 6,348 57,899 4.9 86 1.00 
Computer services 34,296 71,015 3.9 86 1.07 
Other business services 279,009 58,070 6.7 85 0.73 
All sectors 734,598 56,124 5.3 82 0.93 
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The same variables are also summarized based on the type of outsourcing used by the firms 
(see Table 4.3). The majority of the employees worked for firms that did not outsource in 
the period 2001–2006. However, the number of employees that worked for firms that did 
outsource is large considering that this group contains only about 26 percent of the firms in 
the data. This implies that firms that outsourced have considerably more employees than 
firms that did not outsource. The average wage is lower than the overall average for firms 
that outsourced domestically (45,000 euro), and higher than the overall average for firms 
that outsourced internationally (67,150 euro) or outsourced to both destinations (81,300 
euro). The share of jobs that ended in involuntary unemployment was the highest for firms 
that outsourced only domestically (7.3 percent) and the lowest for firms that outsourced 
only internationally (4.0 percent). This implies that employees have the highest (lowest) 
risk of getting involuntarily unemployed at firms that have outsourced only domestically 
(internationally). Section 4.5 explores this relationship more formally using the Cox 
proportional hazard model, which also controls for job duration and other control variables. 
Although employees that work for firms that outsourced internationally have a relatively 
low risk of becoming involuntarily unemployed, they have a relatively high average 
unemployment duration (1.18 years). So if these employees lose their job, they seem to 
have more difficulty finding a new job. The opposite applies to employees from firms that 
outsourced only domestically: they have the highest risk of losing their job and the lowest 
average unemployment duration. As expected, the ranking of the share of unemployed 
employees that find a new job before 2009 is exactly the opposite of the ranking of the 
average unemployment duration.  
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Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics by type of outsourcing 
 
4.4 Empirical model 
We use a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) to determine the effect of several 
types of outsourcing on the probability that an employee involuntarily loses his job and on 
the probability that an unemployed person finds a new job. The Cox proportional hazard 
model allows us to correct for the duration of the job spell or the unemployment spell, as 
well as for other control variables. This section will give a technical description of the 
model based on the original article by Cox (1972). This description applies to the case 
where we model the transition from employment to involuntary unemployment, but the 
methodology is similar for the case of a transition from involuntary unemployment back to 
employment.  
If we denote the job duration by T, the probability P(t) that a job ends and a worker 
becomes involuntarily unemployed within time t can be written as: 
( ) ( ).P t P T t   (4.1)
Similarly, the probability S(t) that a job survives longer than time t, can be written as: 
( ) ( ) 1 ( ).S t P T t P t     (4.2)
 Obser-
vations 
(jobs) 
Average 
annual fiscal 
wage (in 
2008 euros) 
Percentage 
of jobs 
ending in un-
employment 
Percentage 
of unem-
ployed that 
find a new 
job before 
2009 
Average 
unem-
ployment 
duration 
(in years) 
No outsourcing 432,439 56,176 4.8 82 0.94 
Only domestic    
     outsourcing 170,277 45,016 7.3 83 0.78 
Only international  
     outsourcing 102,625 67,150 4.0 79 1.18 
Both types 29,256 81,325 4.6 71 1.42 
All firms 734,597 56,124 5.3 82 0.93 
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The model aims to explain the hazard rate of becoming involuntarily unemployed. This 
hazard rate is equal to the probability density function of becoming involuntarily 
unemployed, conditional on the duration of the job. The hazard rate h(t) is the probability 
that a job will end in involuntary unemployment within a short time period, ∆t, given that 
the job survived up until time t. The hazard rate can be expressed as: 
0
( | )( ) lim .
t
P t T t t t Th t
t 
       (4.3)
The Cox proportional hazard model estimates the hazard rate by using a semi-parametric 
approach. The hazard rate is estimated as a function of a baseline hazard rate function that 
varies over time, and k explanatory variables that enter the model linearly:  
1
log ( ) ( ) .i k ki
k
h t t x 

   (4.4)
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the hazard rate. The first term of the 
right hand side represents the base hazard rate, which varies over the duration of the job. It 
is comparable to the constant in a regular regression model, but it varies over time: 
0( ) log ( ).t h t   (4.5)
This term captures differences in the hazard rate that are the result of the duration of the 
job. The model assumes that the pattern of this base hazard rate does not differ between 
different groups. Figure 4.1 shows the development of the average hazard rate over the 
duration of a job. This function was estimated for all jobs in the Netherlands, not just the 
jobs of firms that were available in the outsourcing survey.  
 Empirical model 113 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Smoothed hazard rate of losing a job and receiving unemployment benefits 
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The horizontal axis depicts the job duration in years and the vertical axis contains the base 
hazard rate h(t). The shortest job duration in our data is 0.5 years, since we removed all jobs 
with a shorter duration. Some jobs have a very long duration, but since the number of these 
jobs is very small, they have almost no effect on the estimation results.25 Not too much 
value should be attached to the extreme part of the right-tail of Figure 4.1, since part is only 
based on a very small number of observations. Figure 4.1 shows that new jobs with a short 
duration start with a relatively high hazard rate. The hazard rate decreases for jobs with a 
longer duration, but starts to increase again after a duration of about 25 years. A possible 
explanation for this is the existence of temporary contracts. In the Netherlands, it is 
generally not possible to agree to several sequential temporary contracts.26 Therefore, jobs 
with a short duration can be either jobs with a temporary contract or with a permanent 
contract, while jobs with a longer duration are generally permanent jobs. If firms have to 
                                                 
25 In two alternative specifications, we removed the jobs with a duration above 25 or above 40, which has 
almost no impact on the results. This chapter always reports the results of the specification including all jobs 
with a duration of at least six months.  
26 Under current labour market regulations, the fourth sequential temporary contract will automatically 
become a permanent contract. 
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reduce the amount of employees, it is likely that will first end the contracts of temporary 
employees, because firing an employee with a permanent position can be very costly. A 
firm that wants to fire an employee has to go through expensive procedures and provide 
monetary compensation to the employee, which is often based on the number of years of 
employment. Additionally, when firms are forced to reduce the number of employees, 
labour unions often negotiate that firms first have to fire the employees that joined the firm 
last. This means that jobs with a short duration have a higher risk to end in case of large 
reorganizations, which would explain the higher average hazard rate for these jobs. A third 
possible explanation is that firms need some time to evaluate whether or not the employee 
is suitable for the job. Especially in the first few years, a firm can decide to fire an 
employee that is not performing well enough. If an employee is still not fired after several 
years, this probably means that the employee is performing sufficiently well and therefore 
the hazard rate will decrease. 
The finding that the hazard of becoming unemployed starts to increase again for jobs 
that lasted for a long time is a somewhat unexpected result, considering that the cost of 
firing an employee generally increases with the job duration in the Netherlands. However, 
the result is consistent with Hassink (1999) and Gielen and Van Ours (2004), who 
independently find that the probability to become unemployed increases for older workers 
in the Netherlands. Although they do not provide a full explanation for this phenomenon, it 
is attributed to the fact that older workers are relatively expensive, while their productivity 
could decrease as a result of out-dated knowledge and insufficient abilities regarding 
technological advancements. This argument refers to the efficient layoff rule of Lazear 
(1995). Furthermore, older workers are less likely to leave the firm voluntarily when they 
notice that the prospects of the firm are decreasing, for example because they are less likely 
to find a new job, or because they feel more attached to their current job. Additionally, a 
possible explanation for the relatively high hazard rate for jobs with a long duration is that 
some functions might simply disappear. Jobs that started several decades ago might have 
become redundant as a result of technological change. 
The second term of the right hand side of equation (4.4) includes the explanatory 
variables. These include a number of control variables, as well as the indicators for 
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outsourcing that were introduced in the previous section. The control variables are gender, 
age, country of birth, firm size, and sector dummies. The variable firm size is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the amount of full-time equivalents employed by the firm. The 
outsourcing indicator is a binary variable that indicates whether or not a firm outsourced in 
the period 2001–2006. Alternatively, we distinguish two binary variables, for domestic 
outsourcing and for international outsourcing. While the model allows a flexible base 
hazard rate, which varies with job duration, the effect of the covariate variables is estimated 
to be time invariant. 
The model is estimated using the partial likelihood estimator developed by Cox 
(1972). The interpretation of the estimated coefficients is that an increase in the value of the 
independent variable by one corresponds to a change of the natural logarithm of the hazard 
ratio by β. This corresponds to a change of the hazard ratio by eβ. In the next section, which 
presents the estimation results, all coefficients are reported as the exponent of β. This 
means that the reported values can be interpreted as hazard ratios. When a variable 
increases by one, the hazard rate can be multiplied by the reported values. For variables that 
are denoted in natural logarithms, like wage and firm size, the reported values can be 
interpreted as an elasticity. For both types of variables, a value of one implies that the 
variable has no effect on the hazard rate, and a value above (below) one implies that the 
variable increases (decreases) the hazard rate. 
 
4.5 Estimation results 
 
4.5.1 From employment to unemployment 
The first part of our empirical analysis considers the probability that an employee loses his 
job. The relevant variable is the hazard of unemployment after a certain job duration. When 
we compare this probability for firms that outsourced parts of their activities in the period 
2001–2006 with firms that did not outsource in that period, there appears to be little 
difference. Panel A in Figure 4.2 shows the smoothed hazard estimates and the Kaplan-
Meier survival estimates for employees working in both groups of firms, plotted as a 
function of job duration. The Kaplan-Meier survival estimates represent the estimated share 
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of employees that do not become involuntarily unemployed. The Kaplan-Meier survival 
estimates are used, because all jobs that are still active at the end of 2008 leave our sample 
at that time, without information on whether it will eventually lead to involuntary 
unemployment or not. The method developed by Kaplan and Meier (1958) is able to deal 
with these kind of right-censored data. For employees working for a firm that outsourced, 
the hazard rate is somewhat higher for young and for old jobs, while it is smaller for the 
jobs in between. The left part of the figure is the most relevant, because a large share of 
jobs has a relatively short duration. Overall, the difference between both groups of firms 
looks small, which could indicate that the employees who had their jobs outsourced were 
re-assigned within the firm. It is also possible that positive productivity effects and negative 
transitional effects are somewhat in balance. In firms that do not outsource, productivity 
growth might be lower which could result in decreasing employment. Firms that outsource 
might grow faster due to higher productivity growth (consistent with the predictions of 
Mitra and Ranjan, 2010), which increases employment in these firms, but at the same time 
it is likely that some employees get fired during the process of outsourcing.  
This comparison is also made for firms that did or did not outsource domestically and 
for firms that did or did not outsource internationally. The panels B and C in Figure 4.2 
show that the higher probability of unemployment for employees with short job durations 
working for firms that outsourced, is caused by domestic outsourcing. In firms that 
outsourced internationally, the hazard rate was actually smaller for jobs with a short 
duration. Note that these figures should only be used as an indication of the differences 
between the hazard rates of both groups. They only control for job duration, and not for any 
other characteristics of the firms or the employees, like the size of the firms or the age of 
the employees. We used the Cox proportional hazard model to determine the relationship 
between the hazard rate of losing a job and several firm and employee characteristics. Table 
4.4 shows the estimation results of the Cox proportional hazard model. Since we have 
included a number of firm-level variables in our specifications and because there usually 
are multiple observations per firm, we have estimated firm-level clustered standard errors. 
 Estimation results 117 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Hazard and survival rates of losing a job and receiving unemployment benefits 
A. Outsourcing versus non-outsourcing firms 
 
 
B. Internationally outsourcing versus not internationally outsourcing firms 
 
 
C. Domestically outsourcing versus not domestically outsourcing firms 
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The first model specification only includes control variables, like gender, age, fiscal wage, 
country of birth and firm output. A coefficient of one implies that we have not found an 
effect of this variable on the risk of becoming unemployed. The statistical significance 
levels are based on the null-hypotheses that states that there is no effect, which means that 
the coefficient is equal to one. The estimation results indicate that, given the job duration, 
the probability of losing a job and receiving unemployment benefits is higher for female 
employees, younger employees, and employees born in low-income countries. The 
coefficients for the total output of the firm and the fiscal wage of the employee are not 
statistically significant. The risk of becoming involuntarily unemployed is particularly high 
for female employees (about 45 percent higher than males) and for employees that are born 
in a country with a GDP of less than 20,000 USD in 2010 (about 170 percent higher than 
for Dutch employees).  
 For the first specification in Table 4.4, the sector dummies are shown graphically in 
Figure 4.3. This figure shows the point estimates of each sector dummy with a 95 percent 
confidence interval. The reference sector is wholesale trade, which is omitted. The 
definition of the sectors is the same as in the previous chapter, and can be found in Table 
3.14 in Appendix 3.B. The sectoral hazard rates are adjusted for the control variables that 
are included in specification (I) in Table 4.4. The risk of becoming unemployed is 
particularly low for employees working in the sectors other goods (0.28), mining and 
quarrying (0.39), other manufacturing (0.43), and electronics (0.44). For example, this 
means that an employee that works in the sector electronics, is 56 percent less likely to 
become involuntarily unemployed than a similar employee working in the wholesale trade 
sector. The risk of becoming unemployed is relatively high in the sectors other business 
services (1.14), and in the reference sector wholesale trade (1). The sector dummies are not 
reported for the other specifications, but they are similar to those shown in Figure 4.3. 
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Table 4.4. Cox proportional hazard model estimation results for probability of losing a job 
and receiving unemployment benefits 
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Significance levels for 
deviations from 1 are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
 Dependent: hazard rate of becoming 
unemployed 
 (I) (II) (III) 
Female 1.42*** 
(0.14) 
1.43*** 
(0.13) 
1.45*** 
(0.13) 
Age  0.96*** 
(0.01) 
0.96*** 
(0.01) 
0.96*** 
(0.01) 
Ln(annualized fiscal wage) 0.92 
(0.25) 
0.93 
(0.23) 
0.96 
(0.23) 
Employee from foreign high-income country 1.22 
(0.19) 
1.23 
(0.18) 
1.28* 
(0.19) 
Employee from foreign low-income country 2.69*** 
(0.18) 
2.70*** 
(0.17) 
2.71*** 
(0.18) 
Ln(firm size) 1.05 
(0.14) 
1.03 
(0.11) 
1.01 
(0.09) 
Outsourced  1.21 
(0.23) 
 
Outsourced internationally   0.68*** 
(0.10) 
Outsourced domestically   1.52** 
(0.32) 
Observations 734,597 734,597 734,597 
Failures 38,611 38,611 38,611 
Total duration (in million years) 6.65 6.65 6.65 
Sector dummies 22 22 22 
Number of clusters 995 995 995 
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Figure 4.3. Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for sectoral hazard rates of 
losing a job and receiving unemployment benefit (relative to the wholesale trade sector) 
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In specification (II) in Table 4.4, a dummy is added which indicates whether or not a firm 
outsourced in the period 2001–2006. In specification (III) this dummy is split in two 
dummies, for international and for domestic outsourcing. The coefficients of the control 
variables do not change much compared to specification (I). As indicated by the results 
estimated for specification (II), the coefficient for the outsourcing variable is positive but 
not statistically significant. Although we would expect that employees working for firms 
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that outsourced in the period 2001–2006 would have a higher risk of becoming 
unemployed, we do not find statistically significant evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
This seems to be related to the different effects we find for domestic and international 
outsourcing. In specification (III), these two types of outsourcing are included separately. It 
turns out that the risk of losing a job is in fact lower for firms that have been outsourcing 
internationally, while it is higher for firms that outsourced domestically. Employees are 32 
percent less likely to lose their job if they work in a firm that engages in international 
outsourcing, and 52 percent more likely to lose their job if they work in a firm that 
outsourced domestically.  
 A possible explanation for these findings is that firms that outsource internationally 
are able to increase their productivity, which allows them to grow faster, which is likely to 
result in increased labour demand. The results from Chapter 3 do not suggest that 
international outsourcing increases total factor productivity (TFP). However, it is possible 
that it increases the size and employment of the firm, without increasing TFP. Another 
possible explanation is that international outsourcing requires more labour to manage the 
contracts than domestic outsourcing contracts. In that case, the number of jobs that is 
effectively outsourced would be lower, but the cost savings associated to one outsourced 
job would be larger, because international outsourcing enables firms to benefit from 
comparative cost advantages.  
The previously discussed models use a linear specification with respect to the 
logarithm of the fiscal wage. However, the relationship between wage and the risk of losing 
a job may not be linear. It is possible that certain wage groups are more affected by 
outsourcing than others, for example because some job types are easier to outsource than 
others (see, e.g., Akçomak et al., 2011). Therefore we repeat the model with dummies for 
four wage groups. The groups are based on the quartiles of the distribution of real annual 
fiscal wages across all firms in the dataset. Note that our data only contain employees that 
earn at least the minimum wage. The wages are normalized to 2008 wages by adjusting for 
inflation and real wage changes over time. The quartile boundaries are about 27,900 euro, 
38,100 euro and 54,000 euro. The first specification in Table 4.5 shows that the relationship 
between wage and the risk of getting unemployed is indeed not linear. The first quartile is 
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omitted, so the coefficients of the other three quartiles are relative to the first wage quartile. 
The first wage quartile has the highest risk of getting unemployed, since the coefficients of 
all other quartiles are below one. Employees in the third wage quartile have the lowest risk 
of getting unemployed.  
 In the second specification of Table 4.5, we include interaction effects between the 
variables that indicate whether the firm did or did not outsource and the wage quartile 
variables. Since the interaction term between the first quartile and the outsourcing dummy 
is omitted, the outsourcing variable provides the effect on the risk of getting unemployed 
for the first wage quartile. This coefficient is 1.71, and statistically significant. To obtain 
the effect on outsourcing for the other wage quartiles, we need to multiply this coefficient 
with the relevant interaction effect. For example, for the second wage quartile this is 1.71 x 
0.77 = 1.32. Note that the stars for the coefficients of wage quartiles two, three and four, 
indicate a statistically significant difference with the first wage quartile, which is the 
reference group. These results reveal that the effects of outsourcing differ strongly between 
the four wage quartiles. The risk of getting unemployed increases by 71 percent for the first 
wage quartile, by 32 percent for the second wage quartile, and it has almost no effect for 
employees in the other two wage quartiles.  
 Finally, the third model specification includes interaction effects for domestic 
outsourcing as well as for international outsourcing. For the reference group (the first wage 
quartile) international outsourcing decreases the risk of getting unemployed (0.74), while 
the coefficient for domestic outsourcing strongly increases the risk (2.05). This is in line 
with the previous results in Table 4.4, which did not include any interaction effects. One of 
the most interesting results is that domestic outsourcing increases the risk of getting 
unemployed particularly for employees earning wages in the lowest quartile (2.05), while 
the effect becomes smaller for the higher wage groups. After multiplying the international 
outsourcing coefficient of the first wage quartile with the interaction terms of the other 
wage quartiles, we find a coefficient of 1.85 for the second quartile, 1.29 for the third 
quartile and 0.90 for the fourth quartile. Interestingly, international outsourcing decreases 
the hazard rate for all wage quartiles. This effect is the largest for the second wage quartile 
(0.55) and for the third wage quartile (0.64). 
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Table 4.5. Cox proportional hazard model estimation results, for probability of losing a job 
and receiving unemployment benefits, including wage-outsourcing interacting terms  
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Significance levels for 
deviations from 1 are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
 Dependent: hazard rate of becoming 
unemployed 
Female 1.33*** 
(0.10) 
1.35*** 
(0.08) 
1.37*** 
(0.09) 
Age  0.97*** 
(0.01) 
0.97*** 
(0.01) 
0.97*** 
(0.01) 
Second wage quartile 0.58*** 
(0.04) 
0.67*** 
(0.05) 
0.66*** 
(0.05) 
Third wage quartile 0.38*** 
(0.04) 
0.49*** 
(0.07) 
0.48*** 
(0.06) 
Fourth wage quartile 0.56** 
(0.15) 
0.77 
(0.21) 
0.75 
(0.19) 
Second wage quartile × outsourced  0.77 
(0.21) 
 
Third wage quartile × outsourced  0.57*** 
(0.12 
 
Fourth wage quartile × outsourced  0.52*** 
(0.12) 
 
Second wage quartile × outsourced domestically   0.90 
(0.25) 
Third wage quartile × outsourced domestically   0.63* 
(0.16) 
Fourth wage quartile × outsourced domestically   0.44*** 
(0.10) 
Second wage quartile × outsourced internationally   0.74 
(0.14) 
Third wage quartile × outsourced internationally   0.87 
(0.17) 
Fourth wage quartile × outsourced internationally   1.16 
(0.26) 
Employee from foreign high-income country 1.21 
(0.19) 
1.20 
(0.17) 
1.25 
(0.17) 
Employee from foreign low-income country 2.49*** 
(0.17) 
2.46*** 
(0.17) 
2.46*** 
(0.17) 
Ln(firm size) 1.04 
(0.18) 
1.00 
(0.09) 
0.97 
(0.07) 
Outsourced  1.71*** 
(0.06) 
 
Outsourced internationally   0.74** 
(0.09) 
Outsourced domestically   2.05***
(0.34) 
Observations 734,597 734,597 734,597 
Failures 38,611 38,611 38,611 
Total duration (in million years) 6.65 6.65 6.65 
Sector dummies 22 22 22 
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Additionally, in firms that outsource internationally, employees in the first quartile of the 
wage distribution (0.74) actually have a somewhat smaller hazard rate than employees in 
the highest wage quartile (0.86), although this difference is not statistically significant. This 
is likely to be related with the type of jobs that are being outsourced domestically and 
internationally. For many types of jobs with low wages, it is not possible to outsource 
internationally. A good example are cleaning jobs, which pay relatively low wages, but 
cannot be outsourced internationally because the job has to be performed locally. They can, 
however, be outsourced domestically, which explains the result that the risk of getting 
unemployed for employees with low wages is particularly increased when firms outsource 
domestically, and not when they outsource internationally. Even though these jobs are 
unlikely to be outsourced internationally and therefore less vulnerable from competition 
from low wage countries, as the polarization literature predicts (Autor et al., 2006; Goos et 
al., 2009), they may be outsourced domestically. 
 
4.5.2 From unemployment back to a job 
The second part of the analysis focuses on the probability of finding a new job, after a 
period of unemployment. For this part we only use the data for employees that lost their job 
and received unemployment benefits. Panel A in Figure 4.4 shows the estimated hazard and 
survival rates, plotted against the number of years after the end of their last job. The figure 
shows that there is almost no difference between employees that used to work for a firm 
that outsourced or for a firm that did not outsource. The probability of finding a new job is 
very high in the first year after losing a job and becomes much smaller after a longer period 
of unemployment. This is likely to be related to a loss of skills that occurs after longer 
periods of inactivity, but also to selection effects. Employees with high unobserved abilities 
are likely to find a job quicker than workers with lower abilities, which results in a 
decreasing potential of the workers that remain unemployed after a longer time. For both 
groups, almost 75 percent of the employees found a new job within one year. About ten 
percent of the employees from our dataset did not find a job within nine years. However, 
this does not mean that these employees were unemployed for this entire period. For 
example, they might have started their own business, or they might have retired. So this 
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figure somewhat overestimates the unemployment duration of employees, but this should 
not be problematic for comparing the job market entry rates between employees from firms 
that did or did not outsource.  
The panels B and C in Figure 4.4 make the same comparison for international 
outsourcing and for domestic outsourcing. It is interesting to see that the small difference in 
the estimated survival rates presented in panel A seems to be the result of two opposite 
differences that cancel out: employees from firms that outsourced internationally (panel B) 
were less likely to find a new job and employees from firms that outsourced domestically 
were slightly more likely to find a new job (panel B). We expect that the explanation for 
this is that jobs that are lost due to international outsourcing are at a comparative 
disadvantage in the Netherlands and are therefore disappearing to foreign countries. 
Employees that were previously working in such jobs will therefore have more trouble 
finding a new similar job, and may have to change their skills by training and education. 
For employees that lost their job due to domestic outsourcing, this argument does not 
apply, since domestic outsourcing only leads to reallocation between firms within the 
Netherlands, even though employment might be slightly reduced due to a higher labour 
productivity that is made possible by enhanced specialization.  
Table 4.6 shows the estimation results of the Cox proportional hazard model applied 
to the probability of finding a new job after a period of unemployment. These regressions 
only include the employees that became unemployed in the period 2000–2008, which are 
about 30,500 observations. It is possible that some individuals have lost their jobs multiple 
times during this period. In that case each lost job is considered as one independent 
observation. In the context of a hazard model, a failure is a unit of observation that leaves 
the current state of unemployment, so more than 80 percent of the observed individuals 
found a new job within our sample period. This does not mean that the other 20 percent 
never found a new job, since we do not observe unemployed individuals after the year 2008 
and we do not observe whether people find a job after this year. The share of employees 
that never find a new job after unemployment is probably below, but somewhere close to, 
ten percent, as indicated by the survival rate estimates shown in Figure 4.4. And this 
includes former employees that are no longer looking for a new job. 
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Figure 4.4. Hazard and survival rates for getting out of unemployment by finding a new job 
A. Outsourcing versus non-outsourcing firms 
 
 
B. Internationally outsourcing versus not internationally outsourcing firms 
 
 
C. Domestically outsourcing versus not domestically outsourcing firms 
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Specification (I) in Table 4.6 does not yet include any outsourcing indicators.  The results 
of this specification suggest that unemployed former employees are less likely to find a new 
job if they are female, are older, had a higher wage in their previous job, or are born in a 
foreign country. This may be related to the length of the period people are willing to search 
for a new job. For example, woman may be able to afford longer search periods, since they 
are more often than men the secondary earner of a family in the Netherlands. It is also 
possible that these groups have more difficulty finding a new job. For example, foreigners 
might have more difficulty with finding a new job because they are less fluent in the Dutch 
language. And older people might have more difficulty with finding a new job because of a 
discrepancy between their wage and their productivity. Additionally, people that worked 
for the same employer for many years may depend relatively strongly on firm-specific 
capital, which is less useful when they have to find a new job at a different employer.  
 The size of the firm of their previous job has no effect on the likelihood of finding a 
new job. The sector dummies point estimates and their 95 percent confidence intervals are 
shown in Figure 4.5. Although the differences in the hazard rate of becoming unemployed 
were often statistically significant (see Figure 4.4), the differences are much smaller and 
less often statistically significant for the hazard rate of finding a new job after being 
involuntarily unemployed. The only sectors that deviated statistically significantly from the 
wholesale trade sector are other goods (0.57), food, beverages, and tobacco (0.80), other 
business services (1.09), and transport services (1.14). Since there are significant 
differences in the risk of becoming involuntarily unemployed (inflow of unemployment) 
while the differences in the probability of finding a new job are much smaller (outflow of 
unemployment), this suggests that there is a substantial sectoral component in 
unemployment.  
Specification (II) in Table 4.6 also includes a dummy for whether or not the firm of 
their previous job outsourced part of its activities. This has no significant effect on the 
likelihood of finding a new job. However, when we look at international and domestic 
outsourcing separately in specification (III), the likelihood of finding a new job is 
significantly lower for former employees of firms that outsourced internationally and 
higher for former employees of firms that outsourced domestically. This result is consistent 
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with the picture in Figure 4.4 and suggests that there is a general trend in the type of jobs 
that are being outsourced, which results in a longer unemployment period for employees 
that lost their job due to international outsourcing. We do not show the results with non-
linear interaction effects of wages, since these did not yield any statistically significant 
results. 
 
Table 4.6. Cox proportional hazard model estimation results, for probability of finding a 
new job after receiving unemployment benefits  
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Significance levels for 
deviations from 1 are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). 
 
 Dependent: hazard rate of finding a job after 
unemployment 
 (I) (II) (III) 
Female 0.93*** 
(0.02) 
0.93*** 
(0.02) 
0.93*** 
(0.02) 
Age  0.97*** 
(0.004) 
0.97*** 
(0.004) 
0.97*** 
(0.004) 
Ln(annualized fiscal wage) 0.86*** 
(0.02) 
0.86*** 
(0.02) 
0.87*** 
(0.02) 
Employee from foreign high-income country 0.89*** 
(0.03) 
0.90*** 
(0.03) 
0.90*** 
(0.03) 
Employee from foreign low-income country 0.84*** 
(0.01) 
0.84*** 
(0.02) 
0.84*** 
(0.02) 
Ln(total firm output) 1.00 
(0.01) 
1.01 
(0.01) 
1.01 
(0.01) 
Outsourced  0.93** 
(0.03) 
 
Outsourced internationally   0.91* 
(0.05) 
Outsourced domestically   0.94 
(0.04) 
Observations 30,489 30,489 30,489 
Failures 25,002 25,002 25,002 
Total duration (in years) 28,356 28,356 28,356 
Sector dummies 22 22 22 
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Figure 4.5. Point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for sectoral hazard rates of 
finding a new job after receiving unemployment benefits (relative to the wholesale trade 
sector) 
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
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Other manufacturing
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Post and communication
Real estate and renting
Computer services
Other business services
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter combined data on unemployment benefits with data from a survey on 
outsourcing to determine how outsourcing is related to the risk of losing a job as well as the 
probability of finding a new job after becoming unemployed. We used a Cox proportional 
hazard model to control for the duration of the job, as well as for other characteristics of the 
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firms and the employees. Our measure for outsourcing is a binary variable that indicates 
whether or not a firm outsourced any of its activities in the period 2001–2006. 
Additionally, we distinguished between domestic and international outsourcing.  
The first part of this chapter considered the probability that an employee would 
involuntarily lose his job. Our results suggest that the risk of involuntary job loss is 
relatively high for jobs with a low tenure, is the smallest for jobs with a tenure between 10 
and 25 years, and increases again after that. One of the reasons for the higher hazard rate 
for jobs with a low tenure is that firms that have to reduce the amount of employees are 
more likely to fire or not extend contracts of temporary employees, because firing an 
employee with a permanent position can be very costly. After controlling for job duration, 
the estimation results show that the risk of involuntary job loss is higher for female 
employees, younger employees, and employees born in low-income countries. We can 
think of two explanations for these results. The most likely explanation is that employees in 
these groups relatively often have temporary jobs. A more theoretical explanation is that 
some types of employees have a higher variance in terms of the extent of the success of a 
match between employer and employee. If we assume that employers are rational, and are 
aware of these higher rates of firing employees, they would not hire these employees unless 
there was a probability of a higher reward. A higher variance of the benefits of a contract 
for the employer could explain why they do still hire these employees, since they are aware 
of higher firing rates but also gain more when the match is successful.  
The risk of involuntary unemployment has no statistically significant relationship 
with the general outsourcing variable. However, this seems to be the result from a positive 
effect of domestic outsourcing and a negative effect of international outsourcing. 
Employees were 32 percent less likely to lose their job if they worked in a firm that 
outsourced internationally, and 52 percent more likely to lose their job if they worked in a 
firm that outsourced domestically. A possible explanation for this is that firms that 
outsource internationally, are able to increase their size and employment. The results from 
Chapter 3 do not indicate that international outsourcing increases total factor productivity 
(TFP) of firms. However, it may lead to an increase in size without increasing TFP. A 
second possible explanation for the difference between the effects of domestic and 
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international outsourcing is that internationally outsourcing contracts require more labour to 
manage the contracts than domestic outsourcing contracts.  
The second part of this chapter considered the probability of finding a new job after 
being involuntary unemployed. Again, we employed a Cox proportional hazard model, but 
in this case it is based on the unemployment duration instead of the job duration. The 
results suggest that female employees, older employees, employees with a higher wage, and 
foreign-born employees are less likely to find a new job after an involuntary job loss. This 
may be related to the length of the period people are willing to search for a new job. For 
example, woman may be able to afford longer search periods, since they are more often 
than men the secondary earner of a family in the Netherlands. It is also possible that these 
groups have more difficulty finding a new job. For example, foreigners might have more 
difficulty with finding a new job because they are less fluent in the Dutch language. And 
older people might have more difficulty with finding a new job because of a discrepancy 
between their wage and their productivity. Additionally, people that worked for the same 
employer for many years may depend relatively strongly on firm-specific capital, which is 
less useful when they have to find a new job at a different employer. 
We find no relationship between domestic outsourcing and the probability of finding 
a new job. However, former employees of firms that have outsourced internationally are 
about nine percent less likely to find a new job. This is probably the case because jobs that 
are lost due to international outsourcing are actually leaving the country. In the case of 
domestic outsourcing, the jobs only relocate to a different region within the Netherlands, or 
they might stay in the same region and only move to a different firm. Employees that lose 
their job as a result of domestic outsourcing are often able to perform the same task in a 
different firm. When firms outsource activities internationally, this suggests a comparative 
disadvantage of the Netherlands in these tasks. This implies that the demand for these tasks 
in the Netherlands is decreasing, and employees might not be able to find a new job in 
which they can perform the same task as in their previous job. They might have to change 
their skill set, by training or education, before they are able to find a new job, which can 
explain why they are less likely to find a new job. 
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5 Ethnic diversity and firm 
productivity 
 
5.1 Introduction27 
The increasing ethnic diversity of the population of many developed countries has 
prompted the question whether a more diverse society increases economic growth. Previous 
research shows that cities and regions with more culturally diverse inhabitants (based on 
the country of birth, ethnicity or linguistic background of people) have higher average 
wages and higher economic growth (see, e.g., Ottaviano and Peri, 2005; 2006; Bellini et al., 
2011; Suedekum et al., 2009; Sparber, 2010). This suggests that interactions between 
diverse people at the level of the city increase economic performance.  
The arguments for these effects are often derived from the seminal work of Jacobs 
(1969). In her research on the economics of cities, she stresses the importance of a diverse 
sector and firm structure in cities to maintain urban economic growth. The key to urban 
economic growth lies in the ability of firms to translate technologies and ideas from other 
sectors or firms to their own production processes in order to innovate and keep up with 
changes in demand or supply of any factor that affects a firm. Applied to diversity of the 
population, the parallel argument is that a more diverse labour force in cities will increase 
productivity. Interaction among diverse people with a high variety of backgrounds 
increases the capability for innovation, creativity and problem solving. From an 
endogenous growth theory perspective, these are the main ingredients for economic growth 
(see, e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Negative effects of diversity on economic growth are 
found in the work by Putnam (2007), Lazear (1999), and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), 
                                                 
27 This chapter is based on joint work with Jessie Bakens (VU University Amsterdam).  
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who state that increased diversity incurs costs on society if people find it harder to 
communicate or trust each other.  
The abovementioned mechanisms through which ethnic diversity influences regional 
economic growth, could potentially also be present at the level of the firm, where people 
with different ethnic backgrounds interact and are productive. If this is the case, it could 
explain part of the relationship between diversity and economic performance of cities. To 
test this hypothesis, this chapter looks at diversity and productivity at the individual firm 
level. We use a two-step approach, where the first step estimates sectoral production 
functions to derive firm-level total factor productivity (TFP). In the second step, we use 
TFP as the dependent variable to determine whether heterogeneous firms are more 
productive than homogeneous firms. We explain TFP by the diversity of the employees in 
the firm using cross-sectional data as well as panel data. If these externalities exist at the 
firm level, we would expect firms with more ethnically diverse employees to have a higher 
TFP relative to the sector average. The benefit of using TFP is that it can be used to correct 
for individual productivity levels of employees and determine whether there is a diversity 
externality. Using wages as the dependent variable only allows estimating an indirect effect 
of diversity, namely whether individual productivity is higher in firms with a higher 
diversity. There might be other causes for differences in individual productivity that cannot 
be easily filtered out. Using TFP allows us to correct for individual productivity and 
separate this from the productivity of (the management of) the firm.  
In the next section we discuss the different channels through which diversity can 
influence TFP, productivity and economic growth. Section 5.3 deals with the data and the 
model we used to estimate the impact of immigrant diversity on TFP. Section 5.4 discusses 
the results and robustness checks and Section 5.5 summarizes the main conclusions. 
 
5.2 Cultural diversity and productivity 
The impact of immigrants on the economies of receiving countries has been extensively 
studied. One of the main focuses has been on the short-term labour market impacts such as 
the impact on wages and unemployment (see, e.g., Borjas, 1994; Card, 1990). Depending 
on the scale and scope of the labour market that is subject to research, in general only small 
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or statistically insignificant impacts of immigrants on wages and employment are found 
(see Longhi et al., 2008). This prompts a question about the medium to long-term impact of 
immigrants on labour markets and productivity. The last years have seen a rapid increase in 
research focused on the medium and long-term impact of immigrants on economic growth, 
especially on lower levels of aggregation. The main focus has been shifted towards the 
impact of immigrants on economic growth in cities and productivity gains in firms, with a 
focus on the effect of the diversity of ethnicities that is induced on cities and firms by the 
presence of immigrants.  
Ottaviano and Peri (2005; 2006) find that native workers earn a higher wage in more 
culturally diverse US cities. Especially highly educated native workers seem to benefit 
from this (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005). Suedekum et al. (2009) find the same effect for 
Germany, especially when the immigrants are high skilled. When the immigrants are low 
skilled, diversity of the low-skilled immigrants can partly offset this effect. Bellini et al. 
(2011) find a positive effect between a culturally diverse labour force and GDP per capita 
in European regions. Sparber (2010) finds that the impact of ethnic diversity on state GDP 
in the US is rather mixed. At the city level though, ethnic diversity seems to positively 
impact wages, even after controlling for endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Sparber (2010) also uses an alternative operationalization of economic growth, namely total 
factor productivity (TFP). He finds that the effect of diversity on TFP is smaller than the 
effect of diversity on wages. Additionally, he does not find a positive significant effect with 
fixed effects on the state level, but only with fixed effects on the much more aggregate 
regional level.  
When turning to the firm level, Parrotta et al. (2011) find negative or no effects of 
firm diversity on firm TFP in Denmark when estimating a cross-sectional regression. For 
industries that are more open to trade, Parrotta et al. (2011) do find a positive effect of 
diversity on firm TFP. This supports the theory by Osborne (2000) and Rauch and Casella 
(2003) which states that diversity among employees increases the ability of a firm to 
operate in different countries (in the global market) where country-specific knowledge can 
be important. Internationally oriented firms can gain from hiring immigrants because they 
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understand foreign markets better and immigrants can thus form a stepping stone for 
foreign trade or investments. 
Another mechanism through which firms could achieve a higher economic growth 
when having an ethnically diverse workforce is innovation. Ozgen et al. (2011) and Hunt 
and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010) find that firms with more diverse employees innovate more. 
However, the results are highly dependent on the education level of the immigrants: they 
disproportionally hold degrees in science and engineering. Saxenian (2007) finds that high-
skilled Chinese and Indian immigrants have a positive effect on innovation in the US.  
Besides the above mentioned mechanisms that result in productivity increases, Lazear 
(1999) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) argue that a society with more diversity can face 
lower productivity due to higher communication costs and due to the costs associated with 
a lack of trust between individuals. Den Butter et al. (2007) also argue that within firms, 
there is an overrepresentation of workers of the same ethnic group, because trust is higher 
within homogeneous groups and a higher level of trust reduces coordination costs. When 
people from different backgrounds and with a different language have to work together, 
productivity might decrease due to higher communication costs or because time and effort 
have to be invested in building a common understanding. Ottaviano and Peri (2005) find 
that better integrated immigrants in the US, like immigrants that master the English 
language well, contribute more to GDP than immigrants who do not master the language. 
Proficiency in the language of the receiving country is also an indication for between-group 
contacts and barriers. Several studies find a negative relationship between the presence of 
large homogeneous groups of immigrants and economic growth indicators (see, e.g., 
Ottaviano and Peri, 2005). Putnam (2007) argues that the overall social cohesion in diverse 
societies is low, because people refrain from participating in society all together (as 
opposed to the view that within-group solidarity increases in a diverse society), imposing 
costs on the society. 
To summarize, when focusing on individual firms, the effect of ethnic diversity on 
firm performance is mixed. In the literature both positive and negative effects of 
immigrants and immigrant diversity on the productivity are found, mostly depending on the 
level of aggregation and the measure of economic performance used. As we assume that at 
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least part of the Jacobs externalities are created by interactions between different ethnic 
groups in work-related situations, we focus on the firm level in this research as this is the 
most obvious location where these interactions would take place. The benefit of using TFP 
rather than wages is that we do not need all employee characteristics, because all employee-
specific characteristics should be included in the labour costs, if the labour market functions 
well. 
 
5.3 Data and methodology 
In order to estimate the effect of diversity of employees on firm productivity, we implement 
a two-stage approach. In the first stage, sectoral production functions are estimated in order 
to determine the total factor productivity (TFP) of the firms. This has also been done in 
Chapter 3. In the second stage, the TFP of the firm is explained by the diversity of the 
employees.  
 
5.3.1 Data description and estimation of stage one 
In the first stage, we estimate production functions for a number of sectors, in order to 
determine the TFP of firms. TFP is defined as the firm-specific residual of an estimated 
production function. We estimate TFP by estimating production functions for several 
sectors, using all firms in the Netherlands for which the KLEMS data are available. 
According to the definition of a firm that is used by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), it is 
characterized by the ability of making independent decisions about the production process. 
As such, a firm can have multiple production plants, or offices. It is ambiguous on which 
level the relationship between diversity and productivity is most likely to exist. If there is 
intensive cooperation between the individual plants, the firm as it is defined by Statistics 
Netherlands is probably the relevant level. However, if plants operate mostly 
independently, using firm-level observations might be less appropriate. An example of this 
might be large retail firms with many local shops. Unfortunately, in the Dutch system of 
statistics, the firm is the main level of observation, and no production and financial data is 
available on the level of the plant. However, it is possible to identify the number of plants 
that each firm has. We therefore also performed our estimations for the firms that only have 
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one plant. The results of the estimations with only firms with one plant were very similar to 
the estimations that include all firms. One of the reasons for the small differences is that the 
number of firms that have multiple plants is not very large. In our dataset, about 77 percent 
of the firms had only one plant, fourteen percent had two plants, and nine percent had more 
than two. Although the firms with multiple plants are on average larger than firms with 
only one plant, all firms have an equal weight in the estimations, which is why the results 
are not much affected. In this chapter, all reported results are based on the full sample of 
firms. 
The estimations of the first stage are also used in Chapter 3, where the productivity 
estimations were used to determine the relationship between firm productivity and 
outsourcing. The estimation of TFP is done using the solution described by Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003). The solution provided by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) uses intermediate 
inputs, as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. This is necessary, because 
productivity is likely to be correlated with the level of inputs, since the firm is able to 
observe its own productivity. Without correcting for this, OLS estimations are likely to be 
biased. In our dataset, intermediate inputs are available from the KLEMS framework. We 
take the sum of costs for energy (E), materials (M) and services (S) as the proxy. Appendix 
3.D of Chapter 3 gives a technical overview of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach 
for the case where value added is estimated as a function of capital and labour.  
The firm TFP levels are estimated using the Stata syntax from Petrin et al. (2003), for 
23 different sectors. The sector classification, as well as the number of observations for 
each sector and some descriptive statistics, are included in Appendix 3.B and Appendix 3.C 
of Chapter 3. Since the production functions are estimated on a sectoral level, any sector-
specific characteristics that may affect productivity, like the type of activity or the intensity 
of competition, should be filtered out. We cannot guarantee that there is no heterogeneity 
within these sectors, but we believe that estimating production functions for these 23 
sectors is a significant improvement compared to estimating a single production function 
for all firms. 
We explain value added (VA) as a function of capital costs (K) and labour costs (L), 
using intermediates as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. The measures for output 
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and inputs are obtained from the KLEMS framework, which was provided to us by 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The KLEMS framework refers to capital (K), labour (L), 
energy (E), materials (M) and services (S). A description of how the output and input 
components are constructed can be found in Table 3.7 in Chapter 3.  
In the first stage we estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function, where turnover or 
value added is a function of some combination of the inputs capital and labour. We explain 
valued added (VA) by capital costs (K) and labour costs (L):  
,K Lit it it itVA A K L
   (5.1)
with Ait representing the TFP of firm i in year t.  
The estimation results show that for all sectors, the sum of the coefficients for capital 
and labour is lower than one, indicating decreasing returns to scale. After estimating the 
sector-specific production functions, the procedure by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
calculates the predicted value added, based on capital and labour inputs. The difference 
between the logarithm of the actual value added and the logarithm of the predicted value 
added represents the logarithm of Ai from equation (5.1), which we will refer to as the TFP 
of the firm in the rest of this chapter. We adjusted the TFP by subtracting the average TFP 
of the sector, so that the average TFP is zero for each sector.  
 
5.3.2 Data and methodology for stage two 
In stage two we estimate whether part of the variability in total factor productivity (TFP) 
can be explained by the ethnic diversity of the employees of the firms. A proxy for 
ethnicity that is often used in empirical research is the country of birth. Although this is a 
crude measure, it is objective and available in the data. Table 5.1 shows the shares of the 
largest immigrant groups that are employed in the Netherlands in 2008. 
Countries that are former colonies of the Netherlands, like Surinam, the Netherlands 
Antilles, and Indonesia, have relative large immigrant shares. Turkey and Morocco also 
have large shares, which is the result of large labour immigration from these countries in 
the 1960s. In this period, labour migration from these countries was actively stimulated by 
the Dutch government. Although this policy was initially meant to stimulate temporary 
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migration, many immigrants remained in the Netherlands. Western European countries, like 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and Belgium, are also strongly represented, as a result of 
the short distance to the Netherlands. The relatively high shares of countries like Iraq, Iran, 
and Afghanistan, are likely the result of political refugees.  
 
Table 5.1. Share in total immigrant employees by country of birth, 2008 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from Statistics Netherlands. 
 
The results presented in this chapter are all based on the country of birth of the employee 
itself. As an alternative, we based the diversity measure on the country of birth of the 
employee and the country of birth of his parents. In this way, we also considered second 
generation immigrants to be foreign employees. The argument for this would be that second 
Ranking Country of birth Share in total immigrant 
employees (in percent) 
1 Surinam 12.9 
2 Turkey 10.1 
3 Morocco 8.4 
4 Netherlands Antilles 6.0 
5 Indonesia 5.7 
6 Germany 5.4 
7 Poland 3.6 
8 Yugoslavia 3.2 
9 United Kingdom 3.0 
10 Belgium 2.5 
11 Iraq 1.8 
12 Russia 1.8 
13 China 1.7 
14 Afghanistan 1.6 
15 Iran 1.4 
16 France 1.3 
17 United States 1.2 
18 India 1.1 
19 Italy 1.1 
20 Spain 1.0 
 Total share of largest 20 74.5 
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generation immigrants employees are less similar to native Dutch employees and could 
therefore affect firm productivity through diversity. If we consider second generation 
immigrants employees to be the same as Dutch employees the effect of diversity might be 
underestimated. On the other hand, second generation immigrants are likely to be more 
integrated into Dutch society than first generation immigrants, and dissimilarities between 
native Dutch employees will be smaller for second generation immigrants than for first 
generation immigrants. Therefore, including second generation immigrants as being foreign 
might also understate the effect of diversity. We tried both models, and it turned out that it 
did not matter much for the results whether we based the diversity measure only on first 
generation immigrants or on second generation immigrants as well.  
Diversity is often measured as a fractionalization index (see, e.g., Ottaviano and Peri, 
2006), which is calculated as follows: 
21 ,E
E
F s   (5.2)
where F is the diversity, and SE is the share of ethnicity E. 
The value of F approaches the probability that two randomly selected employees are 
born in a different country. This diversity index ranges from 0 (all employees are born in 
the same country) to 1 (all employees are born in a different country). Equation (5.2) is 
mostly suitable for firms with a large number of employees. Since we also have firms with 
few employees, we use a slightly different expression, so that the interpretation of F also 
holds for small firms:28 
( 1)1  for  is at least 2,
( 1)
E E
T
E T T
N NF N
N N
    (5.3)
where F is the diversity, NE is the number of employees with ethnicity E and NT is the total 
number of employees in the firm.  
                                                 
28 The interpretation of F being the probability of selecting two individuals with a different ethnicity does not 
hold for equation (5.2) for firms with few employees. For example, the fractionalization index for a firm with 
two employees with different ethnicities, will be 1 – 0.52 – 0.52 = 0.5, instead of one. 
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With equation (5.3), the range of F is zero to one, while with equation (5.2), F can never 
become one. Moreover, equation (5.3) is not influenced by the size of the firm. When 
employees would be randomly assigned to firms of different sizes, the expected value of F 
would be the same for every firm size (excluding firms with only one employee, which we 
assign a diversity of zero). When using equation (5.2), the expected value would depend on 
the size of the firm. See Appendix 5.B for a proof of this result for the situation with two 
different nationalities. These differences between equation (5.2) and (5.3) are only relevant 
for cases with small values of NT, and become negligible for situations with many 
individuals, like large firms or cities.  
This measure for diversity is more suitable than a simple measure, like the share of 
foreign employees. The reason is that this measure really captures diversity. For example, a 
firm that only contains German employees has a high share of foreign employees, but its 
employees are actually very homogeneous in terms of their ethnicity. Although this 
diversity index captures the concept of diversity that we are interested in, it is highly 
correlated with the share of foreign employees. Figure 5.1 contains a scatter plot that shows 
the relationship between the diversity index and the foreign share, for each firm in our 
sample in 2008. The reason for the parabolic shape is due to the construction of the index: 
by definition the minimum value of the diversity index is highest (0.5) when the foreign 
share is equal to 0.5.29  
Figure 5.1 clearly shows the high correlation between both measures. The correlation 
coefficient between the diversity index and the foreign share is equal to 0.84. The 
correlation is especially high at low levels of foreign shares. Although the vast majority of 
the firms has a foreign share smaller than 50 percent, the overall correlation between these 
variables remains high. Therefore, if there is a relationship between the diversity index 
defined above and firm productivity, it is not clear whether this is caused by having a high 
                                                 
29 For example, consider a large firm with 50 percent Dutch employees and 50 percent foreign employees that 
are born in the same country. The diversity – or the probability of randomly selecting two employees of a 
different ethnicity – is now about 50 percent. Reducing the size of the firm or changing the composition of the 
foreign employees will always increase the probability that two randomly selected employees are born in a 
different country.  
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diversity of employees, or by having a high share of foreign employees. If there is a 
relationship between diversity and productivity, this would suggest the presence of 
externalities like those suggested by Jacobs (1969). However, if this relationship is only 
due to the share of foreign employees, this would indicate that foreign employees are good 
for productivity, rather than the mix of ethnicities. In this case, a positive or negative 
relationship could indicate that wages of foreign employees are too low or too high 
compared to native employees. 
 
Figure 5.1. Correlation between the foreign share and the diversity index of firms (2008) 
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Alternatively, we calculate both the share of foreign employees and the diversity of the 
non-Dutch employees. This would allow to separate the effects of having foreign 
employees and having a more diverse composition of foreign employees. These two 
indicators can be used in the same estimation, since they are not strongly correlated (see 
Figure 5.2). The correlation coefficient between these measures is only 0.06, while it is 
0.84 for the share of foreigners and diversity.  
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Figure 5.2. Correlation between the foreign share and the diversity index among 
immigrants of firms (2008) 
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The share of foreign employees is simply calculated by dividing the number of foreign 
employees by the total number of employees. The diversity of the foreign employees is 
calculated in a similar way as in expression (5.3), except that Dutch employees are ignored 
in the calculation. For firms with only one foreign employee, we assigned a diversity of 
foreign employees of zero. For firms with no foreign employees, the diversity of foreign 
employees is undefined.  
Additionally, we decomposed the share of foreign employees in the share of 
employees that were born in an OECD country other than the Netherlands and the share of 
employees that were born in any of the other countries. The reason for including this 
measure is that immigrants from OECD countries tend to be a different type of immigrants, 
i.e. higher skilled, than immigrants from other countries. As is shown in Section 5.2, the 
skill level of immigrants is important in determining their overall impact on the economy of 
receiving country as higher skilled immigrants tend to a positive impact on the economy of 
the receiving country. 
In order to obtain the foreign share and the diversity index, we need to know where 
each employee is born. Information about the country of birth is available for everyone that 
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is registered in a Dutch municipality. This data source is called the ‘Gemeentelijke Basis 
Administratie’ (GBA). In order to determine which employee works for which employer 
we use the ‘Sociaal Statistisch Bestand’ (SSB), which contains data from the tax 
administration. The SSB contains all the employer-employee relations, since the employer 
has to report the wages for all his employees for tax purposes. Both the GBA and the SSB 
were provided by Statistics Netherlands (CBS). By linking data from the GBA and the 
SSB, we can determine the share of foreign employees and the diversity index for every 
firm. Since firms can hire and fire employees during the year, we only consider employees 
that are employed in the firm at the first day of the year. It is possible that one employee 
works for multiple firms. In order to avoid including small jobs, like small part-time jobs or 
jobs that only existed for a relatively small part of the year, we removed jobs of employees 
that worked less than 130 working days (half a year).  
After determining the diversity measures, we linked these to the estimated TFP. 
Although the data from the SSB and the GBA are register data (instead of survey data), we 
were not able to determine the diversity measures for all firms. First of all, the SSB and 
GBA were only available for 1999–2008 instead of 1993–2008. Secondly, not all firms 
have employees, in which case they do not appear in the SSB. Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 in 
Appendix 5.A show the number of firms that we were able to match. These tables also 
show the number of matching firms with a TFP between –2 and 2. Firms with a TFP 
outside this range can be considered to be extreme cases and were not included in the 
estimations. For the firms that we were able to link, the histograms in Figure 5.3 and Figure 
5.4 show the distribution of the diversity measures. 
Figure 5.3 shows that many firms have no foreign employees at all. This is the case 
for about 40 percent of the firms. The number of firms that have zero diversity is slightly 
higher. This is because there are some firms where all the foreign employees come from the 
same country. The diversity of the foreign employees is usually zero or very high. When it 
is zero, the firm has one or more foreign employees that are all from the same country. 
When it is one, the firm does not have more than one foreign employee from the same 
country. This can often be the case for small firms with, for example, two foreign 
employees. When there is only one foreign employee, we define diversity of foreign 
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employees to be zero. The high values of the measure for diversity of foreign employees 
indicate that firms do not tend to hire many foreign employees from a single foreign 
country. 
 
Figure 5.3. Histograms for diversity, foreign share, and diversity of foreign employees 
(1999–2008) 
 
 
 
 
Due to the high density around zero and one in the above histograms, the scale of the 
vertical axis is rather high. In order to show the distributions of the other values more 
clearly, the histograms in Figure 5.4 use a smaller scale and show the distributions 
excluding the value zero. In the histogram that shows the diversity of foreigners the value 
one is also excluded.  
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Figure 5.4. Histograms for diversity (excluding 0), foreign share (excluding 0), and 
diversity of foreign employees (excluding 0 and 1) (1999–2008) 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Estimation results 
We estimate the relationship between total factor productivity (TFP) and the diversity 
measures by a pooled OLS as well as by a fixed effect estimation, which identifies the 
relationship exclusively using variation over time within firms. We first discuss the results 
of the pooled OLS regressions.  
 
5.4.1 Pooled OLS 
Figure 5.5 graphically shows the density functions of TFP for firms with no foreign 
employees and firms with at least one foreign employee. These density functions are based 
on all observations in the years 1999–2008. Note that these density functions are not 
corrected for other firm characteristics, except for the sector and the year. 
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Figure 5.5. Density function for firms with and without foreign employees 
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Note: based on 114,600 firms with foreign employees and 112,600 firms without foreign employees. 
 
Figure 5.6. Density function for firms with less and with more than 100 employees  
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Note: based on 226,200 firms with less than 100 employees and 31,000 firms with more than 100 employees. 
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Figure 5.7. Density function for firms with and without export  
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Note: data on export were available for about 160,000 firms. These density functions are based on 72,500 
firms with export and 87,600 firms without export. 
 
Figure 5.5 shows that the entire TFP distribution for firms with at least one foreign 
employee is located more to the right than the TFP distribution of firms without any foreign 
employee. This would indicate a positive relationship between diversity and TFP. Figure 
5.6 shows that large firms (with at least 100 employees) are clearly more productive than 
smaller firms (with less than 100 employees). The difference in TFP between small and 
large firms appears to be larger than the difference in TFP between firms no diversity and 
firms with some diversity. Figure 5.7 shows the TFP density functions for firms that do not 
export and firms that do export. These density functions are based on a smaller number of 
observations, since the export status is not available for all firms. The figure shows that the 
density function of exporting firms lies more to the right than the density function for firms 
that do not export.  
In the pooled OLS regression, we explain TFP by diversity. The TFP levels are 
corrected for sectoral differences in the TFP level and for sectoral business cycle effects by 
subtracting the average TFP for each sector in every year. In this way, the average TFP in a 
certain year in a certain sector is always zero. We also include municipality dummies to 
account for the fact that the diversity in a local labour market can influence the diversity of 
the firms within it. The municipality dummies should also filter out any regional-specific 
characteristics that may affect productivity, like agglomeration externalities. Besides 
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categorizing firms based on whether they employ immigrants, we also categorized firms 
based on whether or not they export, in order to test the hypothesis that exporting firms 
benefit more from foreign employees than non-exporting firms. The export share was not 
available for all firms, reducing the total number of observations from about 255,000 to 
about 159,000. The results are depicted in Table 5.2 (without adjusting for firm size), in 
Table 5.3 (with adjusting for firm size), and in Table 5.4 (with an interaction term with the 
export share). Since these estimations use the pooled data of all years, many firms occur in 
the data more than once. Since standard OLS will underestimate the standard errors, we use 
an estimator that obtains robust standard errors for cluster-correlated data. See Williams 
(2000) for a brief proof on this method and see Rogers (1993) for an explanation of the 
Stata command that we used.  
Specifications (I) and (II) in Table 5.2 show the regression results for all firms for the 
simplest regression with diversity as the only explanatory variable. Both specifications 
show a positive relationship between TFP and diversity. In the first specification, no 
municipality dummies are included. When municipality dummies are added in specification 
(II), the diversity coefficient decreases from 0.17 to 0.13. This means that part of the 
relationship between diversity and TFP is absorbed by the municipality dummies, which 
indicates that municipalities with more diversity have a higher average firm TFP. This 
observation is consistent with previous research that pointed at a positive relationship 
between economic performance and diversity at the level of cities. However, it is also 
possible that this observation is caused by other factors. For example, it might be that firms 
in municipalities are more productive due to an agglomeration effect (see, e.g., Ciccone and 
Hall, 1996; Ciccone, 2002), and that more dense municipalities also have more diverse 
populations. Moreover, there are arguments that could explain a positive effect of diversity 
at the city level without occurring at the firm level. For example, firms might be better able 
to find a suitable employee in cities with more diverse employees.  
When we include a dummy for the firms without any foreigners in specification (III), 
the sign of the coefficient for diversity switches from positive to negative. The sign of the 
dummy for firms without any foreign employees is negative. This means that firms that 
employ no foreign employees at all have a lower average TFP, and that increasing diversity 
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for firms with at least one foreign employee has a negative effect on TFP. We believe that 
this is a spurious effect, which is caused by picking up the relationship between firm size 
and TFP. The reason for this is that small firms are much more likely to have a share of 
foreign employees of zero than larger firms. When we differentiate between the effect of 
the share of immigrants and the diversity among immigrants in specification (IV), the share 
of foreigners is negative and the diversity of the foreigners is positive. This implies that 
given the share of foreign employees, firms with a more diverse group of foreign 
employees are more productive. Finally, column V also includes a variable that indicates 
whether a firm has a diversity index of one. This variable is negative and significant, which 
is probably also caused by the size of firms, since the probability that the diversity of 
foreigners is one becomes very small as the number of foreigners in the firm increases. 
 
Table 5.2. Pooled OLS estimation of total factor productivity 
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). Constant not reported when municipality dummies are 
included. TFP is defined as the difference between the natural logarithm of the actual output and the natural 
logarithm of the predicted output. 
 Dependent: TFP 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
No foreigners (dummy)   –0.29*** 
(0.004) 
–0.12*** 
(0.004) 
–0.12*** 
(0.004) 
Diversity among foreigners equals 1 
     (dummy) 
    –0.33*** 
(0.006) 
Diversity 0.17*** 
(0.009) 
0.13*** 
(0.009) 
–0.34*** 
(0.012) 
  
Foreign share    –0.40*** 
(0.014) 
–0.55*** 
(0.014) 
Diversity among foreigners    0.25*** 
(0.004) 
0.45*** 
(0.006) 
Constant –0.02*** 
(0.002) 
    
Municipality dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 255,055 255,055 255,055 255,055 255,055 
R2 0.004 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.13 
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Table 5.3. Pooled OLS estimation of total factor productivity, controlled for firm size 
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). Constant not reported when municipality dummies are 
included. TFP is defined as the difference between the natural logarithm of the actual output and the natural 
logarithm of the predicted output. 
 
Table 5.3 corrects for the size of firms, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of 
full-time equivalents. The coefficient for this variable ranges between 0.13 and 0.15, and 
can be interpreted as an elasticity. This result confirms the graphical representation of TFP 
density in Figure 5.6, which showed that larger firms on average have a higher TFP. This 
result is also consistent with the results from Chapter 3, although Chapter 3 used the 
logarithm of output as an indicator for firm size, instead of the logarithm of full-time 
equivalents. After we control for firm size, the dummy for firms with no foreign employees 
becomes much smaller. This confirms the hypothesis that the previously found positive 
effect was mainly caused by the relationship between firm size and TFP. We still include 
this dummy, since it allows us to preserve all observations for the specifications that 
 Dependent: TFP 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
Ln(firm size) 0.15*** 
(0.001) 
0.15*** 
(0.002) 
0.14*** 
(0.002) 
0.13*** 
(0.002) 
0.14*** 
(0.002) 
0.13*** 
(0.002) 
0.13*** 
(0.002) 
0.12***
(0.002)
No foreigners  
     (dummy) 
 –0.006** 
(0.004) 
0.03*** 
(0.004) 
0.02*** 
(0.004) 
 –0.008 
(0.005) 
0.03*** 
(0.005) 
0.01***
(0.005)
Diversity     
     among foreigners    
     equals 1 (dummy) 
   –0.12*** 
(0.006) 
   –0.10***
(0.007)
Diversity –0.12*** 
(0.008) 
–0.12*** 
(0.010) 
  –0.13*** 
(0.010) 
–0.14*** 
(0.013) 
  
Foreign share   –0.10*** 
(0.013) 
–0.18*** 
(0.013) 
  –0.13*** 
(0.016) 
–0.21***
(0.017)
Diversity among  
     foreigners 
  0.06*** 
(0.004) 
0.15*** 
(0.006) 
  0.05*** 
(0.005) 
0.13***
(0.008)
Export share     0.14*** 
(0.007) 
0.14*** 
(0.007) 
0.13*** 
(0.007) 
0.12***
(0.007)
Municipality   
     dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 255,055 255,055 255,055 255,055 158,650 158,650 158,650 158,650
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
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include the diversity of the foreign employees. By including firm size, the coefficient for 
the variable that indicates whether a firm has a diversity among foreigners of one also 
becomes smaller, although this one remains statistically significant. 
The diversity measure ranges from –0.14 to –0.12, and seems to be fairly robust: the 
coefficient is almost the same for the full sample of firms (about 255,000) and the sample 
of firms for which the export share is available (about 159,000). When the effect of 
diversity is split in the effect of the share of foreign employees and the diversity of the 
foreign employees, the results show that the negative effect of diversity is caused by the 
share of foreign employees and that the diversity of the employees actually has a positive 
coefficient. The specifications that also include the export share of the firms (specifications 
V, VI, VII and VIII) show a consistently positive coefficient for the export share, indicating 
that firms that export relatively much are more productive. This result is consistent with 
Figure 5.7.  
In order to test the hypotheses that exporting firms benefit more (or suffer less) from 
diversity than firms that do not export, we show some estimation results for these two firm 
groups in Table 5.4. When we apply the simplest model to both groups (specifications I and 
II), the coefficient for diversity is 0.04 for non-exporting firms and 0.11 for exporting firms. 
When we control for firm size by adding the logarithm of the number of employees 
(specifications III and IV), we find a negative diversity coefficient for both groups, but it is 
slightly less negative for the exporting group. These results suggest that firms that export 
have some benefit from a diverse workforce compared to firms that do not export. The 
reason for this might be that foreign employees are better capable of making agreements 
with foreign firms, especially in their home country. This can, for example, result from 
better communication, a better cultural understanding, or because they have people in their 
network, which can reduce search costs for trading partners. Chapter 2 showed that these 
type of costs are also important for international trade flows at the country level. 
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Table 5.4. Pooled OLS estimations for exporting and non-exporting firms, with export 
share interaction term 
Notes: standard errors (corrected for cluster-correlation) are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance 
levels are indicated by *** (1%), ** (5%) and * (10%). Constant not reported when municipality dummies are 
included. TFP is defined as the difference between the natural logarithm of the actual output and the natural 
logarithm of the predicted output. 
 
Additionally, specification V includes an interaction term between diversity and the export 
share of the firms. This specification adds more information than comparing the results of 
firms that export with the results of firms that do not export, because it allows us to take the 
export share into account, rather than just a binary export variable. When we estimate 
specification V, we again find that larger firms are more productive, more diverse firms are 
less productive, and exporting firms are more productive. Moreover, the interaction term 
between diversity and the export share is positive. This confirms that firms that export more 
benefit from diversity, after correcting for the overall positive relationship with the export 
share and the negative relationship with the diversity.  
 Dependent: TFP 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
 Firms 
without 
export 
Firms with 
export 
Firms 
without 
export 
Firms with 
export 
All firms 
Ln(firm size)   0.12*** 
(0.002) 
0.16*** 
(0.002) 
0.14*** 
(0.002) 
Diversity 0.04*** 
(0.012) 
0.11*** 
(0.018) 
–0.12*** 
(0.012) 
–0.10*** 
(0.015) 
–0.15*** 
(0.011) 
Export share     0.12*** 
(0.009) 
Export share * diversity     0.08*** 
(0.031) 
Municipality dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  86,901 71,749 86,901 71,749 158,650 
R2 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.19 0.17 
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5.4.2 Firm fixed effects 
The previous section used pooled OLS estimations to determine the relationship between 
our measures for diversity and total factor productivity (TFP). Another approach is to use 
firm fixed effects and to estimate the relationship by exploiting variation over time. The 
advantage of using firm fixed effects is that all time-invariant firm characteristics are 
filtered out, reducing the probability that the estimation results are affected by omitted 
variable bias. The disadvantage is that we can no longer use variation between firms, but 
only variation over time. Additionally, in order to be able to correctly estimate a possible 
relationship, this method requires that this relationship manifests itself within the period of 
one year. This means that a change in the employee composition, as a result of hiring or 
firing employees, should result in a TFP change in the same year. If the relationship 
materializes over a longer term period, for example because a change in employee 
composition first leads to an adjustment process, estimation based on time variation is 
problematic.  
We show the estimation results for two model specifications with fixed effects. These 
models do not include sector or year dummies, since the measure for TFP is already 
demeaned for each combination of a sector and a year. Therefore, the average of TFP is 
zero for each year and for each sector. Table 5.5 shows the results of the fixed effects 
estimation for all firms and for four other sets of firms, which are based on the firm size. 
Since firm sizes change over time, the firms are classified in a group of firms based on the 
largest firm size in the period 1999–2008. When the model is estimated using all firms, the 
diversity coefficient is negative (–0.03) and statistically significant. This result seems to be 
caused mainly by small firms, since the coefficient is most negative for firms with less than 
10 employees, and it increases as the firm size becomes larger. For firms with more than 25 
employees, the relationship becomes statistically insignificant. However, the explanatory 
power of diversity is almost zero in these fixed effects estimations. 
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Table 5.5. Fixed effects estimations for diversity 
Notes: standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance levels are indicated by *** (1%),  
** (5%) and * (10%). TFP is defined as the difference between the natural logarithm of the actual output and 
the natural logarithm of the predicted output. 
 
In Table 5.6 the results are shown for the specification that splits diversity into foreign 
share and diversity among foreign employees. Note that the number of observations is 
smaller, since the diversity of the foreign employees is undefined for firms without any 
foreign employees. In these estimations, the diversity among foreigners is statistically 
insignificant for all firm groups. The coefficient for foreign share is somewhat larger, but 
not statistically significant at the one percent level. Again, the explanatory power is almost 
zero, which indicates that employee diversity does not contribute to explain time variation 
of TFP within firms.  
 
 Dependent: TFP 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
 All firms Firms 
with less 
than 10 
fte 
Firms 
with 
between 
10 and 25 
fte 
Firms 
with 
between 
25 and 
100 fte 
Firms 
with at 
least 100 
fte 
Diversity –0.03*** 
(0.008) 
–0.04*** 
(0.01) 
–0.03** 
(0.02) 
–0.02 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.003) 
Observations 255,055 58,153 69,928 89,103 37,871 
Fixed effects groups  73,383 26,105 21,575 19,195 6,508 
Min N 1 1 1 1 1 
Average N 3.5 2.2 3.2 4.6 5.8 
Max N 10 10 10 10 10 
Within R2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
 Estimation results 157 
 
 
Table 5.6. Fixed effects estimations for foreign share and diversity of foreigners 
 Dependent: TFP 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
 All firms Firms 
with less 
than 10 fte
Firms 
with 
between 
10 and 25 
fte 
Firms 
with 
between 
25 and 
100 fte 
Firms 
with at 
least 100 
fte 
Foreign share –0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
–0.06* 
(0.04) 
–0.08** 
(0.03) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
Diversity among foreigners –0.0008 
(0.003) 
–0.006 
(0.02) 
0.0008 
(0.007) 
–0.001 
(0.004) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Observations 144,361 10,414 30,793 66,431 36,723 
Fixed effects groups (full set) 40,454 5,587 11,916 16,480 6,471 
Min N 1 1 1 1 1 
Average N 3.6 1.9 2.6 4.0 5.7 
Max N 10 7 10 10 10 
Within R2 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 
Notes: standard errors are shown in parentheses. Statistical significance levels are indicated by *** (1%),  
** (5%) and * (10%). TFP is defined as the difference between the natural logarithm of the actual output and 
the natural logarithm of the predicted output. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter tested the hypothesis that diversity of employees increases productivity at the 
firm level. Previous research suggested that such a positive relationship exists at the level 
of cities. There are several reasons why a positive relationship can exist at the city level. 
One of the reasons is that it occurs (partly) at the level of the firm. This chapter tested this 
hypothesis by using a two-step approach. In the first step, sectoral production functions 
were estimated using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. The resulting firm-level 
total factor productivity (TFP) levels were related to firm-level diversity in step two.  
A cross-sectional analysis showed that more productive firms are larger, more 
diverse, and more likely to export. When TFP is explained by these three variables 
simultaneously, the relationship between diversity of the employees and TFP is negative. 
This negative relationship is caused by the share of foreign employees, and not by the 
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diversity of the foreign employees, which showed a positive relationship with TFP. This 
implies that, given the share of foreigners in a firm, the firm performs better when the 
foreigners are more heterogeneous. This is possibly related to the result found in previous 
studies at the level of cities that economic growth is smaller in the case of large 
homogeneous groups of immigrants (see, e.g., Ottaviano and Peri, 2005).  
However, when we include firm fixed effects, the relationship largely disappears. 
There are two ways to interpret this. One is that the cross-sectional analysis suffers from 
omitted variable bias, since we cannot correct for all firm specific characteristics. A second 
interpretation is that the fixed effects estimation gives a short-run effect and the cross-
sectional estimation gives a long-run effect. Since the fixed effects estimation can only use 
variation between years, to identify a relationship it requires the relationship to materialize 
in the period of a year. This might be problematic since changing the employee 
composition may affect productivity in a different time period. Since the cross-sectional 
estimations show that overall diversity has a negative effect on TFP between firms and the 
fixed effects estimations show almost no impact of diversity on TFP within firms, both 
interpretations suggest that processes that occur at the firm level are unlikely to explain any 
potential positive relationship between diversity and TFP at more aggregate levels, like the 
level of the city. If such a relationship does exist at higher levels of aggregation, other 
explanations have to be considered. For example, it might be caused by the matching 
process: firms might be better able to find a suitable employee in cities with more diverse 
employees. Alternatively, there might be selection effects that cause more productive firms 
or employees to move to more diverse cities. 
A second observation from this chapter is that exporting firms benefit more from 
having a diverse workforce than firms that do not export, after correcting for the overall 
positive relationship between TFP and the export share and the negative relationship 
between TFP and diversity. This benefit gets higher as the share of the revenue that is 
generated by exporting increases. An explanation for this is that foreign employees are 
potentially better in closing contracts with foreign firms in their home-country. This can, 
for example, be caused by lower communication costs, a better cultural understanding, or 
because they have people in their network, which can reduce search costs for trading 
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partners. Chapter 2, using a gravity model approach, showed that these type of costs are an 
important determinant of trade flows between countries. So if immigrants would be able to 
reduce these costs, they could increase trade on a micro level as well as on a macro level. 
An interesting approach for further research would be to study the relationship between the 
ethnicity of employees and the trade flows of the firm.  
 
Appendix 5.A     Number of observations, by year and sector 
This appendix shows the number of firm observations for which data was available on 
ethnic diversity and on total factor productivity (TFP). We were able to calculate ethnic 
diversity for all firms. We calculated TFP based on the production statistics, which is a 
sample. Table 5.7 provides the number of available firms by year and Table 5.8 provides 
the number of available firms by sector. If a firm occurs in our data in multiple years it is 
also counted as multiple observations.  
 
Table 5.7. Number of observations by year 
 
 Number of firms Number of firms with 
TFP between 
–2 and 2 
1999 15,408 15,279 
2000 27,970 27,757 
2001 34,167 33,903 
2002 31,743 31,494 
2003 28,183 27,967 
2004 26,315 26,108 
2005 25,649 25,435 
2006 23,346 23,137 
2007 21,934 21,733 
2008 22,466 22,242 
Total 257,181 255,055  
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Table 5.8. Number of observations by sector 
 
 
SBI 1993 codes Number of firms Number of firms 
with TFP 
between 
–2 and 2 
Mining and quarrying 10, 11, 14, 23 751 701 
Food, beverages and tobacco 15, 16 7,547 7,461 
Textile, clothing and leather products 17, 18, 19 2,675 2,659 
Wood, paper and printing 20, 21, 222 7,798 7,777 
Chemical products, rubber and plastic  
     products 24, 25 6,096 5,773 
Other manufacturing (non-metallic  
     mineral products, recycling, utilities) 26, 37, 40, 41 3,040 2,929 
Basic metals and metal products 27, 28 10,055 10,026 
Machinery and equipment 29 7,208 7,192 
Office, electrical and communication  
     machinery, medical instruments 30, 31, 32, 33 5,058 5,022 
Motor vehicles and other transport 
equipment 34, 35 2,727 2,706 
Other goods  36 2,775 2,763 
Construction 45 34,135 34,055 
Reparation and selling of motor vehicles 50 9,369 9,272 
Wholesale trade 51 52,294 51,797 
Retail trade 52 20,564 20,418 
Hotels and restaurants 55 7,185 7,119 
Transportation 60, 61, 62 14,339 14,280 
Transport and travel services 63 6,506 6,433 
Post and communication 64 1,329 1,286 
Real estate and renting 70, 71 3,174 3,156 
Computer services 72 8,949 8,887 
Other business services 73, 74, 221, 223 41,643 41,385 
Other services (waste disposal,  
     recreational activities, and other not  
     elsewhere specified services) 90, 92, 93 1,964 1,958 
Total  257,181 255,055 
 Appendix 5.B Expected value of fractionalization index 161 
 
 
Appendix 5.B     Expected value of fractionalization index 
This appendix shows the expected value of the fractionalization index for equation (5.2) 
and equation (5.3), when employees from two different nationalities from a large pool of 
employees are randomly assigned to a firm. We consider two nationalities, Dutch and non-
Dutch, which have a share in the pool of pNL and 1 – pNL. We show that the expected value 
of the fractionalization index does depend on the total number of employees in the firm for 
equation (5.2) and not for equation (5.3). 
 
Using equation (5.2), we get: 
2
21 1 ,EE
E E T
NF s
N
          (5.4)
where NE is the number of employees in the firm with ethnicity E and NT is the total 
number of employees in the firm. In the case of two nationalities (ENL and foreign) this 
becomes: 
2 2
1 .NL T NL
T T
N N NF
N N
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 (5.5)
The expected value of F is a function of NT and pNL: 
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(5.6)
To show that this expression is dependent on the total number of employees NT we can just 
plug in two different values of NT (e.g. 2 and 3) and confirm that the results are different: 
1 1 1 1 1( ; 2; 0.5) 0 0 ,
4 2 2 4 4
1 3 4 3 4 1 1( ; 3; 0.5) 0 0 .
8 8 9 8 9 8 3
T NL
T NL
E F N p
E F N p
        
          
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Using equation (5.3), we get: 
( 1)1 ,
( 1)
E E
E T T
N NF
N N
    (5.7)
where NE is the number of employees in the firm with ethnicity E and NT is the total 
number of employees in the firm. In the case of two nationalities (ENL and foreign) this 
becomes: 
( 1) ( )( 1)1 .
( 1)
NL NL T NL T NL
T T
N N N N N N
N N
       (5.8)
The expected value of F is again a function of NT and pNL: 
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 (5.9)
This can be simplified to:  
( ) 2 (1 ).NL NLE F p p   (5.10)
This expression shows that the expected value of F is only a function of the composition of 
entire pool of employees pNL, and that it is independent of the size of the firm NT. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
6.1 Summary 
In the introduction of this dissertation, three main research questions were posed. The first 
question was: how do physical, economic, cultural and institutional distance act as barriers 
to international trade, and does the impact of these types of distance vary for different types 
of products? This question was covered in Chapter 2, which used a gravity equation to 
model international trade flows. The issue of cultural barriers to trade is also related to 
Chapter 5, which investigates the relationship between immigrants, trade, and productivity 
at the level of the firm. The results from Chapter 2 confirm the network/search theory 
specified in Rauch (1999) with respect to the effect of linguistic or colonial links. Trade 
flows are significantly higher between countries that share the same language or have a 
common colonial history. Our results show that trade flows are about 80 percent higher for 
countries that either share the same language or have a common colonial history, compared 
to country pairs that have none of these. The effect of linguistic or colonial links is larger 
for more differentiated goods. This is in line with the network/search theory from Rauch 
(1999), which indicates that these type of links are less important for homogeneous 
products. The reason for this is that homogeneous products can simply be traded on world 
markets, which means that it is less difficult to find a match between buyers and sellers and 
that it requires less negotiation since contracts can be standardized. So the more 
heterogeneous products are, the higher the importance of linguistic or colonial links.  
For geographical distance, our results show the opposite pattern: this type of distance 
is relatively important for homogeneous products. An explanation for this is that 
transportation costs form a larger share of the total transaction costs for homogeneous 
products than for heterogeneous products. So the result that geographical distance is more 
important for homogeneous products qualifies the importance of non-traditional distance 
types relative to geographical distance for heterogeneous products. The analysis of 
additional cultural and institutional distance variables suggests that these effects are rather 
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different for different product types. Cultural distance exercises a negative influence and 
institutional distance a positive influence on goods traded on organized exchanges, while 
both variables are statistically insignificant for trade in differentiated goods. A possible 
explanation for the positive effect can be found in the trade-off between FDI and trade. 
Zooming in on more disaggregated product groups provides further insights on the effect of 
different dimensions of distance. An interesting result is that for nine out of ten groups 
cultural distance does have a negative effect on trade. It is likely that the various types of 
distance have even more heterogeneous effects when even more detailed product groups are 
considered. This is an interesting direction for further research.  
The second main research question was: what are the characteristics of firms that 
outsource, and how does outsourcing affect the productivity of the firm and the probability 
that employees lose their job? This question consists of two parts, which are discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 focussed on the consequences of outsourcing on firm 
productivity, while Chapter 4 studied the effects of outsourcing on the risk that employees 
would lose their job. Outsourcing is expected to reduce production costs and increase firm 
productivity. However, it can also lead to redistribution effects and to an increase of 
temporary unemployment. Chapter 3 investigated whether firms that outsourced are more 
productive than firms that did not outsource, and whether there exists a selection effect. To 
answer this question, three different measures for productivity were analysed: (i) labour 
productivity measured as the ratio between output and labour costs, (ii) labour productivity 
measures as output per full-time equivalent, and (iii) total factor productivity (TFP). While 
labour productivity is an intuitive measure, it is less suited for this analysis than TFP, since 
it does not account for any other input factors. Therefore, the results on TFP are the most 
relevant. The estimations clearly showed that larger firms are more productive than smaller 
firms. An increase of the firm size of one percent is associated with an increase of TFP of 
0.22 percent. The evidence on outsourcing is rather mixed and depends strongly on the type 
of outsourcing. The strongest relationship was found for firms that internationally 
outsourced support activities. These firms were statistically significantly more productive 
than firms that did not outsource any support activities internationally. The higher 
productivity of these firms was also observed before they outsourced, which implies that 
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firms self select into this type of outsourcing. The model by Melitz (2003) also predicts 
such a selection effect for exporting, and this is empirically confirmed for Dutch firms by 
Kox and Rojas-Romagosa (2010). However, no selection effect was found for the other 
three types of outsourcing. Self-selection effects are more likely to occur for exporting than 
for outsourcing, because exporting is a sign of being more productive than other firms, 
while outsourcing is a sign of being less productive than another firm. 
Regarding the effect of outsourcing on the change in productivity we found that firms 
that internationally outsourced core activities decreased their TFP compared to firms that 
did not. And firms that domestically outsourced support activities increased their TFP 
compared to firms that did not. This implies that international outsourcing of core activities 
was less successful than the firms thought it would be. It is possible that this is caused by 
higher than expected inter-firm transaction costs. These costs may be higher in the case of 
international outsourcing than in the case of domestic outsourcing. This is likely to be 
related to, for example, differences in languages or culture, see Chapter 2. Additionally, if 
something goes wrong at the insourcing firm, it might be more costly for the production 
process of the outsourcing firm in the case of core activities than in the case of support 
activities. These reasons might explain the result that firms that domestically outsourced 
support activities did increase their productivity while firms that outsourced core activities 
decreased their productivity.  
The possibility that outsourcing increases involuntary unemployment was 
investigated in Chapter 4. In the public debate this is particularly relevant for international 
outsourcing. The effects of outsourcing on the risk for employees of involuntarily losing 
their job were studied by combining data on unemployment benefits with data from a 
survey on outsourcing. Additionally, it considered whether employees that used to work for 
firms that outsourced have a different probability of finding a new job after they lost their 
job. These questions are studied using a Cox proportional hazard model, which allows us to 
control for the duration of the job, as well as for other characteristics of the firms and the 
employees. One of the characteristics the model corrected for is job duration. The results 
suggest that the risk of involuntary job loss is relatively high for jobs with a low tenure, is 
smallest for jobs with a tenure between 10 and 25 years, and increases again after that. The 
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risk of involuntary job loss is also higher for female employees, younger employees, and 
employees born in low-income countries. This can partly be explained by a higher share of 
short-term contracts for these groups. The risk of involuntary unemployment has no 
statistically significant relationship with the general outsourcing variable. However, this 
seems to be the result of a positive effect of domestic outsourcing and a negative effect of 
international outsourcing. Employees were 23 percent less likely to lose their job if they 
worked in a firm that outsourced internationally, and 60 percent more likely to lose their 
job if they worked in a firm that outsourced domestically.  
The probability of finding a new job after becoming involuntarily unemployed is 
lower for female employees, older employees, employees with a higher wage, and foreign 
employees. This may be related to the length of the period people are willing to search for a 
new job. For example, woman may be able to afford longer search periods, since they are 
more often than men the secondary earner of a family in the Netherlands. It is also possible 
that these groups have more difficulty finding a new job. For example, foreigners might 
have more difficulty with finding a new job because they are less fluent in the Dutch 
language. And older people might have more difficulty with finding a new job because of a 
discrepancy between their wage and their productivity. Additionally, people that worked 
for the same employer for many years may depend relatively strongly on firm-specific 
capital, which is less useful when they have to find a new job at a different employer.  
The negative effect of the previous wage on the probability of finding a new job may 
be caused by a more efficient labour market for lower wage jobs. Jobs with higher wages 
might require longer search periods because it may be more difficult to find a successful 
match. We find no relationship between domestic outsourcing and the probability of 
finding a new job. However, former employees of firms that have outsourced 
internationally are about nine percent less likely to find a new job. This is probably the case 
because jobs that are lost due to international outsourcing are actually leaving the country. 
In the case of domestic outsourcing, the jobs only relocate to a different region within the 
Netherlands, or they might stay in the same region and only move to a different firm. 
Therefore, employees that lose their jobs as a result of domestic outsourcing are sometimes 
able to perform the same task in a different firm. When firms outsource activities 
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internationally, this suggests a comparative disadvantage of the Netherlands in these tasks. 
This implies that the demand for the skills that are required for these tasks in the 
Netherlands is decreasing, and employees might not be able to find a new job in which they 
can perform the same task as in their previous job. They might have to change their skill 
set, by training or education, before they are able to find a new job, which can explain why 
they are less likely to find a new job. 
The third main research question was: how does ethnic diversity within firms affect 
the productivity of these firms? This question was studied in Chapter 5. The existence of a 
relationship between ethnic diversity and productivity at the level of the firm could explain 
why previous research found that such a positive relationship exists at the level of cities. 
The results show that more productive firms are larger, more diverse, and more likely to 
export. When TFP is explained by these three variables simultaneously, the relationship 
between diversity of the employees and TFP is negative. This negative relationship is 
caused by the share of foreign employees, and not by the diversity of the foreign 
employees, which showed a positive relationship with TFP. This is possibly related to the 
result found in previous studies at the level of cities that economic growth is smaller in the 
case of large homogeneous groups of immigrants (see, e.g., Ottaviano and Peri, 2005). 
When the estimations are adjusted for time invariant firm characteristics, the 
relationship largely disappears. This could imply that there is actually no relationship 
between ethnic diversity and firm productivity, or that the estimation on time variation 
within firms is problematic. However, since the cross-sectional estimations show that 
overall diversity has a negative effect on TFP between firms and the fixed effects 
estimations show almost no impact of diversity on TFP within firms, both interpretations 
suggest that processes that occur at the firm level are unlikely to explain any potential 
positive relationship between diversity and TFP at more aggregate levels, like the level of 
the city. If such a relationship exists, other explanations have to be considered. For 
example, it might be caused by the matching process: firms might be better able to find a 
suitable employee in cities with more diverse employees. Alternatively, there might be 
selection effects that cause more productive firms or employees to move to more diverse 
cities. It is possible that other types of diversity than ethnic diversity are more relevant for 
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productivity on the level of firms. For example, diversity of the level of education or 
diversity of the field of education. 
A second result from Chapter 5 is that exporting firms seem to get some benefit from 
having a diverse workforce over firms that do not export, after correcting for the overall 
positive relationship with the export share and the negative relationship with diversity. This 
benefit gets higher as the share of the revenue that is generated by exporting increases. An 
explanation for this is that foreign employees are potentially better in closing contracts with 
foreign firms in their home-country. This can, for example, be caused by lower 
communication costs, a better cultural understanding, or because they have people in their 
network, which can reduce search costs for trading partners. Chapter 2, using a gravity 
model approach, showed that these type of costs are an important determinant of trade 
flows between countries. So if immigrants would be able to reduce these costs, they could 
increase trade on a micro level as well as on a macro level. An interesting approach for 
further research would be to study the relationship between the ethnicity of employees and 
the trade flows of the firm.  
 
6.2 Policy recommendations 
Since trade theory unambiguously shows that trade improves the level of global economic 
welfare, policy should focus on minimizing barriers to international trade.30 With this in 
mind, several policy recommendations can be derived from this dissertation. The gravity 
model that was estimated for international trade showed that physical, economic, cultural 
and institutional distance between countries can act as barriers to trade. Obviously not all of 
these distances can be influenced by policy, like geographical distance, but some potential 
barriers to trade can be reduced by policy.  
                                                 
30 For large countries that can influence world prices, setting a small import tariff could be optimal for 
national welfare (see any textbook on international trade, for example, Feenstra, 2004). However, this 
assumes that other countries will not respond to this by setting tariffs as well. And the total decrease of 
welfare of other all countries will be higher than the welfare gain of the country that sets the tariff, so from a 
global perspective such tariffs are undesirable. Additionally, a tariff will lead to income redistribution from 
consumers to producers within the country that sets the tariff. 
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For example, an important determinant of trade is the variable that indicates whether two 
countries had a common colonial history or have the same language. This implies that not 
speaking the same language can be an important barrier to trade. This is an argument for 
underlining the importance of foreign languages in the educational system. This is 
particularly important for a small open country like the Netherlands. In a longer term 
perspective, the possibility of having a single global language, like English, could 
potentially raise global welfare by increasing global trade, which can lead to a more 
efficient allocation of global production. This might be difficult to achieve, due to the lock-
in effects of languages. Also note that the effect of having a single global language on 
global trade would be smaller than suggested by the results from the gravity model 
estimation, due to trade substitution. This means that when two countries get the same 
language, part of the increase of trade between these two countries will be the result from a 
decrease of trade between the countries that previously already shared the same language. 
The possibility of forming trade blocs is another relevant issue for policy. The results 
of the gravity model showed that countries that are part of the same trade bloc trade about 
75 percent more than countries that are not in the same trade bloc. However, note that 
creating a trade bloc will usually also lead to some trade substitution from countries that are 
outside the bloc to countries that are inside the bloc. This has also been found in Straathof 
et al. (2008), who studied the effect of the European internal market on Dutch trade. They 
find that in 2005, Dutch trade in goods (excluding re-exports) is about fifteen percent 
higher and Dutch trade in services is about five percent higher, compared to a situation 
where the European internal market would not have been founded.31 This suggests that 
forming a trade bloc can substantially increase trade as a result of lower trade barriers with 
countries inside the bloc. However, the elimination of all policy-induced trade barriers with 
all countries in the world will obviously lead to the highest volume of trade. The benefits 
for trade of going a step further than a trade bloc, by introducing a common currency, are  
                                                 
31 If the European internal market would have been founded and the Netherlands would not have joined, the 
effect would have been more severe, because other European countries would have substituted trade with the 
Netherlands to trade with other countries in the internal market. 
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less clear. A meta-analysis by Rose and Stanley (2005) suggests a positive effect between 
20 and 80 percent (after correcting for publication bias). However, Bun and Klaassen 
(2007) showed that the effect on trade of introducing the euro was very small, when the 
estimation method included a trend for each pair of countries. From a theoretical 
perspective, the effects of a common currency are unlikely to be very high, as the main 
benefit for trade of having a common currency is that it removes currency risk. However, 
with developed financial markets, such risks can be covered fairly easily. From a trade 
perspective, it seems likely that the main benefits for the Netherlands come from the 
participation in the European internal market, rather than from participation in the euro.  
A third barrier for trade is cultural distance. The results from the gravity model 
indicated that cultural distance decreases trade in homogeneous goods. It seems to have no 
statistically significant effect on trade in heterogeneous goods, but this might be related to 
the trade-off between trade and foreign direct investments (FDI). Following this argument, 
reducing cultural distance will lead to an increase in the sum of trade and foreign direct 
investments. Cultural distance might also be one of the reasons that the Dutch export share 
to emerging economies like Brazil, Russia, India and China is somewhat below the average 
of the EU-15 (Groot et al., 2011). Although it is difficult for policy to influence culture, this 
dissertation also gave some preliminary indications that immigrants may act as a bridge for 
cultural distance. This would be an argument in favour of a less strict immigration policy 
for certain types of immigrants. Additionally, cultural distance might be reduced by 
economic diplomacy. Several empirical studies show that there is a positive relationship 
between bilateral trade and embassies and state visits (Van Bergeijk, 2009). A cost benefit 
analysis by Van den Berg et al. (2008) concluded that Dutch policy on trade missions had a 
positive welfare effect. 
Based on the analysis of outsourcing and unemployment, we found that the hazard 
rate of involuntary unemployment is relatively high for jobs with a low and jobs with a 
high tenure. The higher hazard rate for jobs with a short duration can be expected, but the 
conclusion that jobs with a long duration also have a higher hazard rate is somewhat 
surprising, given the labour market institutions in the Netherlands which make it very 
expensive for firms to fire these employees. These institutions would imply that firms 
 Policy recommendations 171 
 
 
might actually prefer to replace employees with a long tenure by new employees, but 
decide to keep the employee due to the costs involved with this. The reason that firms 
might prefer to replace these employees is related to a difference in the development of the 
productivity of the employee and its wage. Many employees in the Netherlands are paid 
according to collective labour agreements, which usually state that wages increase with job 
experience, up to a maximum level. When the wage ceiling is reached, wages do not go 
down, which means that employees with a long job duration will be the most expensive for 
the firms. Productivity, however, might not follow the wage curve, and might even go 
down relative to younger employees, for example as a result of out-dated knowledge. The 
resulting inefficiency of the labour market has implications for labour market policies. For 
example, collective labour agreements could allow for the possibility of a decreasing wage 
after the wage ceiling has been reached. This can, for example, be achieved by not applying 
the indexation for inflation.  
Another policy measure is to make it less costly for firms to end existing contracts 
with employees. Under the current labour market institutions, firms that want to end a 
labour contract usually have to pay one month wage for each year served on the contract. 
Setting a ceiling on these costs of, for example, one annual salary, would serve to make the 
labour market more flexible. A more flexible labour market does imply that more 
employees will lose their job. However, it should also mean that it will be less difficult to 
find a new job, since employees will be less reluctant to hire new employees. Additionally, 
firms will be less reluctant to give their employees fixed contracts, which will decrease the 
number of temporary contacts. It will also reduce the unbalanced situation where jobs with 
fixed contracts are much more protected compared to jobs with temporary contacts. The 
argument that older employees will not be able to find a new job after they lost their job 
indicates that there is a mismatch between wage and productivity. By removing the 
difference between wage and productivity, everyone should be able to find a new job, 
assuming their productivity is higher than the prevailing minimum wage.  
The results on the effects of ethnic diversity on firm productivity are somewhat 
mixed. The relationship is positive, but becomes negative after adjusting for firm size. That 
triggers the question whether the firms are larger as a result of their diversity, or that the 
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relationship is the other way around. However, when the relationship was estimated while 
controlling for time-invariant firm characteristics, no significant relationship between 
diversity and firm productivity could be found. This could be caused by estimation issues 
related to the timing of the effect, or it could indicate that there actually is no relationship 
between diversity and firm productivity. If the latter is the case, this would be an argument 
against policies that try to attract foreign employees, like the 30 percent rule, which allows 
employees that are recruited from outside the Netherlands to receive 30 percent of their 
wage tax free. However, there can be other arguments in favour of attracting high-skilled 
labour. For example, even if there is no relationship between diversity and productivity on 
the level of the firms, this relationship can still exist at the level of cities, regions or 
countries. This would be comparable with the micro-macro paradox in the context of 
exports and productivity. For example, a more diverse city could lead to better matches 
between firms and employees, which increases the productivity without requiring a 
relationship between diversity and productivity at the level of the firms themselves.  
Additionally, an analysis of the effect on productivity is not sufficient to evaluate 
policies that target a high number of foreign employees. Examples of other relevant issues 
that should be taken into account are the effect of diversity on consumer amenities, and the 
effect on the state budget. Additional employees should lead to more tax revenues, which 
improves the state budget. Since the 30 percent rule is targeted at employees with a high 
level of education and a high income, they are likely to have a positive contribution to the 
state budget. A higher pressure on the social security could mitigate this effect. This 
dissertation did not study the unemployment effects of this particular group, but this could 
be an interesting topic for future research. The analysis on the hazard rate of becoming 
unemployed did show that this hazard rate is much lower for foreign employees born in 
high-income countries than for foreign employees born in low-income countries.  
 
6.3 Suggestions for future research 
The previously discussed results offer several interesting directions for future research. An 
important question in the literature is whether or not openness leads to more economic 
growth. The introduction of this dissertation explained that trade should generally lead to a 
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higher level of productivity, but there is no consensus yet over the effect on the growth of 
productivity. A potentially relevant issue in this discussion is the way openness is 
measured. With the traditional definition of openness, which is the ratio between the total 
international trade flow and the GDP of a country, the most open countries are generally 
very small countries. This is partly caused by the definition of openness. If two countries 
would be exactly the same, except for their size, the smaller country will have a higher ratio 
between international trade and openness, simply because a larger share of the trade 
transactions will be defined as international. A suggestion for future research could be to 
adjust the openness measure for the size of countries. This could provide a better indication 
of the attitude of the country to international trade, which can be the result of, for example, 
trade restrictions and the quality of institutions.  
Second, the theoretical argument for the existence of a positive relationship between 
openness and economic growth, is that countries that trade more will have better access to 
knowledge which benefits technological progress and growth. A suggestion for future 
research would be to focus on the number of product varieties that a country imports, rather 
than using total trade. A country that trades relatively much to its GDP, but only imports 
one product, like oil, is unlikely to benefit from technological advances made in other 
countries through its imports. Using data on the number of import varieties could 
potentially improve existing insights on the relationship between openness and economic 
growth. 
An interesting research direction related to Chapter 2, is the possibility of creating 
more homogeneous product groups than the classification into three groups proposed by 
Rauch (1999). These product groups can be classified based on key characteristics of 
gravity equations estimated for these groups. A recent study by Lankhuizen et al. (2012) 
created an endogenous classification of product groups and showed that there are large 
differences in the sensitivities to distance between product groups at the SITC 3 digit level. 
A similar analysis could be performed at an even more disaggregate level of product 
groups. More attention can also be given to the proximity-concentration trade-off (see, e.g., 
Lankhuizen et al., 2011). This dissertation considered trade in isolation and thus neglected 
foreign direct investments as an alternative mode of entering foreign markets. Also for 
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foreign direct investments, the pay-off from considering investments at a disaggregate level 
is likely to be substantial, although data problems are particularly severe in this research 
domain.  
The gravity analysis of this dissertation could also be extended by adding data on 
trust between countries. Trust can help to reduce transaction costs, which increases trade 
(Den Butter and Mosch, 2003). Guiso et al. (2009) also find a positive relationship between 
trust and trade. Trust could be particularly important for very heterogeneous products. This 
type of products may require complicated contracts. Creating such contracts can be 
expensive, and trust can act as a replacement for very long contracts, which reduces the 
costs. Therefore, it is expected that bilateral trust has a positive relationship with bilateral 
trade for heterogeneous products. If this is the case, it is also interesting to investigate how 
the current tensions within the euro zone affect trust between the member countries and the 
bilateral trade levels. 
The analysis on outsourcing can be further improved by creating a better indicator for 
outsourcing. Chapters 3 and 4 use a binary variable, which indicates whether a firm 
outsourced in the period 2001–2006. This variable does not contain any information on the 
timing and the intensity of outsourcing. This kind of information could considerably 
improve the quality of the estimations. Moreover, more attention can be given to the 
relationship between outsourcing and vertical FDI. Chapter 2 already discussed the 
proximity-concentration trade-off, which means that firms can use horizontal foreign direct 
investments as an alternative for exports. Vertical foreign direct investments can be used as 
an alternative for outsourcing. 
The chapter on ethnic diversity and firm productivity has two interesting directions 
for future research. First, the diversity measure used in this chapter for ethnic diversity, can 
also be applied to other types of diversity. For example, it is also possible to determine the 
diversity within firms of gender, age, education level or field of education of the 
employees. This makes it possible to study the effects of these types of diversity on 
productivity. The arguments that suggest a relationship between ethnic diversity and 
productivity, like a higher variety of skills and ideas, can also be applied to these types of 
diversity. Besides diversity, one can also look at the effect on productivity of the share of 
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these types of employees rather than at the diversity. This type of research could, for 
example, answer the question whether women are underpaid compared to men, or whether 
older employees are overpaid for their level of productivity, as was suggested by the results 
of Chapter 4.  
A second direction for future research related to ethnic diversity, is the relationship 
with trade. The search/network theory from Rauch (1999), which was discussed in Chapter 
2, suggests that having networks in foreign countries is relevant for trade. The results from 
Chapter 2 confirm the network/search theory. Immigrants often have networks in their 
home country, which implies that immigrants could lead to an increase of trade. It is 
interesting to investigate whether this relationship is also present at the level of the firm. 
The hypothesis is that immigrant employees can use their networks in their home countries 
to establish trade contracts for the firm they work for. The results from Chapter 5 already 
give some indication that firms that export benefit more from foreign-born employees than 
firms that do not export. The analysis of this chapter only used data on the share of output 
that was exported, and not on imports or on the destination of exports. The relationship 
between foreign-born employees and firm-level trade can be explored further by using data 
on both the origin of employees as well as data on the origins of imports and the 
destinations of exports.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Globalisering en Productiviteit 
Inzichten over Heterogene Bedrijven, Werknemers en Producten 
 
Globalisering houdt in dat landen steeds verder met elkaar geïntegreerd raken. Deze 
ontwikkeling heeft grote gevolgen voor de economische structuur van de wereld. Het 
afnemende belang van landsgrenzen heeft positieve gevolgen voor de wereldwijde 
welvaart, bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van toenemende specialisatie, een betere allocatie van 
arbeid en kapitaal, of doordat technologie sneller wordt verspreid. Tegelijkertijd kan 
globalisering negatieve effecten hebben, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van transitiewerkloosheid 
en herverdelingseffecten. Het Internationaal Monetair Fonds (IMF) onderscheidt vier 
belangrijke vormen van economische globalisering: handel, kapitaalstromen, migratie en de 
verspreiding van kennis (IMF, 2000). De onderwerpen die in deze dissertatie worden 
behandeld hebben vooral betrekking op handel en migratie. De verspreiding van kennis 
komt indirect ook aan bod doordat handel en migratie de verspreiding van kennis kunnen 
bevorderen.  
Hoewel globalisering op meerdere manieren tot uiting komt, is handel vaak het eerste 
waarmee globalisering wordt geassocieerd. De wereldhandel in goederen is vanaf de 
tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw sterk toegenomen. Tussen 1950 en 2008 steeg de reële 
wereldhandel in goederen gemiddeld met 6,4 procent per jaar, terwijl de totale reële 
productie van de wereld in die periode gemiddeld met 4,0 procent per jaar toenam. De 
sterke stijging van de omvang van handelsstromen is grotendeels het gevolg van 
technologische ontwikkelingen. Belangrijke ontwikkelingen in de twintigste eeuw die 
hebben bijgedragen aan de toegenomen integratie van de wereldeconomie zijn 
ontwikkelingen op het gebied van transport en communicatie, aangezien deze hebben 
geleid tot een sterke daling van transactiekosten. Ook het beleidsmatig verminderen van 
belemmeringen van internationale transacties, zoals bijvoorbeeld door de oprichting van de 
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‘World Trade Organization’ (WTO) en de Europese interne markt, heeft bijgedragen aan de 
toegenomen economische integratie.  
De meeste hoofdstukken in deze dissertatie richten zich op de gevolgen van 
globalisering voor Nederland. Nederland heeft een lange geschiedenis als handelsnatie die 
teruggaat tot de Gouden Eeuw (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 2003). 
De handel leverde een belangrijke bijdrage aan de relatief hoge welvaart in die periode. 
Ook nu is Nederland één van de meest geïntegreerde landen ter wereld. Volgens de KOF 
globaliseringsindex had Nederland in 2009 de zesde positie voor wat betreft economische 
globalisering en de derde positie voor wat betreft algemene globalisering. Globalisering is 
dus in het bijzonder relevant voor Nederland.  
Een belangrijk thema van deze dissertatie is de relatie tussen globalisering en 
productiviteit. Een toename van de economische integratie van de wereld kan de 
productiviteit verhogen doordat het mogelijkheden biedt voor specialisatie: in een volledig 
geïntegreerde wereld kan de productie daar plaatsvinden waar deze relatief het goedkoopst 
is. Bovendien leidt vrij verkeer van arbeid en kapitaal tot een betere allocatie van deze 
middelen. Een ander belangrijk thema van deze dissertatie is heterogeniteit. In de 
neoklassieke economische theorie wordt doorgaans aangenomen dat bedrijven en arbeiders 
homogeen zijn. In werkelijkheid zijn niet alle bedrijven en arbeiders homogeen, en in de 
recente economische literatuur wordt de aanname van homogeniteit steeds vaker losgelaten. 
De microdata die zijn gebruikt voor deze dissertatie maken het mogelijk om deze 
heterogeniteit te onderzoeken.  
Deze dissertatie bestaat uit vier hoofdstukken, waarin drie onderzoeksvragen aan de 
orde komen: (i) Op welke manier spelen fysieke, economische, culturele en institutionele 
afstand een rol als barrières voor internationale handel, en is de invloed van deze vormen 
van afstand verschillend tussen verschillende productgroepen? Barrières voor internationale 
handel zijn een relevant onderwerp, omdat zij leiden tot een suboptimale hoeveelheid 
internationale handel. Handel zorgt niet alleen voor een hoger niveau van productiviteit, 
zoals al door Ricardo (1817) is aangetoond, maar mogelijk ook tot een hogere groei van 
productiviteit, doordat handel een positief effect heeft op de verspreiding van nieuwe 
technologieën en productieprocessen; (ii) Wat zijn de eigenschappen van bedrijven die 
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activiteiten uitbesteden, en hoe beïnvloedt het uitbesteden van activiteiten de productiviteit 
van bedrijven en de kans dat werknemers onvrijwillig hun baan kwijt raken? Deze 
onderzoeksvraag wordt behandeld in twee hoofdstukken, waarvan één betrekking heeft op 
bedrijfsproductiviteit en één op de kans op onvrijwillig ontslag. Beide onderwerpen hebben 
een relatie met productiviteit. De kans op ontslag is bijvoorbeeld van invloed op de 
werkloosheid, en is via die weg relevant voor de totale productiviteit van een land; (iii) Hoe 
beïnvloedt etnische diversiteit binnen bedrijven de productiviteit van bedrijven? Etnische 
diversiteit kan zowel een positief als een negatief verband hebben met 
bedrijfsproductiviteit. Er kan sprake zijn van een positief verband doordat een diverse 
groep mensen beter in staat is tot innovatie en creativiteit. Hogere communicatiekosten en 
culturele verschillen zouden juist kunnen leiden tot een lagere bedrijfsproductiviteit.  
De eerste onderzoeksvraag wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 2. In dit hoofdstuk wordt 
gebruik gemaakt van een graviteitsmodel voor internationale handel. Dit model ontleent 
zijn naam aan de gravitatiewet van Newton, die stelt dat de zwaartekracht tussen twee 
objecten afhangt van de massa van de objecten en de afstand ertussen. Een graviteitsmodel 
voor internationale handel schat de omvang van een handelsstroom tussen twee landen als 
functie van de economische omvang van de landen en de afstand tussen beide landen. Een 
belangrijke bijdrage van hoofdstuk 2 is dat een ruime interpretatie van afstand wordt 
gehanteerd. Er wordt niet alleen gekeken naar de geografische afstand tussen twee landen, 
maar ook naar de economische, culturele en institutionele afstand. Daarnaast wordt in het 
bijzonder aandacht gegeven aan de heterogene effecten van deze vormen van afstand voor 
verschillende producttypen. Hierbij wordt bijvoorbeeld onderscheid gemaakt tussen 
homogene producten die worden verhandeld op georganiseerde markten, producten 
waarvoor een referentieprijs bestaat, en gedifferentieerde producten.  
De schattingsresultaten van het graviteitsmodel laten zien dat landen gemiddeld 
ongeveer 80 procent meer handel met elkaar drijven dan landen die geen 
gemeenschappelijke taal of koloniaal verleden hebben. Het belang hiervan is groter voor de 
groep met gedifferentieerde producten. Dit bevestigt de netwerk- en zoektheorie van Rauch 
(1999), die stelt dat zoekkosten relevanter zijn voor gedifferentieerde producten. Voor 
homogene producten die op georganiseerde markten worden verhandeld zijn deze kosten 
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immers veel minder relevant omdat er kan worden gehandeld in standaardcontracten. 
Geografische afstand blijkt juist belangrijker te zijn voor homogene producten dan voor 
gedifferentieerde producten. Dit onderstreept het belang van de niet-traditionele vormen 
van afstand bij gedifferentieerde producten. Daarnaast blijkt uit de analyse dat voor de 
handel in homogene producten geldt dat culturele afstand een negatief effect heeft en dat 
institutionele afstand een positief effect heeft. Wanneer de producten worden opgedeeld in 
tien groepen, blijkt dat voor negen van de tien groepen een negatief verband tussen handel 
en culturele afstand wordt gevonden.  
De tweede onderzoeksvraag heeft betrekking op de gevolgen van uitbesteding op de 
productiviteit van bedrijven en op de kans op onvrijwillig ontslag van werknemers. 
Bedrijven zouden hun productiviteit door uitbesteding kunnen verhogen, maar als de 
ontslagkans van werknemers hierdoor toeneemt kan dat leiden tot extra werkloosheid. De 
relatie tussen uitbesteding en bedrijfsproductiviteit wordt behandeld in hoofdstuk 3. 
Uitbesteding is relevant voor productiviteit, omdat het leidt tot een verdere specialisatie. Bij 
uitbesteding is de afruil tussen productiekosten en transactiekosten relevant. Door 
uitbesteding van bepaalde activiteiten kunnen de productiekosten namelijk dalen terwijl de 
transactiekosten toenemen. In dit hoofdstuk wordt gekeken of bedrijven die activiteiten 
uitbesteden meer of minder productief zijn dan bedrijven die dat niet doen, en of een 
productiviteitsverschil mogelijk het gevolg is van een selectie-effect. Er is in hoofdstuk 3 
gebruik gemaakt van een enquête uit 2007 onder ongeveer duizend bedrijven. Deze 
bedrijven hebben aangegeven of zij in de periode 2001–2006 activiteiten hebben uitbesteed, 
wat voor type activiteiten zij hebben uitbesteed, en of het binnenlandse of internationale 
uitbesteding betrof. Er is naar verschillende maatstaven voor productiviteit gekeken, zoals 
de arbeidsproductiviteit per eenheid arbeid, de arbeidsproductiviteit per eenheid aan 
arbeidskosten, en naar de totale factorproductiviteit. De totale factorproductiviteit is de 
meest relevante maatstaf, omdat deze maatstaf ook rekening houdt met de hoeveelheid 
kapitaal en intermediaire leveringen die een bedrijf gebruikt.  
De resultaten uit hoofdstuk 3 laten zien dat grotere bedrijven gemiddeld productiever 
zijn dan kleine bedrijven. Een stijging van de omvang van een bedrijf met 1 procent gaat 
gemiddeld gepaard met een stijging van de totale factorproductiviteit met 0,22 procent. Het 
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verband tussen totale factorproductiviteit en uitbesteding hangt sterk af van het type 
uitbesteding. Het sterkste verband is gevonden tussen bedrijven die ondersteunende 
activiteiten naar het buitenland hebben uitbesteed: deze bedrijven hadden een statistisch 
significant hogere totale factorproductiviteit. Deze bedrijven hadden echter ook al een 
hogere productiviteit voordat ze begonnen met het uitbesteden van activiteiten, wat 
impliceert dat productievere bedrijven zichzelf selecteren. Voor de andere drie typen van 
uitbesteding is geen bewijs voor een selectie-effect gevonden. Daarnaast is ook gekeken 
wat het effect van uitbesteding was op de productiviteit van bedrijven door de bedrijven 
over de tijd te volgen en te corrigeren voor alle tijdsinvariante bedrijfskenmerken. Uit deze 
analyse blijkt dat de productiviteit is toegenomen in bedrijven die ondersteunende 
activiteiten hebben uitbesteed binnen Nederland en dat de productiviteit is afgenomen in 
bedrijven die kernactiviteiten (internationaal) hebben uitbesteed. Een mogelijke verklaring 
hiervoor is dat het uitbesteden van deze activiteiten meer kosten met zich meebracht dan 
verwacht, bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van culturele verschillen, die ook zijn besproken in 
relatie tot handel in hoofdstuk 2.  
Het tweede deel van de onderzoeksvraag over uitbesteding heeft betrekking op de 
kans dat werknemers hun baan onvrijwillig kwijtraken. Dit onderwerp wordt onderzocht in 
hoofdstuk 4. Hoewel uitbesteding als gevolg van een hogere specialisatie zou moeten 
zorgen voor een hogere productiviteit, is de keerzijde dat het kan zorgen voor 
transitiewerkloosheid. Het risico dat werknemers werkloos raken als gevolg van 
uitbesteding is in het publieke debat met name relevant voor internationale uitbesteding, 
doordat het beeld bestaat dat Nederland een baan kwijtraakt aan het buitenland. Hoewel 
dergelijke ontwikkelingen op lange termijn geen effect zouden moeten hebben op het 
evenwicht op de arbeidsmarkt, kan dit op korte termijn wel leiden tot een hogere 
werkloosheid en tot herverdelingseffecten.  
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt de relatie tussen uitbesteding en de kans op onvrijwillige 
werkloosheid onderzocht door gegevens over werkloosheidsuitkeringen te combineren met 
gegevens uit de enquête over uitbesteding. In het hoofdstuk is gebruik gemaakt van een 
‘Cox proportional hazard model’ (Cox, 1972). Dit model maakt het mogelijk om de kans 
op onvrijwillig ontslag te schatten, waarbij rekening gehouden wordt met de duur van een 
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baan, eigenschappen van de bedrijven, en eigenschappen van de werknemers. De 
schattingsresultaten laten zien dat het risico op onvrijwillige werkloosheid relatief hoog is 
voor werknemers die kort bij een bedrijf werken en voor werknemers die juist lang bij een 
bedrijf werken. Het risico op onvrijwillige werkloosheid is het laagst voor werknemers die 
tussen de 10 en 25 jaar bij een bedrijf werken. Dat werknemers met een kort dienstverband 
een hoger risico op ontslag hebben heeft er onder andere mee te maken dat zij vaker 
tijdelijke contracten hebben en dat bedrijven bij reorganisaties vaak eerst de werknemers 
ontslaan die het laatst zijn aangenomen. Daarnaast blijkt de kans op onvrijwillige 
werkloosheid hoger te zijn voor vrouwen, jonge werknemers, en buitenlandse werknemers 
die geboren zijn in een land met relatief lage inkomens. De kans op onvrijwillige 
werkloosheid lijkt niet hoger te zijn bij bedrijven die uitbesteden. Echter, dit resultaat wordt 
veroorzaakt door een positief effect van binnenlandse uitbesteding en een negatief effect 
van internationale uitbesteding. Werknemers die werkten voor een bedrijf dat activiteiten 
naar het buitenland heeft uitbesteed, hadden 32 procent minder kans op onvrijwillige 
werkloosheid. Voor werknemers die werkten voor een bedrijf dat activiteiten binnen 
Nederland heeft uitbesteed was die kans juist 52 procent hoger. Mogelijk komt dit doordat 
bedrijven die activiteiten internationaal uitbesteden meer mogelijkheden hebben om 
werknemers een andere functie te geven doordat ze relatief hard groeien.  
Daarnaast is ook gekeken of werknemers die hun baan kwijt zijn geraakt bij een 
bedrijf dat activiteiten heeft uitbesteed een andere kans hebben om weer een baan te 
vinden. De kans op het vinden van een nieuwe baan blijkt lager te zijn voor vrouwen, 
ouderen, mensen die in hun vorige baan een relatief hoog loon kregen, en mensen die 
geboren zijn in het buitenland. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is dat deze groepen 
minder noodzaak hebben om snel een nieuwe baan te zoeken of dat ze minder snel geneigd 
zijn om een nieuwe baan te accepteren. Vrouwen zouden bijvoorbeeld langer kunnen 
zoeken doordat ze vaker dan mannen de tweede verdiener van een huishouden zijn. Het is 
ook mogelijk dat deze groepen meer moeite hebben met het vinden van een nieuwe baan. 
Mensen die in het buitenland zijn geboren zouden bijvoorbeeld meer moeite kunnen hebben 
met het vinden van een nieuwe baan doordat zij minder goed Nederlands spreken. En 
ouderen hebben mogelijk meer moeite met het vinden van een nieuwe baan doordat er een 
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verschil bestaat tussen hun loon en hun productiviteit. Daarnaast zijn mensen die een lange 
tijd bij dezelfde werkgever hebben gewerkt relatief sterk afhankelijk van bedrijfsspecifiek 
kapitaal dat minder bruikbaar is voor een nieuwe baan bij een andere werkgever.  
De kans op het vinden van een nieuwe baan blijkt niet af te hangen van de vraag of de 
voormalige werkgever activiteiten heeft uitbesteed binnen Nederland. Voor werknemers die 
hun baan zijn kwijtgeraakt bij een bedrijf dat activiteiten naar het buitenland heeft 
uitbesteed, blijkt de kans op het vinden van een nieuwe baan ongeveer negen procent 
kleiner te zijn. Dit komt waarschijnlijk doordat Nederland een comparatief kostennadeel 
heeft in het type banen dat verloren gaat door internationale uitbesteding. Het wordt 
daardoor lastiger om een vergelijkbare baan te vinden in Nederland, en deze werknemers 
moeten mogelijk eerst hun vaardigheden aanpassen, waardoor het langer kan duren voordat 
zij weer een baan vinden.  
De derde onderzoeksvraag betreft het verband tussen etnische diversiteit binnen 
bedrijven en de productiviteit van bedrijven. Uit verschillende studies is gebleken dat er op 
het niveau van steden een positief verband bestaat tussen etnische diversiteit en 
productiviteit. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is het bestaan van een dergelijk verband 
op het niveau van bedrijven. De maatstaf voor productiviteit die in dit hoofdstuk is gebruikt 
is totale factorproductiviteit, net als in hoofdstuk 3. Etnische diversiteit is gemeten als de 
kans dat twee willekeurig geselecteerde werknemers uit hetzelfde bedrijf in een 
verschillend land geboren zijn.  
De resultaten uit hoofdstuk 5 laten zien dat bedrijven die relatief productief zijn, 
gemiddeld ook groter zijn, een grotere diversiteit hebben, en vaker exporteren. Echter, als 
de productiviteit van bedrijven wordt geschat door deze drie variabelen simultaan op te 
nemen in het model, blijkt het verband tussen productiviteit en diversiteit negatief. 
Wanneer diversiteit wordt opgesplitst in het aandeel werknemers dat in het buitenland is 
geboren en de diversiteit van deze groep werknemers, blijkt dat het eerste een negatief 
verband met productiviteit heeft en het tweede een positief verband. Wanneer de 
schattingen worden uitgevoerd door te corrigeren voor alle tijdsinvariante kenmerken van 
bedrijven, verdwijnen bovenstaande verbanden grotendeels. Deze resultaten impliceren dat 
het door eerdere studies gevonden verband tussen diversiteit en productiviteit op hogere 
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aggregatieniveaus kan worden verklaard door het bestaan van een dergelijk verband op het 
niveau van bedrijven. Mogelijk zijn op het niveau van bedrijven andere vormen van 
diversiteit, zoals diversiteit in opleidingsniveau of opleidingsrichting, relevanter voor de 
productiviteit.  
Een tweede resultaat uit hoofdstuk 5 is dat bedrijven die exporteren relatief meer 
voordeel lijken te hebben van een divers werknemersbestand, na correctie voor het 
gevonden positieve verband tussen productiviteit en export en het negatieve verband tussen 
productiviteit en diversiteit. Hoe groter het aandeel van de omzet dat een bedrijf uit het 
buitenland haalt, hoe groter dit effect lijkt te zijn. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is dat 
buitenlandse werknemers beter in staat zijn om succesvolle contracten te sluiten met 
klanten uit hun geboorteland. Dit kan bijvoorbeeld komen door lagere communicatiekosten, 
doordat zij meer kennis hebben van de cultuur, of doordat zij een netwerk hebben waardoor 
ze potentiële klanten makkelijker kunnen bereiken. Hoofdstuk 2 liet reeds zien dat 
dergelijke kosten belangrijke determinanten van handel zijn.  
In deze dissertatie is onderzocht wat de gevolgen van een aantal vormen van 
globalisering zijn voor productiviteit op microniveau. Dit was mogelijk dankzij toegang tot 
unieke microdata over Nederlandse bedrijven en werknemers. In deze dissertatie is hierbij 
vooral gekeken naar uitbesteding en migratie. De toenemende beschikbaarheid van 
microdata biedt ook mogelijkheden voor vervolgonderzoek naar de micro-economische 
effecten van andere vormen van globalisering, zoals kapitaalstromen en de diffusie van 
kennis. Hoewel in sommige gevallen, zoals bij etnische diversiteit, geen duidelijk positief 
verband gevonden is met bedrijfsproductiviteit wordt een dergelijk verband wel vaak 
gevonden op macroniveau. De mechanismen die tot deze verbanden op macroniveau leiden 
zijn een ander interessant onderwerp voor vervolgonderzoek. Daarnaast heeft deze 
dissertatie het belang van heterogeniteit onderstreept. Een voorbeeld hiervan zijn de grote 
verschillen in bedrijfsproductiviteit, wat aantoont dat niet alle bedrijven gelijk zijn. Dit is 
van belang voor economische modellen waarin bedrijven vaak nog homogeen worden 
verondersteld. Een ander voorbeeld is de heterogeniteit tussen regio’s, sectoren en 
productgroepen. Deze dissertatie laat zien dat resultaten die op macroniveau gevonden 
worden sterk heterogeen kunnen zijn op lagere aggregatieniveaus.  
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